Let''s Talk Facts About Bankruptcy

[RV4]

----------------
On 4/7/2003 8:55:39 AM AAviator wrote:

I do. Since 1982 these companies filed bankruptcy. Only 2 are still here. (not counting Usairways) They emerged into the biggest bull market known. The fares charged duiring this time frame were higher than todays fares. All others failed.


1982 Braniff
1983 Continental
1984 Air Florida
1986 Frontier
1989 Braniff
1989 Eastern
1990 Continental
1991 America West
1991 Midway
1991 Pan Am
1992 TWA
1995 TWA
2000 Fine Air
2000 Kitty Hawk
2000 Tower
2001 Midway
2001 TWA
2002 US Airways emerged 3/31/03
2002/3 United


----------------​

Looks like a damn good case for re-regulation instead of worker hacking.
Hacking at workers will only make this list rise.

Can you provide us information from the above list about how many hacked their workers pay/benefits and still failed? I believe a case could be made that hacking the pay/benefit of workers is the WRONG thing to do!

FULL PAY TO THE LAST DAY!

 

[RV4]

----------------
On 4/7/2003 9:57:30 AM KCFlyer wrote:

PS - I have another definition for you -

BRAVADO - 1.) Arrogant behavior 2.) A pretense of courage.​

----------------​

bra•va•do

Pronunciation: (bru-vä'dO),
—n.,
—pl. -does, -dos.
a pretentious, swaggering display of courage.

And most cannot even muster this up out of their fearful minds.

Thank You for the Kind Words KCFlyer!

 

[RV4]

If the company goes under the creditors are screwed!

If the employees get screwed the company goes under!

How does the Judge protect the creditors if he screws everyone else?

 

[Cosmo]

Here are some facts for you:

Fact #1: The federal bankruptcy process is for the benefit of, and attempts to maximize the financial return to, creditors of a bankrupt company. All others, such as shareholders, management, customers and rank-and-file employees (whether union or non-union), are of only secondary importance in this process.

Fact #2: A company in bankruptcy proceedings is required to submit all significant proposed actions for approval by one or more creditors'' committees and the bankruptcy judge. This puts a bankrupt company''s future in the hands of others whose interests might not necessarily coincide with those of the bankrupt company or its stakeholders. In other words, a bankrupt company loses control over its actions while it attempts to reorganize.

Fact #3: The bankruptcy process introduces an element of added uncertainty or risk to a company''s future prospects. Financially, this can be reflected in a higher cost of capital due to a risk premium, or the elimination of the value of all pre-existing stock. For management, this can be reflected in the possibility of being replaced by a court-appointed trustee. And for rank-and-file employees, this can be reflected in layoffs or court-ordered changes to working terms and conditions.

As employees contemplate how they will vote on the various tentative agreements, they need to understand all of the information available to them, decide what is in their best interest, and vote accordingly.

 

[KCFlyer]

----------------
On 4/7/2003 1027 AM RV4 wrote:




(bru-vä''dO),
—n.,​

 

[KCFlyer]

----------------
On 4/7/2003 1:40:06 PM RV4 wrote:


If the company goes under the creditors are screwed!

If the employees get screwed the company goes under!

How does the Judge protect the creditors if he screws everyone else?

----------------​

At least the creditors will get SOMETHING in liquidation - even if it is pennies on the dollar. That''s considerably more than what the employees would get under Chapter 7. That''s the other chapter of the bankruptcy book you need to be reading. If 11 isn''t "doable", then 7 sure is.

 

[xlurker]

http://bankruptcydata.com/

 

[RV4]

----------------
On 4/7/2003 6:56:52 PM Cosmo wrote:

You asked for facts, and I gave you facts. You then responded with assumptions, not facts. If you want everybody else to stick to facts in this thread, isn't it reasonable for the rest of us to expect that you would do the same?

----------------​

You better read the first post again Cosmo:

I open this thread for facts about why "we will end up worse". I am open minded and would like facts. Voting on Fear does not sound like the correct the thing to do!​

Your list of "facts" proves nothing about "we will end up worse".

Your request is reasonable. And so is mine.

In addition, please provide how you determine the following statements not to be factual?

