Al,
What would you call, dual unionism, lawyer shopping, witholding information from those you seek to elect you, intentional breach of contract, and all around lowlife behavior?
I would call it, as the Supreme Court narrowly descibes "bad faith" as "dishonest conduct".
Simple really, pass anything other than the Nic, get sued, waste money, lose "unquestionably ripe DFR". Not that we have to concern ourselves with it, because that would require usapa to actually get a DOH contract passed, which would require usapa to get a DOH tentative agreement to vote on, which would require usapa to get the company to join you in their "dishonest conduct".
Nic4us says:
“What would you call, dual unionism, lawyer shopping, witholding information from those you seek to elect you, intentional breach of contract, and all around lowlife behavior?”
Nic4us,You will have to clarify this a little.
· Dual Unionism? I am not aware that plaintiffs pled this. What count is that in the complaint? Define Dual Unionism, where is the proof and where is the evidence. I have been following this case as closely as the next guy and dual unionism, whatever that is, is not in the complaint.
· Lawyer Shopping? Yes, it’s like car shopping, house shopping or any other shopping for a major purchase. Did your law-firm get pulled out of a hat or the yellow pages? Do they do drunk driving and divorce adds on Phoenix television? Or did your team search, i.e. “shop” for a competent law firm?
· Intentional breach of contract… See the last line of Humphrey v. Moore
· Lowlife behavior? Blocking phone lines, sending feces in the US mail, hanging dolls on flight-decks… You mean that type of stuff?
See what the 7th circuit says about so called “bad motives”
Lee Rakestraw, et al., Plaintiffs-appellees, Cross-appellants, v. United Airlines, Inc., Defendant-appellee, v. Air Line Pilots Association, International,defendant-appellant
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. - 981 F.2d 1524
1
Two cases present a common question: does a union's duty of fair representation under the Railway Labor Act block the union from adjusting seniority in a way known to favor some employees over others?
Slapping the label
"bad faith" or "discrimination" on a classification that is rationally related to a legitimate objective does not alter the analysis.
A discriminatory motive without a discriminatory rule does not condemn a statute. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 91 S.Ct. 1940, 29 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971); cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961) (rule rationally related to legitimate objective not spoiled by religious motivation of some sponsors). Knowledge that some groups gain or lose as a result of a rule does not even amount to a discriminatory motive. Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979).
For the reasons developed in Part II of this opinion, however, a "bad" motive does not spoil a collective bargaining agreement that rationally serves the interests of workers as a whole, and that treats employees who are pariahs in the union's eyes no worse than it treats similarly situated supporters of the union.
U.S. Supreme Court
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964)
…..The power of the Joint Conference Committee over seniority gave it power over jobs. It was entitled under § 5 to integrate the seniority lists upon some rational basis, and its decision to integrate lists upon the basis of length of service at either company was neither unique nor arbitrary. On the contrary, it is a familiar and frequently equitable solution to the inevitably conflicting interests which arise in the wake of a merger or an absorption such as occurred here. The Joint Conference Committee's decision to dovetail seniority lists was a decision which § 5 empowered the committee to make.
…..Despite the change in rights under the prior agreement, this Court held that the existing labor agreement did not limit the power of the parties jointly, in the process of bargaining collectively, to make new and
Page 375 U. S. 355
different contractual arrangements affecting seniority rights. It necessarily follows from Huffman that a settlement of a seniority dispute, deemed by the parties to be an interpretation of their agreement, not requiring an amendment, is plainly within their joint authority.
Just as, under the Huffman decision, an amendment is not to be tested by whether it is within the existing contract, so a grievance settlement should not be tested by whether a court could agree with the parties' interpretation. If collective bargaining is to remain a flexible process,
the power to amend by agreement and the power to interpret by agreement must be coequal.
As Mr. Gumby says on Monty Python...."My Brain hurts...." I'm going back to lurking.