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Sorry for the length, but it is a very funny read.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-80051
_______________________________________________
Don ADDINGTON, John BOSTIC, Mark BURMAN, Afshin IRANPOUR,
Roger VELEZ, and Steve WARGOCKI, individually and representing a
class of persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Respondents
v.
US AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, an unincorporated association
representing the pilots in the employment of US Airways Inc.,
Defendant-Petitioner
_______________________________________________
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO EMERGENCY MOTION
FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL
_______________________________________________
OVERVIEW OF RESPONSE
Class certification rulings are interlocutory, and generally
not immediately appealable. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e),
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(f) permits a petition for
leave to appeal certification of a class and, in the event
permission is granted, the Rule provides discretion to stay the
district court proceedings during the appeal. Rule 23(f), however,
does not provide a basis to stay proceedings while this Court
merely considers whether it will grant leave to file an appeal.
Given that the Court so rarely grants such leave, it would be
unreasonable to grant a stay before granting leave to appeal.
Moreover, as demonstrated in Respondents’ Answer to Petition
for Permission to Appeal (March 23, 2009), no appeal is
warranted.
When America West and US Airways merged in 2005, the
pilots agreed to arbitrate a final and binding integration of their
seniority lists. Dissatisfied with the outcome of this arbitration
(which is referred to as the “Nicolau Arbitrationâ€), the US
Airways pilots formed Petitioner, US Airline Pilots Association
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(“USAPAâ€). USAPA claims, because it is a new union, that the
Nicolau Arbitration is a nullity and it refuses to take any steps to
implement the seniority list resulting from the arbitration.
Respondents, representing the America West pilots (“West
Pilotsâ€), filed the underlying action. In this action, Respondents
assert, among other things, that they have a procedural right to
fair representation and that USAPA is in breach of its duty to
provide that right. Hence, they state a ripe claim for injunctive
relief-both in their own right and on behalf of a West Pilot (B)(2)
class.
USAPA moved to dismiss, arguing that the West Pilots
brought their claim both too early and too late. These arguments
and others were rejected by the district court. Addington v. US
Airline Pilots Assn., 588 F.Supp.2d 1051, 1062 (D. Ariz. 2008)
(“In effect, USAPA argues that the Plaintiff West Pilots have
sued too early and too late. Both arguments fail.â€). USAPA also
argued that the System Board had exclusive jurisdiction. These
arguments too were rejected. See id. at 1065 (noting this Circuit
has held that “[t]he Railway Labor Act provides no [extrajudicial]
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3
remedy for grievances between employees and unions where the
allegation is that the union breached its duty of fair
representationâ€). It now reasserts all those arguments and adds
a specious argument that the National Mediation Board (“NMBâ€)
has exclusive jurisdiction over this unfair representation claim.
On March 14, 2008, the district court certified a Rule
23(B)(2) class and scheduled a jury trial for April 28, 2009. On
March 26, 2009, the district court denied USAPA’s premature
motion to stay proceedings in light of its petition for leave to file
an interlocutory appeal, explaining that “a stay would pose grave
harm to the interests of the litigants and the public.†(Order at
2:1-2 (Mar. 26, 2009) (doc. 288).) The district court, recognizing
that there is going to be a trial here with or without class
certification, strongly suggested that USAPA’s entire use of Rule
23(f) was improper:
If the Court of Appeals permits an appeal and reverses
the class certification, it would not change the issues at
trial or the scope of relief except to limit USAPA’s own
privilege of res judicata in the event of a defense verdict.
* * *
Thus, if there were any error in the class certification, it
is utterly without consequence for the April 28, 2009 trial.
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A stay of the trial cannot serve any purpose of remedying
an erroneous class certification order.
(Id. at 2:14-16 & 2:24-26.)
USAPA now seeks an “emergency†stay of the trial from this
Court. Unquestionably, USAPA does so only in hopes of delaying
the district court. Its motion must, therefore, be denied.
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ARGUMENT
A. The Court Should Summarily Deny This Motion for a Stay
Because, as yet, There is no Appeal.
1. There is no basis to even ask for a stay now.
USAPA styles its motion as seeking a stay pending appeal.
There is no “pending appeal,†however. There is only a petition
for permission to file an appeal. The mere“[f]iling a request for
permission to appeal does not stop the litigation.†Newberg on
Class Actions § 7:38 (4th ed. 2008). The question of whether to
stay the litigation does not arise until permission to appeal is
granted and there is an appeal. That has not happened here.
