US Pilots Labor Discussion

[Ames]

All,

1013 pages, 10501 posts and what of substance has all this arguing accomplished?

It accomplishes nothing. Who cares?

 

[Sadstateofaffairs]

Why do Easties keep repeating this as if it means anything? Both sides are flying within the limits of the Transition Agreement. Within those limits it's irrelevant who's flying which routes.

I know the majority of posters on this message board are far left and far right. So here is a view point from a east pilot who considers himself not an extremist. We agreed to a process of binding arbitration and as such the Nic List is the outcome. Call it the only seniority list there is. Call it what ever you want; but even though I agreed to binding arbitration I also agreed that it would not be implemented till we have a joint contract. I will never vote for a joint contract that has the Nic in it unless Doug throws so much money at me that the amount I lose from the Nic is irrelevant (how many of you west pilots think Doug would do that?). So here we are, I lose so much because of the award I feel working under LOA 93 is better than the Nic. Let me say that again I lose so much under the Nic that I would rather work under LOA 93 than have the Nic. Oh my gosh, guess what, the majority of US Airways pilots must feel the same way I do because that is exactly what is happening. And this is why we both lose. I bet if the award was a little (and a mean a little) more sided for LOS you would have agreed to it and disliked it, we would have agreed to it and disliked it, and and we would be working as one group trying to bring to this property an industry standard contract.

 

[Ames]

I stayed at a troubled airline that finally got it's cost in line, leading to a merger that saved it and another airline and has, so far, enabled both to stick around.

I am flying the same seat, in the same base, that I held in 9/2001. How is that taking anything from you?

I am quite sure that without the "merger" I would still be around and you would not.

The "merger" saved your airline. Ruined mine.

Yes, you are flying the same seat in the same base that you held in 2001. That isn't taking anything from me. True. However, if DOH was shoved up tha AWA pilots asses you would be, at a minimum, in a much better bid position than you were in 2001. That's you. I know of formerly furloughed easties who would be700 numbers senior to me, a captain. That is taking a lot from me and even more from the formerly employed junior AWA pilots who suffered furlough while ungrateful eastholes returned demanding more.

You mistake my pragmatism for arrogance. Just another form of twisting the facts. An easthole specialty.

 

[Pi brat]

Yes, I absolutely do. The slanted articles you provided prove nothing. Financial statements, plain and simple go a lot further in exposing the truth.

Man,you are clueless. If it gets you through the day.....................

Show me the financial statements that show a profit in 2004, the last quarter of 2004, the second quarter 2005, and first quarter 2005, if you remove the hedging gains.

 

[Ames]

I know the majority of posters on this message board are far left and far right. So here is a view point from a east pilot who considers himself not an extremist. We agreed to a process of binding arbitration and as such the Nic List is the outcome. Call it the only seniority list there is. Call it what ever you want; but even though I agreed to binding arbitration I also agreed that it would not be implemented till we have a joint contract. I will never vote for a joint contract that has the Nic in it unless Doug throws so much money at me that the amount I lose from the Nic is irrelevant (how many of you west pilots think Doug would do that?). So here we are, I lose so much because of the award I feel working under LOA 93 is better than the Nic. Let me say that again I lose so much under the Nic that I would rather work under LOA 93 than have the Nic. Oh my gosh, guess what, the majority of US Airways pilots must feel the same way I do because that is exactly what is happening. And this is why we both lose. I bet if the award was a little (and a mean a little) more sided for LOS you would have agreed to it and disliked it, we would have agreed to it and disliked it, and and we would be working as one group trying to bring to this property an industry standard contract.

Adding to your comment, if the arbitrator's decision went DOH the west would have agreed to it even though we disliked it. We would have accepted the fact that a final and binding decision was made and moved on. Subsequently we would have voted for a contract based on its merits.

I believe that once the court speaks and the east realizes that the Nicolau is the only list there will be the east will vote on a contract based on its merits, knowing that otherwise things will never improve.

 

[Piedmont1984]

It is sometimes useful for a teammate to throw some cold water on his buddies rather than carry water for them. Here are some issues I have with PI and Swan. The Piedmont pilots wanted nothing to do with DOH in 1988-89 and many were hurt in that merger. I was one of them. Yet the same people proclaim the sanctity of DOH this time around. Seniority based on longevity is fair and good, but longevity and DOH are not the same thing. Credit for time served at a company is not the same as a time stamp indicating when one was hired, when it is followed by years of furlough. Many on furlough went to other carriers, or left the industry - without any regrets and without looking back. They had little expectation of returning to this particular company. If I had continuous service at a company and a furloughee was slotted ahead of me because of an earlier hire date, I would be furious.

