US Pilots Labor Discussion

[AWA320]

You are way off on many fronts. First, self interest has been driving this situation all along and it will continue to do so. That's where you Angry F/Os are screwed because you cannot deliver a contract expediently that has DOH. You took a pseudo log jam and created a real log jam. Now there is no West to negotiate with, so the options for all of us is status quo or the Nic. There are more than enough East pilots who are not willing to keep up the fight for DOH if it means LOA 93 into perpetuity. Second, YOU may not think it's fair to put a newhire ahead of an 88 hire, but the fact is that that the 88 hire was on the street and therefore brought no job to the merger. Cleary and Mowery themselves said in a 2003 Airways article that there's not much for furloughs to come back to in a merger situation. Guess what - Cleary and Mowery were right.

Vote no all you want. I'm sure that serves you best but the problem you have is that fighting your DOH battle does not serve the majority of the pilot group. You had your opportunity to cram DOH down the West's throats but you failed. If you don't understand the predicament you're in, then ask Bradford. He understood very well the importance of getting the DOH list solidified into a contract as soon as possible. The West sits well entrenched in the legal high ground. We're well funded and you're no where close to getting released. We eat meat while you Easties eat rice. We can wait.

Eating big boned meat at that. It costs more and since we make more we can afford to eat better.

AWA320 says no to UBS's

 

[BoeingBoy]

So what is it 4 or 18 capts?

4 capt net gain but the gains and loses are in different equipment. The A330 is a wash wiith the number of captains remaining the same by converting 7 reserve spots to blockholder. But since there are 2 333 bases one could gain captain spots while the other balances that out by losing captain spots. That would be true for all the equip except the 190 where all the crews are in one base.

The 76I has the biggest change with a net gain of 9 captain jobs (loses 8 reserve and gains 17 blockholder spots). The 737 loses 3 reserve capt jobs, and the 190 has a net loss of 2 captain jobs (gains 1 blockholder but loses 3 reserve spots.

As in any bid, there will be more changes the the net change would indicate since the net change covers shifts of time, more or fewer blockholder jobs in various bases/equipment. So more people will move around than the 4 net gains, some being displaced while others moving up to fill vacancies.

The net gain/loss is also something of a prediction based on what was known when bid 11-2 came out. For example, 2 captains are shown as early retirements between Apr and May. But until they walk out the door they can change their mind so those anticipated vacancies could disappear.

Jim

 

[nevergiveup]

The truth is ugly and hits a nerve.

Quit the BS about how the East is superior to the West and I'll quit refuting your BS.



NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
USAIR, INC.
BOEING 737-400
LAGUARDIA AIRPORT
FLUSHING, NEW YORK
SEPTEMBER 20, 1989


3.2 Probable Cause
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the
probable cause of this accident was the captain's failure to exercise his
command authority in a timely manner to reject the takeoff or take sufficient
control to continue the takeoff, which was initiated with a mistrimmed
rudder. Also causal was the captain's failure to detect the mistrimmed
rudder before the takeoff was attempted


3. CONCLUSIONS
3.1 Findings
1. The flight and cabin crews were properly certificated and
qualified for the flight.
2. The airplane was certificated, equipped, and maintained in
accordance with Federal regulations and approved procedures.
3. Rudder trim moved full left while the airplane was parked with
engines off at LGA.
4. The captain could have detected the mistrim rudder condition
during taxi, during the flight control freedom-of-movement
check and during the response to a checklist challenge. He
failed to do so.
5. The captain did not use the autobrake system during the
takeoff roll, as recommended by Boeing and USAir management.
His failure to do so delayed the onset of maximum braking and
extended the airplane's stopping distance.
6. Both pilots were relatively inexperienced in their respective
positions. The captain had about 140 hours as a B-737
captain, and the first officer was conducting his first nonsupervised
line takeoff in a B-737, and also his first takeoff
after a 39-days non-flying period.
7. Early in the takeoff attempt, the first officer inadvertently
disarmed the autothrottle. He then manually advanced the
throttles; the resultant delay and the slightly low thrust set
on the left engine lengthened the airplane's ground roll and
added to the directional control problem.
8. The captain's use of the nosewheel steering tiller during the
takeoff roll was not proper and may have masked the initial
directional control problem created by the mistrimmed rudder.
9. Because of poor communication between the pilots, both
attempted to 'maintain directional control initially and
neither was fully in control later in the takeoff, compounding
directional control difficulties.
10. Neither pilot was monitoring indicated airspeed and no
standard airspeed callouts occurred.
56
11. The captain should have been aware of the directional control
problem and should have initiated an RTO before accelerating
to high speed.
12. Unusual noise and vibration from the cocked nosewheel, and the
leftward veer, led the captain to reject the takeoff.
13. Computed VT speed was 125 knots and action by the captain to
reject the takeoff began at 130 knots.
14. After initiating the RTO, the captain used differential
braking to steer the airplane. This delayed the attainment of
effective braking until 5 l/2 seconds after the takeoff was
rejected.
15. Braking during the RTO was less than the maximum braking
achievable on the wet runway; the airplane could have been
stopped on the runway.