USAPA, therefore, has no basis to ask for a stay.
If there were an appeal, the Court would decide whether to
stay the litigation in large part by analyzing the likelihood that it
would reverse the certification order. Chamberlan v. Ford Motor
Co., 402 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that in Rule 23(f)
appeals, “a stay will not issue unless the likelihood of error on
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the part of the district court tips the balance of hardships in
favor of the party seeking the stayâ€).1
There cannot be any likelihood at all that the Court will
reverse class certification unless it first grants permission to file
an appeal. As shown below, in the usual case the Court is highly
unlikely to grant such permission and in this case it surely ought
not do so. Hence, we find no instance where a court of appeals
granted a Rule 23(f) stay before it granted permission to appeal
the class certification order. USAPA does not cite any such
cases.
1 The full analysis is closely analogous to that used to
decide whether to grant a preliminary injunction. In re
Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 208 F.R.D. 1, 3
(D.D.C. 2002) ( “[W]hether or not a stay should be granted in the
context of a pending Rule 23(f) petition is a discretionary matter
to be informed by a flexible application of the well-established, …
test employed to consider preliminary injunctive relief.â€);
Sumitomo, 262 F.3d at 140 (“tay will not issue unless the
likelihood of error on the part of the district court tips the
balance of hardships in favor of the party seeking the stay.â€);
Blair v. Equifax Check Services, Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir.
1999) ( “tay would depend on a demonstration that the
probability of error in the class certification decision is high
enough that the costs of pressing ahead in the district court
exceed the costs of waiting.â€).
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To grant a stay without first taking the appeal would allow
USAPA to use Rule 23(f) as a “vehicle to delay proceedings in the
district court.†Sumitomo Copper Litigation v. Credit Lyonnais
Rouse, Ltd, 262 F.3d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 2001). That would clearly
be a misuse of the rule. Rather, “appeals under Rule 23(f) should
not unduly retard the pace of litigation.†Blair v. Equifax Check
Services, Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 1999).
Quite simply, USAPA makes a premature motion. It has no
basis to move for a stay unless and until this Court determines
that this is an unusual case meriting Rule 23(f) review. The
Court should, therefore, reject this motion summarily.
2. Rule 23(f) reviews are very rare.
There should be a strong presumption that the Court will
deny any Rule 23(f) petition. There are “too many class actions
filed each year for federal appeals courts practicably to
adjudicate class certification decisions on an interlocutory basis
as a matter of course.†Prado-Steiman ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221
F.3d 1266, 1273 (11th Cir. 2000). If freely allowed, such appeals
would “add to the heavy workload of the appellate courts, require
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8
consideration of issues that may become moot, and undermine
the district court's ability to manage the class action.â€
Chamberlan, 402 F.3d at 959. Hence, “petitions for Rule 23(f)
review should be granted sparingly.†Id. “nterlocutory review
of class rulings and of most class-related orders has become the
exception rather than the rule.†Newberg on Class Actions §
7:38.
3. This case is not suitable for Rule 23(f) review.
This Circuit permits Rule 23(f) appeals only where the
matter satisfies one of three standards. Chamberlan, 402 F.3d at
959. These three standards are as follows:
(1) there is a death-knell situation for either the plaintiff
or defendant that is independent of the merits of the
underlying claims, coupled with a class certification
decision by the district court that is questionable; (2) the
certification decision presents an unsettled and
fundamental issue of law relating to class actions,
important both to the specific litigation and generally,
that is likely to evade end-of-the-case review; or (3) the
district court's class certification decision is manifestly
erroneous.
Id. at 959. See 2 McLaughlin on Class Actions § 7:11 (5th ed.)
(noting that the Ninth Circuit has never deviated from the
Chamberlan factors).
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USAPA addresses only the so-called “death knell†standard.
It completely distorts the standard by disregarding its purpose—
to mitigate the harm where a class certification order prevents
reaching the merits of the underlying dispute. Where
certification would so intimidate the defendant that it would be
compelled to settle, the order sounds the death-knell for the
defendant. See Sumitomo, 262 F.3d at 140 (recognizing death-
knell in cases where “class certification will effectively terminate
the litigation because it will force [defendants] to settle the case
rather than risk trialâ€). Where denial of certification would make
an individual action far too expensive compared to the possible
recovery, the order sounds the death knell for the plaintiff. Blair,
181 F.3d at 834 (recognizing death-knell where “the denial of
class status sounds the death knell of the litigation, because the
representative plaintiff's claim is too small to justify the expense
of litigationâ€).
