From the evidence, it is clear enough that the merger with AWA was a
meaningful factor in U.S. Airway's emergence from bankruptcy. Together, the
two companies were able to attract investments that, operating alone, they might
not have secured. However, West's claim that U.S. Airways emerged from
bankruptcy “only because it [was] acquired by a stronger enterprise”10 is reflected
neither in the KPMG audit report (cited by West)11 nor in any other portion of the
evidence. Instead, each carrier had something to contribute. Airways, for
example, was much larger. It served almost twice as many destinations as AWA
and carried twice the number of passengers.12
Airways has substantially more
cash on hand, following the merger agreement. AWA, for its part, brought relative success as a low cost carrier operation with a meaningful presence in the
Western United States.
Airways' “fresh start”13 included a series of steps designed to strengthen
Airways' financial situation. Among other things, it entered into concessionary
bargaining with its unions, ultimately securing some $1 billion dollars per year in
cost reductions. 14 Termination of certain existing defined benefit and other post-
retirement benefit plans generated substantial savings.15 A 35 percent decrease
in labor cost16 taken together with other cost saving measures, resulted in a
positive net operating income for the second and third quarters of 2005, prior to
approval of the merger agreement in September of 2005.
17 AWA, for its part,
while not in bankruptcy, was attempting to confront what it regarded as a
troubled and potentially perilous future, absent the merger, in the face of rising
fuel costs and depressed unit revenues as a result of over capacity, among other
things. It, too, needed cash.
West characterizes the merger decision on AWA's part as a one-way
economic bailout. But there is no support for this in the record; surely, the
respective companies did not endorse that view. AWA concluded, according to
the statements of its CEO, that “…when we looked out at our future, what we saw wasn't good…. Assuming we couldn't go out and restructure or raise cash, it is
possible that AWA would have been facing its own Chapter 11 at some point.
Employees may like to think we “saved” US but the fact is we saved each other…18
The June 10, 2005 issue of “Plane Deal”, an AWA publication, touted some
of the benefits of joining fleet forces:
When merged, the combined airline will become the nation's 5th larges airline, as measured by domestic available seat miles (ASMs). The combined airline is expected to operated a mainline fleet of 361 planes (supported by 239 regional jets and 57 turbo props for feed into the mainline system), down from a total of 419 mainline aircraft operated by both airlines at the beginning of 2005….19
In the context of a “Town Hall” Q&A , the company noted
the prospect of a combined airline was more enticing to investors:
The money is being raised for the combined airline, because investors see the value in the merged entity. Frankly, airlines in their current state don't look appealing to investors, who are savvy to know industry change needs to take place. The proposed merger represents the kind of change that investors believe will be successful. So, unfortunately, we wouldn't garner this kind of interest if we were seeking funding for America West “as is.”20
Much of West's claimed superiority over East, in terms of what it brought
to the merger, is speculative.
There is, for example, scant support for West's
claim that, post-merger, “the focus of lender anxiety is clearly on the side of U.S. Airways”21 or that, following the merger, with the AWA CEO assuming the helm
in Phoenix, “the predator king gets to have the top job, to grant fiefs to his
chieftains, and to fly the flag over his castle!”22