OK Megasnoop, here comes my analysis of
Eliis. A complete copy may be found
here.
Before we actually start, for all of you that don't have a legal background let's go over a few principles. First, the reader must be careful to not accept as the Court's holding all of the material that is cited and discussed in the Opinion before the Court actually begins to comment on the merits of the case and the precedents that have preceded the case on various points of law. Second, you must read the full potion of the Opinion that you cite so that you get the complete flavor of what the Court is trying to establish. Since the Court is only actually deciding one case based on the facts and factors before it differing fact patterns may well lead to differing results despite the past precedents.
So, let's make a go of it, shall we?
USAPA legal fees will be paid by the bargaining unit. The bargaining unit, not just members. U.S. Supreme Court case Ellis V The Railway Labor Clerks. Once upon a time in a galaxy far far away…, actually the Ninth Circuit; a RLA case emerged called Ellis v. Railway Labor Clerks (actually a Western Airlines case). The plaintiffs, (Ellis), didn’t want to have their dues pay for certain union activities and so they went to court and the case ended up before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court stated in its preamble,
Section 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act permits a union and an employer to require all employees in the relevant bargaining unit to join the union as a condition of continued employment. Petitioners, present or former clerical employees who objected to the use of their compelled dues or fees for specified union activities, filed separate suits (later consolidated) in Federal District Court against the respondents.
The parties disagreed about the adequacy of the rebate scheme, and about the legality of charging objecting employees with union expenses for (1) the national union's quadrennial Grand Lodge convention, (2) litigation not involving the negotiation of agreements or settlement of grievances, (3) union publications, (4) social activities, (5) death benefits for employees, and (6) general organizing.
(Boys and girls, pay attention to (2) litigation….)
All of what you quoted there was the syllabus, and not even complete. The syllabus is someone's opinion of what the case says, not actually what the case says. This is important because the syllabus writer is likely not writing the syllabus in the same context that one is reading it, especially if they are looking at the case but have a totally different fact pattern in mind as they look for guidance.
The actual opinion of the Courts starts immediately after this phrase.
"JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court."
We remain convinced that Congress' essential justification for authorizing the union shop was the desire to eliminate free riders - employees in the bargaining unit on whose behalf the union was obliged to perform its statutory functions, but who refused to contribute to the cost thereof. Only a [466 U.S. 435, 448] union that is certified as the exclusive bargaining agent is authorized to negotiate a contract requiring all employees to become members of or to make contributions to the union.
Hence, when employees such as petitioners object to being burdened with particular union expenditures, the test must be whether the challenged expenditures are necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues. Under this standard, objecting employees may be compelled to pay their fair share of not only the direct costs of negotiating and administering a collective-bargaining contract and of settling grievances and disputes, but also the expenses of activities or undertakings normally or reasonably employed to implement or effectuate the duties of the union as exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit.
With these considerations in mind, we turn to the particular expenditures for which petitioners insist they may not be charged.
…..5. Litigation. The expenses of litigation incident to negotiating and administering the contract or to settling grievances and disputes arising in the bargaining unit are clearly chargeable to petitioners as a normal incident of the duties of the exclusive representative. The same is true of fair representation litigation arising within the unit, of jurisdictional disputes with other unions, and of any other litigation before agencies or in the courts that concerns bargaining unit employees and is normally conducted by the exclusive representative.
You have actually mashed up a few separate portions here so lets break them out a bit just for clarity.
We remain convinced that Congress' essential justification for authorizing the union shop was the desire to eliminate free riders employees in the bargaining unit on whose behalf the union was obliged to perform its statutory functions, but who refused to contribute to the cost thereof. Only a union that is certified as the exclusive bargaining agent is authorized to negotiate a contract requiring all employees to become members of or to make contributions to the union. Until such a contract is executed, no dues or fees may be collected from objecting employees who are not members of the union; and by the same token, any obligatory payments required by a contract authorized by § 2, Eleventh, terminate if the union ceases to be the exclusive bargaining agent. Hence, when employees such as petitioners object to being burdened with particular union expenditures, the test must be whether the challenged expenditures are necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues. Under this standard, objecting employees may be compelled to pay their fair share of not only the direct costs of negotiating and administering a collective bargaining contract and of settling grievances and disputes, but also the expenses of activities or undertakings normally or reasonably employed to implement or effectuate the duties of the union as exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit.
That is the entire paragraph. Under the fact pattern of Ellis the third sentence is not material to this discussion and you can effectively skip it as you apply
Ellis to Addington. The following sentence, contained above, gets to the the crux of the issue.
Hence, when employees such as petitioners object to being burdened with particular union expenditures, the test must be whether the challenged expenditures are necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues.
(Emphasis Added)
From the entire West perspective the Addington litigation expenses incurred by USAPA are NOT for "the purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues." You can't make this intra-union squabble arising from a successful DFR litigation to be contained within the context of the quoted text from
Ellis.
The next part is actually a sub-part that arises further in the opinion under what is and isn't a reasonable expense. I will quote your phrase and then the actual phrase from the opinion.
5. Litigation. The expenses of litigation incident to negotiating and administering the contract or to settling grievances and disputes arising in the bargaining unit are clearly chargeable to petitioners as a normal incident of the duties of the exclusive representative. The same is true of fair representation litigation arising within the unit, of jurisdictional disputes with other unions, and of any other litigation before agencies or in the courts that concerns bargaining unit employees and is normally conducted by the exclusive representative. [/i]
5. Litigation. The expenses of litigation incident to negotiating and administering the contract or to settling grievances and disputes arising in the bargaining unit are clearly chargeable to petitioners as a normal incident of the duties of the exclusive representative. The same is true of fair representation litigation arising within the unit, of jurisdictional disputes with other unions, and of any other litigation before agencies or in the courts that concerns bargaining unit employees and is normally conducted by the exclusive representative. The expenses of litigation not having such a connection with the bargaining unit are not to be charged to objecting employees. Contrary to the view of the Court of Appeals, therefore, unless the Western Airlines bargaining unit is directly concerned, objecting employees need not share the costs of the union's challenge to the legality of the airline industry mutual aid pact; of litigation seeking to protect the rights of airline employees generally during bankruptcy proceedings; or of defending suits alleging violation of the nondiscrimination requirements of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
I agree that the sentence that you bolded and underlined addresses the issue in dispute. However, under the totality of the circumstances, I would argue that a distinction exists and must be made for "fair representation litigation arising within the unit" where the union loses the fair representation litigation and is found to have violated the Duty of Fair Representation. To rule otherwise would turn well-settled contract law upon it's head in making the winner pay a portion of the losers costs and fees, especially when the loser is required to pay the winners costs and fees.
BTW, I had no nightmares last evening.