NTSB Identification: DCA94MA065 .
The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact Records Management Division
Scheduled 14 CFR USAIR
Accident occurred Saturday, July 02, 1994 in CHARLOTTE, NC
Probable Cause Approval Date: 1/19/1996
Aircraft: DOUGLAS DC-9-31, registration: N954VJ
Injuries: 37 Fatal, 16 Serious, 4 Minor.


The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

1) THE FLIGHTCREW'S DECISION TO CONTINUE AN APPROACH INTO SEVERE CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY THAT WAS CONDUCIVE TO A MICROBURST; 2) THE FLIGHTCREW'S FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE A WINDSHEAR SITUATION IN A TIMELY MANNER; 3)THE FLIGHTCREW'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN THE PROPER AIRPLANE ATTITUDE AND THRUST SETTING NECESSARY TO ESCAPE THE WINDSHEAR; AND 4) THE LACK OF REAL-TIME ADVERSE WEATHER AND WINDSHEAR HAZARD INFORMATION DISSEMINATION FROM AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL, ALL OF WHICH LED TO AN ENCOUNTER WITH AND THE FAILURE TO ESCAPE FROM A MICROBURST-INDUCED WINDSHEAR THAT WAS PRODUCED BY A RAPIDLY DEVELOPING THUNDERSTORM LOCATED AT THE APPROACH END OF RUNWAY 18R. CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WERE: 1) THE LACK OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL PROCEDURES THAT WOULD HAVE REQUIRED THE CONTROLLER TO DISPLAY AND ISSUE AIRPORT SURVEILLANCE RADAR (ASR-9) WEATHER INFORMATION TO THE PILOTS OF FLIGHT 1016; 2) THE CHARLOTTE TOWER SUPERVISOR'S FAILURE TO PROPERLY ADVISE AND ENSURE THAT ALL CONTROLLERS WERE AWARE OF AND REPORTING THE REDUCTION IN VISIBILITY AND RUNWAY VISUAL RANGE VALUE INFORMATION, AND THE LOW LEVEL WINDSHEAR ALERTS THAT HAD OCCURRED IN MULTIPLE QUADRANTS; 3) THE INADEQUATE REMEDIAL ACTIONS BY USAIR TO ENSURE ADHERENCE TO STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES; AND 4) THE INADEQUATE SOFTWARE LOGIC IN THE AIRPLANE'S WINDSHEAR WARNING SYSTEM THAT DID NOT PROVIDE AN ALERT UPON ENTRY INTO THE WINDSHEAR. (NTSB REPORT AAR-95/03)

Remember junior, if it can happen to one, it can happen to another. You just fall on your knees and be thankful it wasn't you!

 

[A320 Driver]

The truth is ugly and hits a nerve.

Quit the BS about how the East is superior to the West and I'll quit refuting your BS.

You hit a new low...and I didn't think that possible.

Driver :angry:

 

[cleardirect]

4 capt net gain but the gains and loses are in different equipment. The A330 is a wash wiith the number of captains remaining the same by converting 7 reserve spots to blockholder. The 76I has the biggest change with a net gain of 9 captain jobs (loses 8 reserve and gains 17 blockholder spots). The 737 loses 3 reserve capt jobs, and the 190 has a net loss of 2 captain jobs (gains 1 blockholder but loses 3 reserve spots.

As in any bid, there will be more changes the the net change would indicate since the net change covers shifts of time, more or fewer blockholder jobs in various bases/equipment. So more people will move around than the 4 net gains, some being displaced while others moving up to fill vacancies.

The net gain/loss is also something of a prediction based on what was known when bid 11-2 came out. For example, 2 captains are shown as early retirements between Apr and May. But until they walk out the door they can change their mind so those anticipated vacancies could disappear.

Jim

Thanks for the explanation. Always nice to have the facts. Don't know where a 25 year employee that has been looking at this forever got 18 new captains.

 

[AWA320]

You hit a new low...and I didn't think that possible.

Driver :angry:

Funny, I dont think the east can go any lower!!

