OPINION: MEMORANDUM ORDER JED S. RAKOFF, U.S.D.J.
Pending before the Court is defendants' motion for summary judgment. The pertinent facts, either undisputed or taken most favorably to plaintiffs, are as follows.
At all times relevant, plaintiffs Larry Waldon, Charles Lynn, and Gary Schaible were employed as aircraft maintenance technicians by American Airlines and were members of defendants the Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO and its division the Air Transport Workers Union of America (collectively "TWU").
Beginning in October 1998, plaintiffs, along with others, launched a campaign to change their collective bargaining representative from the TWU to the Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Association ("AMFA"). In conjunction with this campaign, plaintiffs ceased paying their union dues to the TWU.
In response, the TWU brought charges against the plaintiffs, not for non-payment of dues but rather for their pro-AMFA activity. The TWU Constitution provides that "advocating or attempting to bring about the withdrawal from the International Union of . . . any member or group of members" or "working in the interest of or accepting membership in any organization dual to the International Union" is grounds for internal union discipline. See Affidavit of John Kerrigan, dated May 24, 2001, Ex. 2 (TWU Constitution), at 59-62. In August 1999, TWU Local 567 charged Waldon and Schaible with violating these provisions of the TWU Constitution by wearing pro-AMFA tee-shirts on the job, and TWU Local 514 similarly charged Lynn with violating these provisions by wearing pro-AMFA tee-shirts and by "talking to other [TWU] members about the AMFA and signing yellow [union authorization] cards [for the AMFA]."
All three plaintiffs were tried and found guilty by their respective locals. As punishment, they were adjudged "in bad standing" for three years. Under the TWU Constitution, "any member in bad standing" is "ineligible to attend Union meetings, to be a candidate for or hold any Union Office or position, or to vote in any Union election or referendum, or otherwise to participate in Union affairs."
[Small fines were also imposed on Waldon and Schaible, but not on Lynn.]
On appeal by Schaible and Lynn, n2 the TWU International Committee on Appeals ("Appeals Committee"), while affirming the findings of guilty, held that the status of being "in bad standing" could not be imposed as a penalty for the particular charges brought against Schaible and Lynn, but that most of the same penalties that accompanied being in "bad standing" could independently be imposed for these charges. Accordingly, the Appeals Committee affirmed the punishment to the extent that Schaible and Lynn were disabled for three years from holding or voting for any union office or position and from attending or taking part in any union meeting, function, or referendum except for mail ballot ratification of a collective bargaining agreement or amendment thereto or a meeting called for that purpose.
Meanwhile, all three plaintiffs continued their aforementioned refusal to pay their union dues. When, ultimately, the TWU demanded payment, plaintiffs themselves filed grievances with their respective Locals, arguing that they were no longer under any obligation to pay such dues because, as a result of the aforementioned penalties, union membership was "not available" to them "upon the same terms and conditions as are generally applicable to any other members," as required by Section 2, Eleventh (a) of the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. § 152.
Lynn's grievance, filed with Local 514, was referred to an arbitrator, who, on January 6, 2000, denied it. While Lynn and Schaible (but not Waldon) then paid their back dues "in protest," all three thereupon commenced the instant action, seeking, inter alia, a declaration that it is unlawful for the TWU to demand payment of union dues while plaintiffs' membership rights are curtailed as a result of the discipline imposed for their pro-AMFA activities. Importantly, however, they do not seek to raise, at least in this lawsuit, any claim that the underlying discipline was itself unlawfully imposed. Rather, plaintiffs' position, reduced to its essence, is that any union member who, for whatever reason, receives union discipline that takes the form of a loss of membership rights thereby no longer enjoys membership on the "same terms and conditions as are generally applicable to any other member" and therefore, under Section 2, Eleventh (a) of the RLA, no longer has any obligation to pay membership dues as a condition of continued membership in the union and continued employment.
This position, however, fundamentally misconceives Section 2, Eleventh (a), which simply requires that union membership be made available on equal terms and conditions to all who wish to join a union, see 42 U.S.C. § 152, but not that, having so joined, a member may evade the obligation to pay dues by violating the responsibilities of a union member and being disciplined therefor. Any other interpretation would threaten both the financial stability of labor organizations and their ability to maintain discipline among the rank and file, leading to the absurd result that any union member seeking to avoid paying union dues could do so simply by breaking the rules of the union and accepting discipline. It would also be inconsistent with the plain language of the Section 2, Eleventh (a), which speaks only of making membership "available" on equal terms and conditions, rather than maintaining such equality regardless of the conduct of individual union members.
Plaintiffs rely heavily on Fenderson v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants, 743 F. Supp. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), which ruled that a union violated Section 2, Eleventh (a) of the RLA when it limited the voting powers of new union members until a certain time period had elapsed. Plaintiffs' reliance on Fenderson is misplaced, however, for it clearly concerns discrimination in the terms and conditions under which union membership is made available to new members, and not, as here, restrictions on membership rights imposed on existing members as a form of discipline for violating union rules. As for the other cases on which plaintiffs rely, such as Klemens v. Air Line Pilots Assoc. Int'l., 736 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1984), they are even further removed from the instant issue.
Much closer on point is Gilbert v. National Labor Relations Board, 312 U.S. App. D.C. 368, 56 F.3d 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In that case, the plaintiff similarly argued that because he was disciplined by the union for disloyalty and thus barred from holding office and attending union meetings, he did not have to pay membership dues under Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (a section that has been held to be "in all material respect identical" to Section 2, Eleventh (a) of the RLA, see Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745, 101 L. Ed. 2d 634, 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988)). As the D.C. Circuit stated in Gilbert, "the mere fact that Gilbert was deprived of certain membership privileges as discipline for violating valid internal Union rules that applied uniformly to every other member does not mean that membership was not 'available' to Gilbert on the same terms and conditions as other employees," or that he was therefore excused from paying his dues. Gilbert, 56 F.3d at 1444-45. The Court finds this reasoning persuasive and, here, dispositive.
Accordingly, the Court hereby grants defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismisses the Complaint in its entirety. Clerk to enter judgment.
Correspondingly, plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment, also pending before the Court, is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED. JED S. RAKOFF, U.S.D.J.
And here I've been operating for so very many years under the impression that the proper term was ignorant dipshi-t 😉 Thanks for clearing that up 😉
You guys have a beautiful campus.