----------------


If the company goes under the creditors are screwed!

If the employees get screwed the company goes under!

----------------
​

 

[Cosmo]

----------------
On 4/7/2003 1:40:06 PM RV4 wrote:


If the company goes under the creditors are screwed!

If the employees get screwed the company goes under!

How does the Judge protect the creditors if he screws everyone else?

----------------​

You asked for facts, and I gave you facts. You then responded with assumptions, not facts. If you want everybody else to stick to facts in this thread, isn''t it reasonable for the rest of us to expect that you would do the same?

 

[flyhigh]

It''s amazing how so many of you have convinced yourselves that bankruptcy could be a better option. The track record alone of bankrupt carriers should be enough to warn you that it offers little to no security. The company has to go bankrupt before it fails. If you sign this agreement, you increase the likelyhood that AA can restructure WITHOUT filing. Along with the changes in labor contracts will come supplier contract changes. For example, if the contracts are ratified, Boeing would be willing to relax lease payments because there is increased longterm certainty in payment. If the company files, they have to increase to get the most for assets.

As for some posts I''ve seen, here are some thoughts...

Bob Owens responded to me by saying that because TWA''s bankruptcy was used to abrogate leases it would be good for AA to use that as well. If it doesn''t make sense to you that using bankruptcy to get rid of planes is a bad idea, I''m not sure how to explain it. It raises the cost of all the other planes you have left, plus you have less revenue opportunities by getting rid of a/c (same total cost, less capacity = higher unit cost in a bad revenue envirnment...not a good plan).

As for selling bases...well they woulndn''t have to sell them. In a bankruptcy, they could simply shut them down, reject the leases and say bye bye to those working there (after changes in labor contracts).

To the poster who said AA or UA is too big to fail....nope, they''re just right. The assumption at present is that we''re about 15% over needed capacity. So, UA failing is a good thing. As fo the jobs...they''re spread throughout the country. The result would be little on the aggregate. Only one city would "suffer"...Denver. And that would only be temporary. CO has already said they would be interested in reviving their DEN hub should UA fail. WAS has plent of svc and most of UA''s at IAD is RJ and Int''l. SFO/LAX...The bay area sucks right now for everyone and LAX has plent of svc. The Pacific would be backfilled quickly. ORD...makes for a much stronger AA.

For those who say deregulation hasn''t worked...for who? Works great for the customer...works great for Southwest, Air Tran, and JetBlue. It didn''t work for you...sorry. You made a bad choice. You have a chance to make that choice a good one...it may involve more from you, but that''s how the system works. You must adapt to change, not simply resist it.

Resman...I do agree that the pricing structure needs to be changed. Our attempt to find a price point for each and every individual who might want to fly has confused even the best computers let alone minds of the industry. However, our current structure (labor costs and structural history) require us to maintain this system so as to be able to make a profit.

RV4...your comment re: worker hacking is quite amusing. Most of the "worker hacking" is required as a result of the raping of the company by the unionized employee groups. Take a look at the recent op-ed piece by Larry Lindsay in the Times or the Journal (can''t remember which). If pilots were willing to work for a salary that wasn''t above that of most VP''s in the industry, it might help. They''re the largest line item in the cost piece of most airline''s flights. It''s ridiculous.

Workingman...yeah that''s it...it''s all management''s fault. They''re all bad. Explain then how Joe Leonard, current head of AirTran leads a successful company after having been an exec at a failed company. He had a shot of morality overnight??? Maybe, just maybe, he knows what he was doing but was hamstrung by other factors (bad union leadership that musceld that company out of business???)?

 

[RV4]

flyhigh,

What are the specifics of YOUR sacrifice in this issue?

 

[RV4]

HERE ARE SOME FACTS FOR EVERYONE TO READ!

United States Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit.

BRIGGS TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, Appellant,
v.
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, and all of its affiliated unions; Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers Union (Independent); International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO and all its local unions; and Local Union No. 710 (Chicago) affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Appellees.

No. 84-5079.

Submitted June 12, 1984.
Decided July 17, 1984.
Certiorari Denied Oct. 15, 1984.

See 105 S.Ct. 295.