Neither definition of “death-knell†applies here. Indeed,
USAPA’s concern is not that it wants an opportunity to litigate
the merits. No, USAPA appeals because it wants to avoid
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litigating the merits. USAPA wants to use the artifice of a Rule
23(f) appeal to cause delay in hopes that with more delay it
would become more difficult to fashion an acceptable remedy.
B. There is no question that the district court has jurisdiction.
USAPA’s contention that there is no subject matter
jurisdiction is a flawed attempt at distraction. Each of its
arguments—lack of ripeness, exclusive System Board
jurisdiction, and exclusive National Mediation Board (“NMBâ€)
jurisdiction—are contrary to well-established law.
1. A DFR claim is ripe without actual concrete injury.
The Fifth Circuit rejected a very similar ripeness argument
in an early Rule 23(f) case where a Railway Labor Act union
defendant (just like USAPA) argued lack of injury in fact in the
context of a seniority dispute. In that matter, the union
defendant argued:
that the named plaintiffs have not suffered any injury …
[because] the challenged seniority changes did not affect
the named plaintiffs' abilities to get the work
assignments they desired; each plaintiff has received the
assignments bid for. Thus, defendants argue, plaintiffs
have demonstrated no monetary loss and lack standing.
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Bertulli v. Independent Assn. of Continental Pilots, 242 F.3d 290,
295 (5th Cir. 2001) (footnotes omitted). As here, “[t]his cramped
view misunderstands standing.†Id.
Loss of seniority is an injury within a commonsense
understanding of the term, and one that is suffered by the
plaintiffs themselves. It carries with it the possibility of
several forms of concrete injury, such as slower
promotion, greater likelihood of being laid off, and lower
benefits.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Furthermore, a claim for “loss of ‘fair
representation’ under the RLA†asserts “‘procedural rights’
protected by statute, the loss of which is itself an injury without
any requirement of a showing of further injury.†Id.
It simply does not matter here, therefore, that Respondents
might suffer more concrete injury if USAPA is allowed to proceed
further with its unfair representation. The deprivation of fair
representation alone is sufficient to give standing.
2. The System Board does not have jurisdiction.
It is hardly worth responding to USAPA’s argument that the
System Board has exclusive jurisdiction over Respondents’ duty
of fair representation claim. In fact, the System Board only has
jurisdiction over “disputes between an employee or group of
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employees and a carrier or carriers.†Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry.
Co., 393 U.S. 324, 328 (1969). Indeed, the System Board has no
jurisdiction because it has “no power to order the kind of relief
necessary.†Hence, “[t]he federal courts may therefore properly
exercise jurisdiction over both the union and [where necessary]
the carrier†in an unfair representation case. Id.
3. The NMB does not have jurisdiction.
Finally, there is no question that the NMB lacks jurisdiction.
NMB jurisdiction is limited to determine “who is the employees’
representative.†Air Line Pilots Assn, Intl. v. Transamerica
Airlines, Inc., 817 F.2d 510, 515 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987). Respondents
neither allege that USAPA is not the representative nor seek a
remedy inconsistent with it being the representative. Rather,
Respondents assert that USAPA is violating its duty as the
representative and seek no different remedy than has been
upheld in similar cases. See Bernard v. Air Line Pilots Assn.,
Intl., 873 F.2d 213, 215 (9th Cir. 1989). The remedy provided in
Bernard was as follows:
By way of remedy, the district court: (1) directed ALPA to
apply its current merger policy providing for negotiation,
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mediation and arbitration in order to resolve merger and
seniority integration disputes between the two groups of
pilots; (2) directed ALPA to treat the former Jet America
pilots as a separate ALPA-represented group for purposes
of implementing this policy and to appoint three Jet
America pilot merger representatives; (3) vacated and set
aside the October 6, 1987, seniority integration
agreement between ALPA and Alaska Airlines; and (4)
specified the basis by which pilots would be furloughed,
promoted and given flying assignments in the interim
period until a new agreement could be reached.
