Nic,
I realize that you hang your hat on this language but your analysis is distorted and tourtured. Yes there is an unquestionably riipe basis for a DFR claim. There is not a ripe DFR claim. That claim is dead and even judge Wake asked your good Dr. about the question of this claim rising from the dead, and it aint gonna happen. You can bring a new one but Addington I is dead and the findings of Judge Wake in that case will not will not be avaible to the plaintiffs in Addington II.
Addington II will be a whole new ball game and the genisis of USAPA will not be an issue. The Ninth Circuit quoted ALPA v. O'neil and stated that the Final Product of bargaining is the basis of measurement of the DFR standard.
2. The final product of the bargaining process may constitute evidence of a breach of the fair representation duty only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape, it can be fairly characterized as so far outside of a "wide range of reasonableness," Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 330, 345 U. S. 338, that it is wholly "irrational" or "arbitrary." The Court of Appeals' refinement of the arbitrariness component authorizes more judicial review of the substance of negotiated agreements than is consistent with national labor policy. Congress did not intend judicial review of a union's performance to permit the court to substitute its own view of the proper bargain for that reached by the union. See, e.g., NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U. S. 477, 361 U. S. 488. Rather, Congress envisioned the relationship between the courts and labor unions as similar to that between the courts and the legislature. See Steele, supra, 323 U.S. at 323 U. S. 198. Any substantive examination of a union's performance, therefore, must be highly deferential, recognizing the wide latitude that negotiators need for the effective performance of their bargaining responsibilities. Cf., e.g., Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U. S. 421, 342 U. S. 423. P. 499 U. S. 78.