Employer appealed from an order of the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, 40 B.R. 972, Paul A. Magnuson, J., which denied its application for a preliminary injunction against present and future peaceful picketing activities of its employees under direction of various unions. The Court of Appeals, Heaney, Circuit Judge, held that Supreme Court decision in Bildisco, which permitted abrogation of existing collective bargaining agreements pursuant to a court order in Chapter 11 proceedings, did not require injunctive relief from peaceful picketing by union members who did not wish to accept abrogation of their contracts and failed to negotiate new agreements with employers attempting Chapter 11 reorganization even where such relief would otherwise be beyond jurisdiction of District Court under Norris-LaGuardia Act.

Affirmed.

Labor Relations 836

232Ak836 Most Cited Cases

Supreme Court decision in Bildisco, which permitted abrogation of existing collective bargaining agreements pursuant to a court order in Chapter 11 proceedings, did not require injunctive relief from peaceful picketing by union members who did not wish to accept abrogation of their contracts and failed to negotiate new agreements with employers attempting Chapter 11 reorganization even where such relief would otherwise be beyond jurisdiction of District Court under Norris-LaGuardia Act. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A § 365(a); Norris- LaGuardia Act, § § 1-15, 29 U.S.C.A. § § 101-115.
*341 Richard A. Miller, Sigal & Miller, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellees named Locals of Intern. Ass''n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO.

O''Connor & Hannan, Joe A. Walters, James A. Rubenstein, Dorie H. Benesh, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellant Briggs Transp. Co.

Scott D. Soldon, Goldberg, Previant, Uelmen, Gratz, Miller & Brueggeman, S.C., Milwaukee, Wis., for appellees Intern. Broth. of Teamsters and Affiliated Local Unions.

Before HEANEY and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges, and HANSON [FN*], Senior District Judge.

FN* THE HONORABLE WILLIAM C. HANSON, Senior United States District Judge for the Northern and Southern Districts of Iowa, sitting by designation.

*342 HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

Briggs Transportation Company appeals from the district court''s, 40 B.R. 972, [FN1] denial of a preliminary injunction against the present and future peaceful picketing activities of its employees under the direction of the defendants, various unions representing approximately 600 of Briggs'' 400 employees. --- B.R. ----. Briggs asserts that the court was not barred from enjoining such employee and union activities under the restrictions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § § 101-115 (1982), because the company had previously filed bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and received an order from the bankruptcy court allowing it to abrogate its collective bargaining contracts with

the unions as part of its reorganization efforts. We cannot agree that the abrogation of existing collective bargaining agreements pursuant to a court order in Chapter 11 proceedings, recently upheld in principle by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, ---- - ----, 104 S.Ct. 1188, 1194-1197, 79 L.Ed.2d 482, 492-496 (1984), automatically lifts the jurisdictional restrictions placed on federal courts in cases of labor disputes by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.

FN1. The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.

Briggs is a motor carrier located in the upper midwest. In 1978, it employed over 2,000 people. Since that time, it has failed to turn an annual profit and has consistently laid off many of its workers. On January 25, 1983, the company filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. At that time, it employed approximately 1,100 people. After filing its bankruptcy petition, Briggs closed thirty-five of its fifty-seven terminals and laid off around 800 more employees. It now employs nearly 400 persons, 300 of which are represented by the unions which are defendants in the present action.

Briggs met several times with union representatives in attempts to reduce its obligations under various collective bargaining agreements with the defendants. Briggs proposed a general wage rate of $9.00 an hour, instead of the $13.21 rate it had agreed to in existing labor agreements, along with significant cuts in fringe benefits and changes in important terms of employment. The record reveals a Briggs'' estimate that the proposed economic package reflected a thirty-two percent cut in pay alone. Failing to arrive at an agreeable reduction in contract benefits with the unions, Briggs moved the bankruptcy court for authority to abrogate its collective bargaining contracts under 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982) in late August of 1983. The bankruptcy court granted this motion on March 30, 1984. 39 B.R. 343, 39 B.R. 343,

The company immediately announced a unilateral reduction in wages, benefits, and terms of employment consistent with the aforementioned proposal, effective April 1, 1984. Employee members of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, one of the defendant unions, began a strike on April 5 and 6, 1984, with pickets stationed at many Briggs terminals. Briggs agreed to postpone the effective date of the proposed changes, and the Teamsters ended the strike. The parties conducted further meetings, but failed to arrive at a negotiated solution.