The '84/'85 east hires may very well be in the "breach" for a widebody upgrade, but they will stay in that status indefinitely because there are simply not enough widebody slots availlable to accomodate those several hundred in number. Attrition may be a good thing to look forward to, but in my case and those in my age bracket - I am the attrition.

My intuition tells me that if USAPA would move off DOH and move towards LOS, enough pilots in the west would be willing to support this position. If Nicolau came out with a LOS based list, we wouldn't be stuck here today.

We have some great pilots in the east, but as a group we are pretty f#$king stupid. If USAPA doesn't modify it's position, we will be arguing the same thing, right here, three years from now, unless adult supervision in the form of one or more judicial judgements intervenes before then.

 

[Ames]

Man,you are clueless. If it gets you through the day.....................

Show me the financial statements that show a profit in 2004, the last quarter of 2004, the second quarter 2005, and first quarter 2005, if you remove the hedging gains.

Yes, although there was no overall profit in 2004, 4q 2004, 1q 2005 and 2q 2005 are indicative of things looking up for AWA. Who, again, is clueless?

 

[luvthe9]

It is sometimes useful for a teammate to throw some cold water on his buddies rather than carry water for them. Here are some issues I have with PI and Swan. The Piedmont pilots wanted nothing to do with DOH in 1988-89 and many were hurt in that merger. I was one of them. Yet the same people proclaim the sanctity of DOH this time around. Seniority based on longevity is fair and good, but longevity and DOH are not the same thing. Credit for time served at a company is not the same as a time stamp indicating when one was hired, when it is followed by years of furlough. Many on furlough went to other carriers, or left the industry - without any regrets and without looking back. They had little expectation of returning to this particular company. If I had continuous service at a company and a furloughee was slotted ahead of me because of an earlier hire date, I would be furious.

The '84/'85 east hires may very well be in the "breach" for a widebody upgrade, but they will stay in that status indefinitely because there are simply not enough widebody slots availlable to accomodate those several hundred in number. Attrition may be a good thing to look forward to, but in my case and those in my age bracket - I am the attrition.

My intuition tells me that if USAPA would move off DOH and move towards LOS, enough pilots in the west would be willing to support this position. If Nicolau came out with a LOS based list, we wouldn't be stuck here today.

We have some great pilots in the east, but as a group we are pretty f#$king stupid. If USAPA doesn't modify it's position, we will be arguing the same thing, right here, three years from now, unless adult supervision in the form of one or more judicial judgements intervenes before then.

You can hold the 767 I right now, captain in PHL. You upgraded to left seat in 5 yrs, and made some good coin for a lot of those years. I really don't think your definition of hurt, with regard to an 88 hire on is even close. You are right, if the west would come off the Nic, there might be some room to negotiate.

 

[Ames]

It is sometimes useful for a teammate to throw some cold water on his buddies rather than carry water for them. Here are some issues I have with PI and Swan. The Piedmont pilots wanted nothing to do with DOH in 1988-89 and many were hurt in that merger. I was one of them. Yet the same people proclaim the sanctity of DOH this time around. Seniority based on longevity is fair and good, but longevity and DOH are not the same thing. Credit for time served at a company is not the same as a time stamp indicating when one was hired, when it is followed by years of furlough. Many on furlough went to other carriers, or left the industry - without any regrets and without looking back. They had little expectation of returning to this particular company. If I had continuous service at a company and a furloughee was slotted ahead of me because of an earlier hire date, I would be furious.

The '84/'85 east hires may very well be in the "breach" for a widebody upgrade, but they will stay in that status indefinitely because there are simply not enough widebody slots availlable to accomodate those several hundred in number. Attrition may be a good thing to look forward to, but in my case and those in my age bracket - I am the attrition.

My intuition tells me that if USAPA would move off DOH and move towards LOS, enough pilots in the west would be willing to support this position. If Nicolau came out with a LOS based list, we wouldn't be stuck here today.

We have some great pilots in the east, but as a group we are pretty f#$king stupid. If USAPA doesn't modify it's position, we will be arguing the same thing, right here, three years from now, unless adult supervision in the form of one or more judicial judgements intervenes before then.