AWA320 says NO to UBS's

 

[traderjake]

Remember junior, if it can happen to one, it can happen to another. You just fall on your knees and be thankful it wasn't you!

I am thankful it wasn't me.

I not the one constantly posting how superior the East is, I'm pointing out how full of BS the poster is.

The fact are the facts even if you don't like them.

 

[traderjake]

You hit a new low...and I didn't think that possible.

Driver :angry:

Being called low by a USAPA defender is a compliment.

 

[BoeingBoy]

Thanks for the explanation. Always nice to have the facts. Don't know where a 25 year employee that has been looking at this forever got 18 new captains.

People who haven't worked with the bid generally don't have a good understanding of the various numbers and how movement can magnify the movement. In theory, you could have one vacancy system-wide which allows the bottom actiive pilot to make a move and end up with everyone moving around. Obviously, that would be an extreme case but the software and bidding contract language would do it. That bottom guy changing base/equip leaves a vacancy behind for the next to bottom guy takes. That leaves a vacancy behind which the 3rd from the bottom guy takes, repeat until everyone has moved. So you could have 2605 pilots move because of a single vacancy, but the net change would be zero (not counting the new hire that gets hired because there's that 1 vacancy).

On this bid, I would NOT be surprised to see 200 or more movements, some up some down and some just changing bases in the same equip/seat.

Jim

 

[cleardirect]

People who haven't worked with the bid generally don't have a good understanding of the various numbers and how movement can magnify the movement. In theory, you could have one vacancy system-wide which allows the bottom actiive pilot to make a move and end up with everyone moving around. Obviously, that would be an extreme case but the software and bidding contract language would do it. That bottom guy changing base/equip leaves a vacancy behind for the next to bottom guy takes. That leaves a vacancy behind which the 3rd from the bottom guy takes, repeat until everyone has moved. So you could have 2605 pilots move because of a single vacancy, but the net change would be zero (not counting the new hire that gets hired because there's that 1 vacancy).

On this bid, I would be surprised to see 200 or more movements, some up some down and some just changing bases in the same equip/seat.

Jim

Thanks. I think MM was trying to imply that there was an increased number overall of 18 captains. New captains. A change of base same seat/equip doesn't increase anything. It looked to me to an overall increase of just 4. Still a good thing for the east.

 

[nycbusdriver]

The truth is ugly and hits a nerve.

Quit the BS about how the East is superior to the West and I'll quit refuting your BS.



NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
USAIR, INC.
BOEING 737-400
LAGUARDIA AIRPORT
FLUSHING, NEW YORK
SEPTEMBER 20, 1989


3.2 Probable Cause
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the
probable cause of this accident was the captain's failure to exercise his
command authority in a timely manner to reject the takeoff or take sufficient
control to continue the takeoff, which was initiated with a mistrimmed
rudder. Also causal was the captain's failure to detect the mistrimmed
rudder before the takeoff was attempted


3. CONCLUSIONS
3.1 Findings
1. The flight and cabin crews were properly certificated and
qualified for the flight.
2. The airplane was certificated, equipped, and maintained in
accordance with Federal regulations and approved procedures.
3. Rudder trim moved full left while the airplane was parked with
engines off at LGA.
4. The captain could have detected the mistrim rudder condition
during taxi, during the flight control freedom-of-movement
check and during the response to a checklist challenge. He
failed to do so.
5. The captain did not use the autobrake system during the
takeoff roll, as recommended by Boeing and USAir management.
His failure to do so delayed the onset of maximum braking and
extended the airplane's stopping distance.
6. Both pilots were relatively inexperienced in their respective
positions. The captain had about 140 hours as a B-737
captain, and the first officer was conducting his first nonsupervised
line takeoff in a B-737, and also his first takeoff
after a 39-days non-flying period.
7. Early in the takeoff attempt, the first officer inadvertently
disarmed the autothrottle. He then manually advanced the
throttles; the resultant delay and the slightly low thrust set
on the left engine lengthened the airplane's ground roll and
added to the directional control problem.
8. The captain's use of the nosewheel steering tiller during the
takeoff roll was not proper and may have masked the initial
directional control problem created by the mistrimmed rudder.
9. Because of poor communication between the pilots, both
attempted to 'maintain directional control initially and
neither was fully in control later in the takeoff, compounding
directional control difficulties.
10. Neither pilot was monitoring indicated airspeed and no
standard airspeed callouts occurred.
56
11. The captain should have been aware of the directional control
problem and should have initiated an RTO before accelerating
to high speed.
12. Unusual noise and vibration from the cocked nosewheel, and the
leftward veer, led the captain to reject the takeoff.
13. Computed VT speed was 125 knots and action by the captain to
reject the takeoff began at 130 knots.
14. After initiating the RTO, the captain used differential
braking to steer the airplane. This delayed the attainment of
effective braking until 5 l/2 seconds after the takeoff was
rejected.
15. Braking during the RTO was less than the maximum braking
achievable on the wet runway; the airplane could have been
stopped on the runway.