Id. Surely, the district court has jurisdiction to provide similar
remedy in this matter.
C. The Expense of Litigation is a Cognizeable Hardship if it
Can be Avoided, Not if it Can Only be Delayed.
Ordinarily, this Court denies a stay unless it makes a
favorable consideration of likelihood of success and balance of
hardships. Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432,1435 (9th Cir. 1983)
(the standard “is similar to that employed by district courts in
deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunctionâ€). In this
situation, the Court must analyze likelihood of success on two
levels. First, the Court must consider the likelihood that it will
permit USAPA to even file an appeal. Second, the Court must
consider, if it did permit an appeal, the likelihood that USAPA
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would prevail. For each of these considerations, the likelihood is
very small. For both together, the likelihood is miniscule.
The Court must also balance the hardships and here,
USAPA fails to identify a cognizable hardship. Litigation
expenses are a cognizable hardship, but only where, with success
of the appeal, litigation expenses would be avoided altogether.
U. S. Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359 F.2d 784, 785 (9th Cir. 1966)
(cognizable hardship where “interlocutory appeal might avoid
protracted and expensive litigationâ€). In this instance, litigation
expenses would only be delayed.
All that USAPA would attain if successful on its Rule 23(f)
appeal of class certification is de-certification of the class.
Because this is a (B)(2) class, if it was decertified it would only
affect USAPA’s right to assert res judicata. The expense of
litigating would be the same. The only difference would be when
the trial occurs. All that USAPA would achieve is delay and
delay by itself cannot justify a stay.
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CONCLUSION
Unquestionably, USAPA is using Rule 23(f) only in hope of
delaying the trial. This Court should reject this misuse
summarily and deny USAPA’s “emergency†motion for a stay.
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CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH F.R.A.P. 32(a)(7)©
AND CIRCUIT RULE 32-1 FOR CASE NUMBER 09-80051
I CERTIFY THAT:
The attached Response to Emergency Motion for Stay
Pending Appeal is proportionally spaced, has a typeface of 14
points, and contains 2,578 words, excluding the cover page, table
of contents, table of authorities, certificate of service, certificate
of compliance and statement of related cases.
DATED: April 6, 2009
Respectfully submitted,
/
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-80051
_______________________________________________
Don ADDINGTON, John BOSTIC, Mark BURMAN, Afshin IRANPOUR,
Roger VELEZ, and Steve WARGOCKI, individually and representing a
class of persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Respondents
v.
US AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, an unincorporated association
representing the pilots in the employment of US Airways Inc.,
Defendant-Petitioner
_______________________________________________
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO EMERGENCY MOTION
FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL
_______________________________________________
OVERVIEW OF RESPONSE
Class certification rulings are interlocutory, and generally
not immediately appealable. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e),
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(f) permits a petition for
leave to appeal certification of a class and, in the event
permission is granted, the Rule provides discretion to stay the
district court proceedings during the appeal. Rule 23(f), however,
does not provide a basis to stay proceedings while this Court
merely considers whether it will grant leave to file an appeal.
Given that the Court so rarely grants such leave, it would be
unreasonable to grant a stay before granting leave to appeal.
Moreover, as demonstrated in Respondents’ Answer to Petition
for Permission to Appeal (March 23, 2009), no appeal is
warranted.
When America West and US Airways merged in 2005, the
pilots agreed to arbitrate a final and binding integration of their
seniority lists. Dissatisfied with the outcome of this arbitration
(which is referred to as the “Nicolau Arbitrationâ€), the US
Airways pilots formed Petitioner, US Airline Pilots Association
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(“USAPAâ€). USAPA claims, because it is a new union, that the
Nicolau Arbitration is a nullity and it refuses to take any steps to
implement the seniority list resulting from the arbitration.
Respondents, representing the America West pilots (“West
Pilotsâ€), filed the underlying action. In this action, Respondents
assert, among other things, that they have a procedural right to
fair representation and that USAPA is in breach of its duty to
provide that right. Hence, they state a ripe claim for injunctive
relief-both in their own right and on behalf of a West Pilot (B)(2)
class.