A most excellent post! You are the one and only east pilot I have come across that makes sense. One thing you should know is that the west merger committee offered discussion on LOS but was shut down by the east. It was DOH or nothing. Read the transcripts. Nicolau told the east merger committee that their DOH demand would not fly and even gave them a last chance to negotiate. They would not.

 

[Black Swan]

Yes, I absolutely do. The slanted articles you provided prove nothing. Financial statements, plain and simple go a lot further in exposing the truth.

America West Airlines Inc, et al. · 10-K · For 12/31/04
Filed On 3/14/05 9:54pm ET · SEC Files 0-12337, 1-12649 · Accession Number 950153-5-517

During 2004, however, extremely high jet fuel prices and excessive capacity throughout the domestic air system began to negatively impact all airlines including the low cost segment of the airline industry as well and several low cost carriers that had previously operated profitably, including AWA, experienced declining earnings.

This, along with increased fuel burn due to increased flying during 2004, resulted in a 48.1% increase in fuel expenses in 2004 over 2003.

In spite of our diligent work to contain our costs, we believe revenues will continue to reflect the excess capacity that exists across the domestic system and fuel prices will remain at, or exceed, record highs. Given these conditions, we anticipate significant losses for full year 2005.

The revenue environment during 2004 remained challenging

In spite of these initiatives, during 2004, we experienced increased low cost carrier (LCC) competition and increased legacy carrier competition, and the results of these two factors can be seen in our unit revenue performance relative to the industry during 2004.

We continue to face considerable challenges in 2005, including competing with legacy carriers that, through a variety of restructuring mechanisms, have reduced labor wages, extended debt maturities and lowered their overall cost per available seat mile. These actions could cause AWA’s cost advantage to diminish. In addition, recent fare initiatives by the major carriers may also cause a reduction in revenue per available seat mile.

Our credit ratings are relatively low, with Moody’s assessment of AWA’s senior implied rating and senior unsecured debt rating at B3 and Caa2, respectively, Standard & Poor’s assessment of AWA’s and Holdings’ corporate credit ratings at B- and AWA’s senior unsecured rating at CCC and Fitch Ratings’ assessment of AWA’s long-term and unsecured debt rating at CCC. In addition, Standard & Poor’s recently placed AWA’s aircraft debt on CreditWatch with negative implications as part of a broader review of aircraft-backed debt. Low credit ratings could cause our borrowing costs to increase, which would increase our interest expense and could affect our net income and our credit ratings could adversely affect our ability to obtain additional financing.

If our financial performance or industry conditions do not improve, we may face future downgrades, which could further negatively impact our borrowing costs and the prices of our equity or debt securities. In addition, any downgrade of our credit ratings may indicate a decline in our business and in our ability to satisfy our obligations under our indebtedness. See “Risk Factors Relating to the Company and Industry Related Risks — Because of our relatively low credit ratings, our borrowing costs may be high and our ability to incur additional debt may be impaired.”


Filed On 7/21/05 7:58am ET · SEC Files 0-12337, 1-12649 · Accession Number 950153-5-1673
PART I — FINANCIAL INFORMATION


Our high level of fixed obligations limits our ability to fund general corporate requirements and obtain additional financing, limits our flexibility in responding to competitive developments and increases our vulnerability to adverse economic and industry conditions.

We have a significant amount of fixed obligations, including debt, aircraft leases and financings, aircraft purchase commitments, leases of airport and other facilities and other cash obligations. As of June 30, 2005, we had approximately $704.0 million of outstanding debt, of which $181.9 million was secured. In addition, we had $11.2 million of payments to satisfy capital lease obligations and $3.1 billion of operating lease obligations through lease expiration dates incurred primarily in connection with off-balance sheet aircraft financings. See “Liquidity and Capital Resources — Off Balance Sheet Arrangements.” We also have guaranteed costs associated with our regional alliance with Mesa and commitments to purchase aircraft from Airbus. As a result of the substantial fixed costs associated with these obligations:

• A decrease in revenues results in a disproportionately greater percentage decrease in earnings.

• We may not have sufficient liquidity to fund all of these fixed costs if our revenues decline or costs increase.

• We may have to use our working capital to fund these fixed costs instead of funding general corporate requirements, including capital expenditures.

