Description
Flight 1048 departed the TPA terminal 17 minutes late due to previous delays on this aircraft, N111US. All seemed normal to entire crew during initial taxi out. As we neared the runway for departure, Paul Echegaray, the B FA became concerned of smoke building up within the cabin. He attempted to contact the cockpit via the cabin to cockpit call system. His attempts were unnoticed by us, as we never received the cockpit buzzer. Several passengers remarked later, that they had smelled the smoke too, and thought someone onboard was striking matches.
We were cleared for takeoff, and I relinquished the controls to F/O Tifft, for it was his turn to fly. As we reached rotation speed, I heard over the cabin interphone system (which I was monitoring through my Audio Control Panel [ACP]) the B FA call Courtney Camp, the A FA, and state that the cabin was filling with smoke and he had been unsuccessful in notifying the cockpit. She said that she would try. The A FA later stated that she, also, had attempted to call the cockpit via the cabin to cockpit call system with no success.
As soon as we broke ground, I directed F/O Tifft to continue to fly and take over my duties of ATC communications; that we had possible smoke in the cabin and that I must call them immediately. I rang the A FA via the call system, and as I looked down at the ACP to select "Cabin", I notice that the amber light on the ACP was flashing in the Cabin position, indicating that the cabin had called the cockpit at some time prior. Again, we never received any buzzer from the system. This cabin to cockpit call system had failed at a critical time during this event. Had I not been monitoring the interphone, we might not have known of the smoke for some time later.
The A FA informed me that the cabin was completely filled with dense gray smoke, and that she could not see to the back of the aircraft. I informed her that we would return immediately to KTPA.
I returned my attention back to the cockpit and ordered all occupants to don their oxygen masks (there were 2 jumpseat riders in the cockpit). Once communication was established, I declared an Emergency with the KTPA tower, and requested immediate vectors back to land on runway 19R.
One of the Jumpseat riders, USAIRWAYS F/O Joseph McKee, who is an Airbus Rated pilot, was instrumental in our ability to get the aircraft back around quickly, as he assumed any duties I asked of him. The three of us worked harmoniously throughout the event, and without his expertise and "third set of eyes and hands", this event would not have gone as smoothly as it did. We were on the ground in 9 minutes. Landing was uneventful and overweight by approximately 2000 pounds.
The Fire and Rescue Squad was called to follow the landing roll out, and as we slowed I communicated with them about the integrity of the exterior of the aircraft. The Fire and Rescue captain stated the he observed no smoke on the outside of the aircraft. F/O KcKee made a PA (under my direction) to the passengers to "Remain Seated, Remain Seated). I overheard the FA's talking on the Cabin Interphone that the smoke seemed to be dissipating. I then taxied to Gate F-83. We deplaned the passengers normally through the 1L Entry Door.
There were never any ECAM warnings or cautions throughout the flight regime. It was not until after engine shutdown and company mechanics were onboard that any ECAM messages were displayed. I recall that they were AIR PACK 2 FAULT and AIR PACK 2 OVERHEAT.
It took Crew Scheduling two hours to make a decision to give us hotels in TPA.
At approximately 2200, Flight Attendant Debra Ceccarelli informed me that she needed to go the Emergency Room due to severe headache, buzzing lips and light-headedness. I accompanied Ms. Ceccarelli to the ER and after admission, medicine and fluid administration, she was discharged and we returned to the hotel, arriving at approximately 0030 on the 24th.
Cause
The negative safety culture at USAIRWAYS has struck again, and due the high level of experience and quality of the training department, the corporation has, at least for now, dodged a bazooka once again. I believe that this event happened because of this safety culture, as I believe that corners are being cut in the maintenance component repair department, either by sloppy repair work on or aircraft, or inadequate/illegal parts being utilized during repairs. We at USAIRWAYS are seeing too many of these types of events to not go unnoticed by the pilots. Our Safety Culture Survey brought this to light in BIG BOLD LETTERS, and USAIRWAYS management has yet to believe what the pilots are telling them. Why is it that only our aircraft are experiencing an unprecedented amount of this type of event? Why is the company turning a blind eye to the potential neurological damage they are exposing to their crews and passengers; all the while exclaiming that the known permanent health threats are not happening to us (crewmembers) and claiming that our pilots and flight attendants have not been affected! The passengers on board my aircraft during this event were not informed of this potential health risk-not informed that they were possibly exposed to the neurotoxin tricresylphosphate (TCP) through the contaminated air supply. This neurotoxin causes permanent neurological damage (read the health hazards from inhaling TCP [Guide Number 151, Item 2574] in the Emergency Response Guidebook 2008-the Orange book-carried in the cockpit of all USAIRWAYS aircraft).
Another example of the negative safety culture is the fact that I was not contacted by a pilot manager, i.e., a Chief Pilot, after this incident until I made the calls to communicate with a manager. I was finally called by the PHL Chief Pilot's office an hour and forty minutes after the return to field! Again, after I initiated contact-through the Operations Control Center Duty Manager! Crew scheduling was immediately in contact with me attempting to reschedule us for more flying! There is such a disconnect from the crewmembers and management; such an incredulous disrespect and ignorance toward our duties and responsibilities.
After discussing this event with the Bridge at OCC, I was informed that the aircraft was signed off as airworthy and would be flying revenue the next day WITHOUT A TEST FLIGHT BY CHECK PILOTS! That is absurd! Where is the oversight?
SUGGESTIONS
I suggest a complete (and serious) review by management of the safety culture at USAIRWAYS, including re-staffing of the individuals responsible for the negative atmosphere toward the crewmembers. The culture here at USAIRWAYS is such that there is a huge potential for a major accident in the future.
It is apparent that the company is not in tune with our concerns, nor using our skills and observations to make this airline SAFE for the flying, unaware, public. There is NO concern for our safety; only profits for the board of directors and upper management. The time has come for this airline to change the culture and be a part of a team for safety, excellence and respect. The end result just may astonish them!