USAPA moved to dismiss, arguing that the West Pilots
brought their claim both too early and too late. These arguments
and others were rejected by the district court. Addington v. US
Airline Pilots Assn., 588 F.Supp.2d 1051, 1062 (D. Ariz. 2008)
(“In effect, USAPA argues that the Plaintiff West Pilots have
sued too early and too late. Both arguments fail.â€). USAPA also
argued that the System Board had exclusive jurisdiction. These
arguments too were rejected. See id. at 1065 (noting this Circuit
has held that “[t]he Railway Labor Act provides no [extrajudicial]
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3
remedy for grievances between employees and unions where the
allegation is that the union breached its duty of fair
representationâ€). It now reasserts all those arguments and adds
a specious argument that the National Mediation Board (“NMBâ€)
has exclusive jurisdiction over this unfair representation claim.
On March 14, 2008, the district court certified a Rule
23(B)(2) class and scheduled a jury trial for April 28, 2009. On
March 26, 2009, the district court denied USAPA’s premature
motion to stay proceedings in light of its petition for leave to file
an interlocutory appeal, explaining that “a stay would pose grave
harm to the interests of the litigants and the public.†(Order at
2:1-2 (Mar. 26, 2009) (doc. 288).) The district court, recognizing
that there is going to be a trial here with or without class
certification, strongly suggested that USAPA’s entire use of Rule
23(f) was improper:
If the Court of Appeals permits an appeal and reverses
the class certification, it would not change the issues at
trial or the scope of relief except to limit USAPA’s own
privilege of res judicata in the event of a defense verdict.
* * *
Thus, if there were any error in the class certification, it
is utterly without consequence for the April 28, 2009 trial.
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A stay of the trial cannot serve any purpose of remedying
an erroneous class certification order.
(Id. at 2:14-16 & 2:24-26.)
USAPA now seeks an “emergency†stay of the trial from this
Court. Unquestionably, USAPA does so only in hopes of delaying
the district court. Its motion must, therefore, be denied.
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ARGUMENT
A. The Court Should Summarily Deny This Motion for a Stay
Because, as yet, There is no Appeal.
1. There is no basis to even ask for a stay now.
USAPA styles its motion as seeking a stay pending appeal.
There is no “pending appeal,†however. There is only a petition
for permission to file an appeal. The mere“[f]iling a request for
permission to appeal does not stop the litigation.†Newberg on
Class Actions § 7:38 (4th ed. 2008). The question of whether to
stay the litigation does not arise until permission to appeal is
granted and there is an appeal. That has not happened here.
USAPA, therefore, has no basis to ask for a stay.
If there were an appeal, the Court would decide whether to
stay the litigation in large part by analyzing the likelihood that it
would reverse the certification order. Chamberlan v. Ford Motor
Co., 402 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that in Rule 23(f)
appeals, “a stay will not issue unless the likelihood of error on
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the part of the district court tips the balance of hardships in
favor of the party seeking the stayâ€).1
There cannot be any likelihood at all that the Court will
reverse class certification unless it first grants permission to file
an appeal. As shown below, in the usual case the Court is highly
unlikely to grant such permission and in this case it surely ought
not do so. Hence, we find no instance where a court of appeals
granted a Rule 23(f) stay before it granted permission to appeal
the class certification order. USAPA does not cite any such
cases.
1 The full analysis is closely analogous to that used to
decide whether to grant a preliminary injunction. In re
Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 208 F.R.D. 1, 3
(D.D.C. 2002) ( “[W]hether or not a stay should be granted in the
context of a pending Rule 23(f) petition is a discretionary matter
to be informed by a flexible application of the well-established, …
test employed to consider preliminary injunctive relief.â€);
Sumitomo, 262 F.3d at 140 (“
likelihood of error on the part of the district court tips the
balance of hardships in favor of the party seeking the stay.â€);
Blair v. Equifax Check Services, Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir.
1999) ( “
probability of error in the class certification decision is high
enough that the costs of pressing ahead in the district court
exceed the costs of waiting.â€).
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To grant a stay without first taking the appeal would allow
USAPA to use Rule 23(f) as a “vehicle to delay proceedings in the
district court.†Sumitomo Copper Litigation v. Credit Lyonnais
Rouse, Ltd, 262 F.3d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 2001). That would clearly
be a misuse of the rule. Rather, “appeals under Rule 23(f) should
not unduly retard the pace of litigation.†Blair v. Equifax Check
Services, Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 1999).