• We may not have sufficient liquidity to respond to competitive developments and adverse economic conditions.



• Our obligations also impair our ability to obtain additional financing, if needed, and our flexibility in the conduct of our business. Our existing indebtedness is secured by substantially all of our assets, leaving us with limited collateral for additional financing. Moreover, the terms of the government guaranteed loan restrict our ability to incur additional indebtedness or issue equity unless we use the proceeds of those transactions to repay the loan, require prepayment if our employee compensation costs exceed a certain threshold, require us to maintain a minimum cash balance of $100 million, and restrict our ability to take certain other actions, including mergers and acquisitions, investments and asset sales.
41

 

[Ames]

You can hold the 767 I right now, captain in PHL. You upgraded to left seat in 5 yrs, and made some good coin for a lot of those years. I really don't think your definition of hurt, with regard to an 88 hire on is even close. You are right, if the west would come off the Nic, there might be some room to negotiate.

It took, what, 30 seconds for an easthole response to a sensible post. Gotta be a new record.

 

[CallawayGolf]

Or, as he said in the PHX CN a few months ago, that the major airlines action of lowering their costs was the "death knell" for AWA. But most won't listen Black Swan, they can't. Because if they admit the truth it makes defending the Nic that much harder.

Admitting to truth isn’t difficult at all. I will admit that there is no reason to doubt that there was a Project Zanzibar just as Kirby is attributed to have said. There was also almost certainly a similar endeavor formed on 9/12/2001 (if not before). No company or CEO just decides out of the blue to file for bankruptcy protection. A solid Management team will bifurcate their efforts when financial trouble is on the horizon. One effort would be launched to save the company a trip into bankruptcy court by slashing expenses, negotiating with suppliers and employee groups and making operational adjustments to try and regain a financial foothold without court protection. The other endeavor would be to prepare all of the documents required for the bankruptcy filing. Just because bankruptcy documents are prepared, doesn’t mean they must be filed. In this case, clearly they weren’t just as HP didn’t file after 9/11, but you can bet that they had plans in place to file should “plan A” fail.

What HP’s options were outside of joining with another carrier and/or outside of bankruptcy court is speculative at best. Whatever options may have been discussed, acquiring US Airways out of bankruptcy was obviously deemed to be the best option for HP as determined by Management, the BOD, and ultimately the shareholders. These facts (or best guesses) don’t change the facts of the HP/US merger or the Nicolau arbitration award in any way. Absent the merger where would US Airways have been on 10/1/2005? Liquidation was either inevitable or at least the most probable result if HP had abandoned the merger discussions. So, Nicolau was unquestionably correct that US was in worse financial condition than HP on 9/27/2005.

Besides all that, what would his list have looked like if he “felt” that HP and US were financially in equivalent situations? Would he have violated the joint statement on merger principles that said no furloughed pilot would displace an active pilot? Would he have changed his protection of the top 517 east WB positions? Would he have used a different ratio methodology to achieve a combined list? We can guess all day, but the reality is that Nicolau combined the two lists according to ALPA policy and the requirements contained in the TA all while following a fairly predictable ratio of 2 east pilots to 1 west pilot given the size of each groups’ active list.
Nevertheless, if anyone thinks Nicolau got it wrong, feel free to file a legal action against the award to get it overturned. If it didn’t meet the criteria, then why not just have that award fixed or vacated rather than forming a new union and risking a DFR with an attempt to ignore the arbitration award as though it didn’t happen?

Okay, there you have it. Any other facts you want a west supporter to admit to? I’m game, so long as they are facts rather than something pulled out of thin air.

 

[Ames]

America West Airlines Inc, et al. · 10-K · For 12/31/04
Filed On 3/14/05 9:54pm ET · SEC Files 0-12337, 1-12649 · Accession Number 950153-5-517

During 2004, however, extremely high jet fuel prices and excessive capacity throughout the domestic air system began to negatively impact all airlines including the low cost segment of the airline industry as well and several low cost carriers that had previously operated profitably, including AWA, experienced declining earnings.

This, along with increased fuel burn due to increased flying during 2004, resulted in a 48.1% increase in fuel expenses in 2004 over 2003.

In spite of our diligent work to contain our costs, we believe revenues will continue to reflect the excess capacity that exists across the domestic system and fuel prices will remain at, or exceed, record highs. Given these conditions, we anticipate significant losses for full year 2005.

