Where in the transcripts did you read this..... a page number please....
This is what the West has been saying all along, at the roadshow, in correspondence etc. I would like to read where the Judge informs Seham.
Here is some of the transcript. You'll find the complete transcript on the AWAPPA site under "Court Transcripts." Look for the post with a PDF attachment labeled "Addington Motion Hearings."
Sorry for the length but here ya go...
MR. SEHAM: And that there seems to be very much
throughout this a damning with faint praise of the concept of
Date-of-Hire seniority, whether you look at the Laturner case
or the Truck Drivers case, 379 F2d 137, that those cases -- and
the Rakestraw case -- those cases all talk about Date-of-Hire
not only being appropriate, but Truck Drivers, for example,
says it is the standard by which all others are judged.
THE COURT: I don't see this case as being grounded in
that. I see this case as being grounded in admittedly
irreconcilable differences, that both interests came together
and they understood their common need to make progress for
economic betterment against their employer. And they
understood the prospect of paralysis, and therefore, they
agreed to a neutral resolution process not knowing how it was
going to turn out. So what I am seeing or wondering about here, Mr.
Seham, is what's the legitimate union purpose when the
represented interests have entered into an explicitly binding,
final and binding resolution to turn around and saying, well,
we don't like who won. We don't like who lost. We want to
change it. What's the union purpose in abandoning that neutral
dispute resolution process? It's kind of a mutual non-suicide
pact by which both pilot groups know that they may not like
what happens but they have bigger fish to fry with the employer
so they are going to get on to that and put this behind them.
MR. SEHAM: I'm going to try to resist a long
rhetorical speech here and try to briefly make two points.
THE COURT: My focused question is, what is the
legitimate union objective in saying we know, we knew from day
one, that somebody, if not everybody, was going to be
profoundly unhappy with the outcome. So what's the legitimate
union objective of saying we're just going to pick a different
winner after everybody, who their representatives have agreed
to a process who they agreed would be binding and final.
MR. SEHAM: Two points. One very briefly, because
it's going to delay me getting to the one you addressed. The
first point is we challenged the factual premise. No one
agreed to this. It was imposed by ALPA, and there was no vote
on the ALPA constitution, no vote on the ALPA Merger Policy, no
vote on the Transition Agreement. None of these pilots voted
on this. Now, putting that factual dispute to one side, the
other issue is this, that Date-of-Hire is in the interest of
the labor movement. It may not appear to be in your interests
today. It may be counter to your transient interest today.
But ultimately, that concept of waiting on line when you get to
the back of a line, you don't feel it's in your interest not to
cut. But as time goes by, and people form in the cue behind
you, it becomes more and more in your interest.
And that's the concept that Rakestraw deliberately --
very specifically addresses. They may say, listen, these scabs
-- and I'm a union attorney so permit me to use a term actually
been addressed at USAPA members.
THE COURT: My father was a union man, and it's not a
polite word.
MR. SEHAM: It's not. It's the lowest form of life.
So when someone says that to you, it's very provocative.
However, when someone crosses a picket line it's just a
truthful way of referring to the man or woman.
In any case, in the Rakestraw case the scabs
benefitted from a permanent agreement, that ALPA entered into a
permanent agreement. And a few years later, after they
actually lived with it for years and years, that was flipped.
And yet there you have the Seventh Circuit, the same Seventh
circuit as Barton Brands in Wisconsin, saying it was in the
scabs' interest to be put down at the bottom of the list
because a cohesive labor union that honored the Date-of-Hire
and strengthened the union movement through the Date-of-Hire
ultimately benefitted everybody.
THE COURT: You are just saying that the agreement of
the two MECs to accept an unknown future neutral resolution is
an illusion, that however it turns out, it can be rejected in
favor of a different substantive outcome. That's what I'm
hearing you say.
MR. SEHAM: No more or less than the permanent
agreement in Rakestraw was an illusion. And a union always has
the right to revisit in a way that satisfies a legitimate union
objective.
