Al Legheny
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- Jul 21, 2009
- 223
- 148
Which, among a whole mountain of other unequivocal statements and actions by USAPA and the East pilot group, effectively removed ripeness as an issue in this case. Seham must know it, otherwise he wouldn't have conjured up a rule of law that does not exist: the "ripeness cannot begin until ratification" argument. If a claim wasn't ripe until a ratification vote, then a whole host of claims (not DFR related) would not be ripe when any principal (even those outside of the union-member relationship) sues their agent. It's a preposterous argument that cannot be found anywhere in the law, which is exactly why Seham couldn't find a single case which supported his position.
The following is taken from the Federal Distric Court in North Carolina in Breeger v. USAPA.
II. DISCUSSION
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(B)(1), the existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold
issue. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 96 (1998). Accord Jones v. American
Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 1999); and Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999). The party seeking federal jurisdiction in this case, the Plaintiffs, have the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991).
In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(B)(1), a court should “regard the
pleadings as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment.†Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal citation omitted). The moving party’s motion to dismiss should be granted when “the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.†Id. (internal citation omitted).
Federal courts may adjudicate “only actual ongoing cases or controversies.†Lewis v.
Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). As a result, federal courts may not entertain
actions that are not yet ripe. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967).
The Supreme Court has established a two part test for determining ripeness, by deciding:
(1) whether the issues are fit for judicial decision, and (2) whether hardship will fall to the
petitioning party on withholding court consideration.†Static Control Components, Inc. v. DarkprintImaging, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 722, 732 (M.D.N.C. 2001) , citing Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at148-49. “An issue is not fit for review if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occuras anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.†Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180,188 (4th Cir. 2007), citing Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998).
Concerning the ripeness of a DFR claim, the Supreme Court has recognized that the “final
product of the bargaining process may constitute evidence of a breach of duty [of fair
representation].†Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 78 (1991) (emphasis added). The
parties have not cited, and the undersigned is unaware of, any published federal authority addressing whether a union’s conduct may give rise to a ripe DFR claim prior to the conclusion of negotiations with the employer.2
That's the North Carolina court quoting the Supreme Court. That's where the ripeness issue came from.