The revenue environment during 2004 remained challenging

In spite of these initiatives, during 2004, we experienced increased low cost carrier (LCC) competition and increased legacy carrier competition, and the results of these two factors can be seen in our unit revenue performance relative to the industry during 2004.

We continue to face considerable challenges in 2005, including competing with legacy carriers that, through a variety of restructuring mechanisms, have reduced labor wages, extended debt maturities and lowered their overall cost per available seat mile. These actions could cause AWA’s cost advantage to diminish. In addition, recent fare initiatives by the major carriers may also cause a reduction in revenue per available seat mile.

Our credit ratings are relatively low, with Moody’s assessment of AWA’s senior implied rating and senior unsecured debt rating at B3 and Caa2, respectively, Standard & Poor’s assessment of AWA’s and Holdings’ corporate credit ratings at B- and AWA’s senior unsecured rating at CCC and Fitch Ratings’ assessment of AWA’s long-term and unsecured debt rating at CCC. In addition, Standard & Poor’s recently placed AWA’s aircraft debt on CreditWatch with negative implications as part of a broader review of aircraft-backed debt. Low credit ratings could cause our borrowing costs to increase, which would increase our interest expense and could affect our net income and our credit ratings could adversely affect our ability to obtain additional financing.

If our financial performance or industry conditions do not improve, we may face future downgrades, which could further negatively impact our borrowing costs and the prices of our equity or debt securities. In addition, any downgrade of our credit ratings may indicate a decline in our business and in our ability to satisfy our obligations under our indebtedness. See “Risk Factors Relating to the Company and Industry Related Risks — Because of our relatively low credit ratings, our borrowing costs may be high and our ability to incur additional debt may be impaired.”


Filed On 7/21/05 7:58am ET · SEC Files 0-12337, 1-12649 · Accession Number 950153-5-1673
PART I — FINANCIAL INFORMATION


Our high level of fixed obligations limits our ability to fund general corporate requirements and obtain additional financing, limits our flexibility in responding to competitive developments and increases our vulnerability to adverse economic and industry conditions.

We have a significant amount of fixed obligations, including debt, aircraft leases and financings, aircraft purchase commitments, leases of airport and other facilities and other cash obligations. As of June 30, 2005, we had approximately $704.0 million of outstanding debt, of which $181.9 million was secured. In addition, we had $11.2 million of payments to satisfy capital lease obligations and $3.1 billion of operating lease obligations through lease expiration dates incurred primarily in connection with off-balance sheet aircraft financings. See “Liquidity and Capital Resources — Off Balance Sheet Arrangements.” We also have guaranteed costs associated with our regional alliance with Mesa and commitments to purchase aircraft from Airbus. As a result of the substantial fixed costs associated with these obligations:

• A decrease in revenues results in a disproportionately greater percentage decrease in earnings.

• We may not have sufficient liquidity to fund all of these fixed costs if our revenues decline or costs increase.

• We may have to use our working capital to fund these fixed costs instead of funding general corporate requirements, including capital expenditures.

• We may not have sufficient liquidity to respond to competitive developments and adverse economic conditions.



• Our obligations also impair our ability to obtain additional financing, if needed, and our flexibility in the conduct of our business. Our existing indebtedness is secured by substantially all of our assets, leaving us with limited collateral for additional financing. Moreover, the terms of the government guaranteed loan restrict our ability to incur additional indebtedness or issue equity unless we use the proceeds of those transactions to repay the loan, require prepayment if our employee compensation costs exceed a certain threshold, require us to maintain a minimum cash balance of $100 million, and restrict our ability to take certain other actions, including mergers and acquisitions, investments and asset sales.
41

As I have said the last quarter of 04 and first two of 05 are indications of improvement. You are the king of obfuscation.

 

[Ames]

Or, as he said in the PHX CN a few months ago, that the major airlines action of lowering their costs was the "death knell" for AWA. But most won't listen Black Swan, they can't. Because if they admit the truth it makes defending the Nic that much harder.

We don't need to defend the Nic. Parker officially accepted it. The court will soon remind him of that fact.

 

[Black Swan]

As I have said the last quarter of 04 and first two of 05 are indications of improvement. You are the king of obfuscation.

Just refuting with actual quotes from your leader. Here we are, here and now. The present. How do you deal with the present, with the past? No, you deal with it today, and until both sides do, there are problems.