NTSB Identification: DCA94MA065 .
The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact Records Management Division
Scheduled 14 CFR USAIR
Accident occurred Saturday, July 02, 1994 in CHARLOTTE, NC
Probable Cause Approval Date: 1/19/1996
Aircraft: DOUGLAS DC-9-31, registration: N954VJ
Injuries: 37 Fatal, 16 Serious, 4 Minor.


The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

1) THE FLIGHTCREW'S DECISION TO CONTINUE AN APPROACH INTO SEVERE CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY THAT WAS CONDUCIVE TO A MICROBURST; 2) THE FLIGHTCREW'S FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE A WINDSHEAR SITUATION IN A TIMELY MANNER; 3)THE FLIGHTCREW'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN THE PROPER AIRPLANE ATTITUDE AND THRUST SETTING NECESSARY TO ESCAPE THE WINDSHEAR; AND 4) THE LACK OF REAL-TIME ADVERSE WEATHER AND WINDSHEAR HAZARD INFORMATION DISSEMINATION FROM AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL, ALL OF WHICH LED TO AN ENCOUNTER WITH AND THE FAILURE TO ESCAPE FROM A MICROBURST-INDUCED WINDSHEAR THAT WAS PRODUCED BY A RAPIDLY DEVELOPING THUNDERSTORM LOCATED AT THE APPROACH END OF RUNWAY 18R. CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WERE: 1) THE LACK OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL PROCEDURES THAT WOULD HAVE REQUIRED THE CONTROLLER TO DISPLAY AND ISSUE AIRPORT SURVEILLANCE RADAR (ASR-9) WEATHER INFORMATION TO THE PILOTS OF FLIGHT 1016; 2) THE CHARLOTTE TOWER SUPERVISOR'S FAILURE TO PROPERLY ADVISE AND ENSURE THAT ALL CONTROLLERS WERE AWARE OF AND REPORTING THE REDUCTION IN VISIBILITY AND RUNWAY VISUAL RANGE VALUE INFORMATION, AND THE LOW LEVEL WINDSHEAR ALERTS THAT HAD OCCURRED IN MULTIPLE QUADRANTS; 3) THE INADEQUATE REMEDIAL ACTIONS BY USAIR TO ENSURE ADHERENCE TO STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES; AND 4) THE INADEQUATE SOFTWARE LOGIC IN THE AIRPLANE'S WINDSHEAR WARNING SYSTEM THAT DID NOT PROVIDE AN ALERT UPON ENTRY INTO THE WINDSHEAR. (NTSB REPORT AAR-95/03)

You keep using the tag line "5 fatal accidents in 5 years," but you only review two of them (in which the pilots were found at fault.)

Tell us, then about the other three. Pay special attention to the one in LAX and the one in PIT.

 

[GuntherA320]

On this bid, I would be surprised to see 200 or more movements, some up some down and some just changing bases in the same equip/seat.

Jim

Jim,

The last bid caused 265 movements. This bid will likely cause more than the previous bid. I can let you know the total in 11 days.

The May bid has 14 widebody vacancies and 2 widebody reductions for a total of 12 net widebody captain vacancies. There are 5 group 2 captain vacancies and 6 group 2 captain reductions for a net of 1 group 2 captain reduction. There are 2 captain reductions on the E190. There are 28 net widebody F/O vacancies. There are 0 net group 2 F/O vacancies/reductions. There are 15 E190 F/O reductions. The net increase in higher paying positions for group a group 2 F/O is 39. There are 93 additional lines of time associated with this bid. That is an increase of approximately 7500 block hours. There are 12 new hires included from the previous bid. (These were pilots that were in a hiring pool from 2008) There first day on the job was Jan 3rd. There are 2 recalls and 17 pilots returning from LOA. There will be more new hires on the East before May. The application window should open very soon.

 

[luvthe9]

Eating big boned meat at that. It costs more and since we make more we can afford to eat better.

AWA320 says no to UBS's

Yes, you do eat the big bone. Aqua too. That was never in doubt....

 

[luvthe9]

You hit a new low...and I didn't think that possible.

Driver :angry:

You got that.

 

[A320 Driver]

Being called low by a USAPA defender is a compliment.

You need to re-read my posts Sport.