Arbitration, in the context of United States law, is a form of alternative dispute resolution — specifically, a legal alternative to litigation whereby the parties to a dispute agree to submit their respective positions (through agreement or hearing) to a neutral third party (the arbitrator(s) or arbiter(s)) for resolution. In practice arbitration is generally used as a substitute for judicial systems, particularly when the judicial processes are viewed as too slow, expensive or biased. Arbitration is also used by communities which lack formal law, as a substitute for formal law.
Hey 700UW, I'm glad you showed up! That's a great definition. Have you seen the merits briefs for Hall Street Associates v. Mattel?
Here is the link.
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/bri...ov07.shtml#hall
This is going to be the "case of the century" according to Souter.
Questions Presented
1. Did the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals err when it held, in conflict with several other federal Courts of Appeals, that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAAâ€) precludes a federal court from enforcing the parties’ clearly expressed agreement providing for more expansive judicial review of an arbitration award than the narrow standard of review otherwise provided for in the FAA?
Throughout modern day courts in the 20th century there has always been a tug of war between government courts and independent courts...aka arbitrative "courts" over the finality of its descisions. I am certainly going to follow this case. Arbitration takes away business from the court system. I'm sure they think it cuts into their territory. Can you say "Godfather"?
The following quote comes from the respondents brief:
"Petitioner’s reliance on W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757 (1983), to claim that this Court has recognized a public policy exception to Section 9 of the FAA is also misplaced because that case did not involve the FAA. It dealt with the
enforcement of arbitration awards made pursuant to collective bargaining agreements. As explained by the Court in the Steelworkers’ Trilogy, that body of arbitration case law
is rooted in federal common law and not an arbitration-specific statute. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). It thus does not bear on the correct interpretation of the FAA."
The Federal Arbitration Act is an arbitration-specific statute. Just to enhance this along further, ALPA policy as explained before is EXTERNAL to the contract because the policy is used to determine how a SPECIFIC Section of the CONTRACT will be written or negotiated. The award would be written into the contract...NOT the policy.
Here is a footnote in the Petitioners brief:
Other circuits have not squarely addressed the enforceability of judicial review provisions in arbitration agreements. For example, in Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1504-05 (7th Cir. 1991), the Seventh Circuit stated in dicta that the
parties “cannot contract for a judicial review†of a labor arbitration award “because federal jurisdiction cannot be created by contract.†Id. at 1505. That case did not involve an agreement to expand judicial review, did not involve the FAA and is inapposite because the FAA, unlike Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, does not create an independent basis for federal question jurisdiction. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 26 (so stating).
One might wonder why anything "fair" so easilly finds itself next to any notions of "swallowing"? 
