Pg 8010
(“[T]he final product of the bargaining process
may constitute evidence of a breach of duty only if it can be
fairly characterized as so far outside a ‘wide range of reasonableness,’
that it is wholly ‘irrational’ or ‘arbitrary.’ ”
As a published case, this will be precedent.
You didn't happen to notice that only the "wide range of reasonableness", "irrational", and "arbitrary" was in quotes, did you? Attributed to SCOTUS in Ford v Huffman (ironically, a DFR case claiming DFR because the union put employees with less LOS ahead of employees with more which the SCOTUS found to be fine). Let me give you the whole quote from Huffman:
"A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents,
subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion."
In ALPA v O'Neill, which the 9th quoted for the "final product" terminology, SCOTUS said:
"We granted certiorari to clarify the standard that governs a claim that a union has breached its duty of fair representation in its negotiation of a back-to-work agreement terminating a strike. We hold that the rule announced in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190, 87 S.Ct. 903, 916, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967)—
that a union breaches its duty of fair representation if its actions are either "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith"—applies to all union activity, including contract negotiation.
We further hold that a union's actions are arbitrary only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of the union's actions, the union's behavior is so far outside a "wide range of reasonableness," Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338, 73 S.Ct. 681, 686, 97 L.Ed. 1048 (1953), as to be irrational."
and:
"The statutory duty of fair representation was developed over 20 years ago in a series of cases involving alleged racial discrimination by unions certified as exclusive bargaining representatives under the Railway Labor Act, see Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 [65 S.Ct. 226]; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 [65 S.Ct. 235, 89 L.Ed. 187 (1944) ], and was soon extended to unions certified under the N.L.R.A., see Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, supra.
Under this doctrine, the exclusive agent's statutory authority to represent all members of a designated unit includes a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct."
So as you can see, SCOTUS clearly outlines a three-prong test for DFR - arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith. The "within a wide range of reasonableness" applies to the arbitrary prong only.
Scotus does carry more weight than the 9th, right?
Jim