Quite simply, USAPA makes a premature motion. It has no
basis to move for a stay unless and until this Court determines
that this is an unusual case meriting Rule 23(f) review. The
Court should, therefore, reject this motion summarily.
2. Rule 23(f) reviews are very rare.
There should be a strong presumption that the Court will
deny any Rule 23(f) petition. There are “too many class actions
filed each year for federal appeals courts practicably to
adjudicate class certification decisions on an interlocutory basis
as a matter of course.†Prado-Steiman ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221
F.3d 1266, 1273 (11th Cir. 2000). If freely allowed, such appeals
would “add to the heavy workload of the appellate courts, require
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8
consideration of issues that may become moot, and undermine
the district court's ability to manage the class action.â€
Chamberlan, 402 F.3d at 959. Hence, “petitions for Rule 23(f)
review should be granted sparingly.†Id. “nterlocutory review
of class rulings and of most class-related orders has become the
exception rather than the rule.†Newberg on Class Actions §
7:38.
3. This case is not suitable for Rule 23(f) review.
This Circuit permits Rule 23(f) appeals only where the
matter satisfies one of three standards. Chamberlan, 402 F.3d at
959. These three standards are as follows:
(1) there is a death-knell situation for either the plaintiff
or defendant that is independent of the merits of the
underlying claims, coupled with a class certification
decision by the district court that is questionable; (2) the
certification decision presents an unsettled and
fundamental issue of law relating to class actions,
important both to the specific litigation and generally,
that is likely to evade end-of-the-case review; or (3) the
district court's class certification decision is manifestly
erroneous.
Id. at 959. See 2 McLaughlin on Class Actions § 7:11 (5th ed.)
(noting that the Ninth Circuit has never deviated from the
Chamberlan factors).
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USAPA addresses only the so-called “death knell†standard.
It completely distorts the standard by disregarding its purpose—
to mitigate the harm where a class certification order prevents
reaching the merits of the underlying dispute. Where
certification would so intimidate the defendant that it would be
compelled to settle, the order sounds the death-knell for the
defendant. See Sumitomo, 262 F.3d at 140 (recognizing death-
knell in cases where “class certification will effectively terminate
the litigation because it will force [defendants] to settle the case
rather than risk trialâ€). Where denial of certification would make
an individual action far too expensive compared to the possible
recovery, the order sounds the death knell for the plaintiff. Blair,
181 F.3d at 834 (recognizing death-knell where “the denial of
class status sounds the death knell of the litigation, because the
representative plaintiff's claim is too small to justify the expense
of litigationâ€).
Neither definition of “death-knell†applies here. Indeed,
USAPA’s concern is not that it wants an opportunity to litigate
the merits. No, USAPA appeals because it wants to avoid
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10
litigating the merits. USAPA wants to use the artifice of a Rule
23(f) appeal to cause delay in hopes that with more delay it
would become more difficult to fashion an acceptable remedy.
B. There is no question that the district court has jurisdiction.
USAPA’s contention that there is no subject matter
jurisdiction is a flawed attempt at distraction. Each of its
arguments—lack of ripeness, exclusive System Board
jurisdiction, and exclusive National Mediation Board (“NMBâ€)
jurisdiction—are contrary to well-established law.
1. A DFR claim is ripe without actual concrete injury.
The Fifth Circuit rejected a very similar ripeness argument
in an early Rule 23(f) case where a Railway Labor Act union
defendant (just like USAPA) argued lack of injury in fact in the
context of a seniority dispute. In that matter, the union
defendant argued:
that the named plaintiffs have not suffered any injury …
[because] the challenged seniority changes did not affect
the named plaintiffs' abilities to get the work
assignments they desired; each plaintiff has received the
assignments bid for. Thus, defendants argue, plaintiffs
have demonstrated no monetary loss and lack standing.
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Bertulli v. Independent Assn. of Continental Pilots, 242 F.3d 290,
295 (5th Cir. 2001) (footnotes omitted). As here, “[t]his cramped
view misunderstands standing.†Id.
Loss of seniority is an injury within a commonsense
understanding of the term, and one that is suffered by the
plaintiffs themselves. It carries with it the possibility of
several forms of concrete injury, such as slower
promotion, greater likelihood of being laid off, and lower
benefits.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Furthermore, a claim for “loss of ‘fair
representation’ under the RLA†asserts “‘procedural rights’
protected by statute, the loss of which is itself an injury without
any requirement of a showing of further injury.†Id.