THE COURT: Is it possible under the Railway Labor Act
for two hopelessly reconciled labor groups to enter into a
binding neutral process to resolve their mutual disagreement so
they can go forward on their areas of neutral interest? Is
that possible?
MR. SEHAM: The answer to that is yes, it is
impossible. Because the rule of law is you can revisit so long
as it's not solely for the illegitimate purpose and it advances
union interest in a certain form.
And what I'm trying to -- I'm not trying to make final
argument here. What I'm trying to say is throughout the jury
instructions, in effect, the jury is prohibited from making a
finding of fact that Date-of-Hire -- there is an interest, that
these West Pilots down the line might be very hurt. In fact,
they are being hurt today because the non-implementation of
that Date-of-Hire concept. And we are, in effect, being --
that is a legitimate factual conclusion. In fact, I would say
that it's the rule of law throughout the United States of
America and the federal courts. But at a minimum, the jury
should be allowed --
THE COURT: The jury should be allowed to decide, we
just think that Arbitrator Nicolau made a poor decision.
That's what you are telling me, they should be allowed to do
that.
MR. SEHAM: Those are two concepts. Yes, they should
be allowed, but again, there maybe I think the ship has sailed
in a sense because we haven't been allowed to submit that
evidence.
THE COURT: Actually, most of the evidence we have
heard on both sides does dual duty. I have allowed it in to
describe the nature of the dispute, how it arose, the context
and the interest at stake. But it's pretty much, everything we
have seen so far is evidence you would also put in if you
wanted to have a jury second guess.
MR. SEHAM: Certainly nowhere near the encyclopedic
evidence we were planning to present. There was a motion in
limine, and we lost it. We were not able to pursue what we
think the Seventh Circuit has recognized as legitimate means of
proceeding.
THE COURT: 10 more minutes, all right? Because I
feel awful that I brought you all down here and we don't have
the time to have the discussion I wanted to have. I was
looking forward to doing it outside of our regular trial day.
And we'll have to add it on to our regular trial days.
MR. SEHAM: Again, to avoid too much legal argument
and focus on where -- if I'm not being too irreverential to
suggest where constructive criticism might actually have an
impact, I will finish up that last point by stating that the
jury should be allowed to consider not just a blind choice
between the benefits of getting a better Collective Bargaining
Agreement and the comparative disadvantage of USAPA versus
Nicolau, which, first of all, we think is a false comparison
because of the reality of indefinite separate operations but
that the jury should be allowed --
THE COURT: But there could only be indefinite
separate operations if there is a valid ability of a
self-interested Eastern pilot majority to prevent an integrated
Seniority List from ever being adopted.
MR. SEHAM: How is that unlawful? That is something
that was --
THE COURT: I'm just asking.
MR. SEHAM: The pilots collectively are not a union.
They are exercising their rights as defined under ALPA Merger
Policy. And it's always been our position -- the plaintiffs
present this as a rule versus tyranny of majority conflict, and
what we say is the rules provide for democracy, albeit at the
tail end of an otherwise oppressive bureaucratic process they
do at the tail end allow these pilots, who are supposed to be
served by their union, allow them the say-so. And the
president of the association, in so many words, said you can
exercise this to protect your seniority interest and your job
security.
THE COURT: But, you know -- well, this comes back to
a fundamental issue of if the parties were proceeding in good
faith and made an agreement through their authorized
representatives, their MECs, for a binding neutral resolution
that, clearly, there's a majority and minority that turns out
probably the majority is more unhappy with it than the minority
is.
But what's -- how is it that if there is a duty of fair
representation to honor that agreement, then how could there
ever be an impasse?
I mean, an impasse would simply mean -- and -- and,
the documents clearly explicitly provide that the two
interested pilot groups do not have the right to ratify or
reject the arbitration award. That is as clear as day. And if
that's the premise, if that's the background, how could it be
in good faith for a majority to use their backup power to
ratify an entire CBA as a way to indirectly defeat their duty
to the minority to honor the agreed resolution of the Seniority
List?