It simply does not matter here, therefore, that Respondents
might suffer more concrete injury if USAPA is allowed to proceed
further with its unfair representation. The deprivation of fair
representation alone is sufficient to give standing.
2. The System Board does not have jurisdiction.
It is hardly worth responding to USAPA’s argument that the
System Board has exclusive jurisdiction over Respondents’ duty
of fair representation claim. In fact, the System Board only has
jurisdiction over “disputes between an employee or group of
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employees and a carrier or carriers.†Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry.
Co., 393 U.S. 324, 328 (1969). Indeed, the System Board has no
jurisdiction because it has “no power to order the kind of relief
necessary.†Hence, “[t]he federal courts may therefore properly
exercise jurisdiction over both the union and [where necessary]
the carrier†in an unfair representation case. Id.
3. The NMB does not have jurisdiction.
Finally, there is no question that the NMB lacks jurisdiction.
NMB jurisdiction is limited to determine “who is the employees’
representative.†Air Line Pilots Assn, Intl. v. Transamerica
Airlines, Inc., 817 F.2d 510, 515 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987). Respondents
neither allege that USAPA is not the representative nor seek a
remedy inconsistent with it being the representative. Rather,
Respondents assert that USAPA is violating its duty as the
representative and seek no different remedy than has been
upheld in similar cases. See Bernard v. Air Line Pilots Assn.,
Intl., 873 F.2d 213, 215 (9th Cir. 1989). The remedy provided in
Bernard was as follows:
By way of remedy, the district court: (1) directed ALPA to
apply its current merger policy providing for negotiation,
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mediation and arbitration in order to resolve merger and
seniority integration disputes between the two groups of
pilots; (2) directed ALPA to treat the former Jet America
pilots as a separate ALPA-represented group for purposes
of implementing this policy and to appoint three Jet
America pilot merger representatives; (3) vacated and set
aside the October 6, 1987, seniority integration
agreement between ALPA and Alaska Airlines; and (4)
specified the basis by which pilots would be furloughed,
promoted and given flying assignments in the interim
period until a new agreement could be reached.
Id. Surely, the district court has jurisdiction to provide similar
remedy in this matter.
C. The Expense of Litigation is a Cognizeable Hardship if it
Can be Avoided, Not if it Can Only be Delayed.
Ordinarily, this Court denies a stay unless it makes a
favorable consideration of likelihood of success and balance of
hardships. Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432,1435 (9th Cir. 1983)
(the standard “is similar to that employed by district courts in
deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunctionâ€). In this
situation, the Court must analyze likelihood of success on two
levels. First, the Court must consider the likelihood that it will
permit USAPA to even file an appeal. Second, the Court must
consider, if it did permit an appeal, the likelihood that USAPA
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would prevail. For each of these considerations, the likelihood is
very small. For both together, the likelihood is miniscule.
The Court must also balance the hardships and here,
USAPA fails to identify a cognizable hardship. Litigation
expenses are a cognizable hardship, but only where, with success
of the appeal, litigation expenses would be avoided altogether.
U. S. Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359 F.2d 784, 785 (9th Cir. 1966)
(cognizable hardship where “interlocutory appeal might avoid
protracted and expensive litigationâ€). In this instance, litigation
expenses would only be delayed.
All that USAPA would attain if successful on its Rule 23(f)
appeal of class certification is de-certification of the class.
Because this is a (B)(2) class, if it was decertified it would only
affect USAPA’s right to assert res judicata. The expense of
litigating would be the same. The only difference would be when
the trial occurs. All that USAPA would achieve is delay and
delay by itself cannot justify a stay.
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CONCLUSION
Unquestionably, USAPA is using Rule 23(f) only in hope of
delaying the trial. This Court should reject this misuse
summarily and deny USAPA’s “emergency†motion for a stay.
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CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH F.R.A.P. 32(a)(7)©
AND CIRCUIT RULE 32-1 FOR CASE NUMBER 09-80051
I CERTIFY THAT:
The attached Response to Emergency Motion for Stay
Pending Appeal is proportionally spaced, has a typeface of 14
points, and contains 2,578 words, excluding the cover page, table
of contents, table of authorities, certificate of service, certificate
of compliance and statement of related cases.
DATED: April 6, 2009
Respectfully submitted,
/