On April 20, 1984, Briggs filed the present action in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. The company sought an injunction against union activities which it viewed as interfering with the abrogation of collective bargaining agreements approved by the bankruptcy court. Specifically, Briggs sought to enjoin the defendants from:
1. Interference or threat of interference with the normal business operations of Briggs Transportation Co.;
2. Picketing or the display of any picket signs within 2000 feet of any terminal, dock facility, or other place of business of Briggs Transportation Co., *343 its agents, customers, suppliers or vendors;
3. Interference or threat of interference with the intrastate or interstate, local or over-the-road movement of equipment and/or freight of Briggs Transportation Co., its agents or customers, including, but not limited to, vandalizing, tampering, blocking, or following said equipment and/or freight;
4. Interfering or threat of interference with the real or personal property of Briggs Transportation Co. or its agents, customers, employees, suppliers or vendors at any Briggs Transportation Co. terminal or any other dock or business facility of an agent, customer, supplier or vendor; [or]
5. Interfering or threatening to interfere with any employee, agent, customer, supplier or vendor of Briggs Transportation Co. or their families, whether on or off duty, during or after business hours, including, but not limited to, following, threatening, assaulting or harassing, by any means, including the use of the telephone.

On April 22, 1984, the company unilaterally implemented its proposed changes in terms and conditions of employment. The district court heard oral argument on its motion for a preliminary injunction against union retaliation on April 24, 1984.

On April 25, 1984, the court issued its order denying the relief requested. It held that Briggs'' requested injunction involved a labor dispute over terms and conditions of employment. See 29 U.S.C. § 113© (1982). Thus, under the circumstances before it, the court found that the Norris-LaGuardia Act limited its power to issue an injunction. See id. § 101. The court rejected Briggs'' contention that the issuance of an injunction restricting a union''s attempts to resist the abrogation of a collective bargaining agreement was a necessary adjunct to the power of a bankruptcy court to authorize such an abrogation, a power upheld by the Supreme Court in Bildisco. Although Bildisco did arrive at an accommodation between the Bankruptcy Code and the National Labor Relations Act which subordinated labor contracts to the legitimate reorganization efforts of failing businesses, the district court held that Bildisco did not discuss or require a similar subordination of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to the Bankruptcy Code. The court succinctly stated, "[W]hile Bildisco may have authorized Briggs to cut its employees'' wages * * *, it does not prohibit the employees from complaining." Briggs Transportation Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 40 B.R. 972, 975 (D.Minn. 1984). Briggs perfected an expedited appeal of the district court''s order to this Court.

On appeal, Briggs candidly recognizes that it is asking for relief which would be unavailable to it in the absence of its Chapter 11 filing and the bankruptcy court''s order authorizing the abrogation of its collective bargaining agreements with the unions. Thus, the principal question is whether the logic of the Supreme Court''s decision in Bildisco requires injunctive relief from legitimate strike activities and peaceful picketing by union members who do not wish to accept the abrogation of their contracts and fail to negotiate new agreements with employers attempting Chapter 11 reorganization, even where such relief would otherwise be beyond the jurisdiction of the district court under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. We agree with the district court that Bildisco does not stretch this far, nor should it.

Initially, we note that the parties have cited us to nothing in the Bankruptcy Code or its legislative history indicating a congressional intent to lift the jurisdictional restrictions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act when a debtor receives court approval of the abrogation of a collective bargaining agreement. Other circuits have expressly held that the automatic stay provisions of the bankruptcy laws did not implicitly alter jurisdictional limits with regard to labor disputes imposed by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Crowe & Associates, Inc. v. Bricklayers & Masons Union Local No. 2, 713 F.2d 211, 214-215 (6th Cir.1983) (per curiam); *344 Petrusch v. Teamsters Local 317, 667 F.2d 297, 299-300 (2d Cir.1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 974, 102 S.Ct. 2238, 72 L.Ed.2d 848 (1982). In the same manner, we are convinced that Congress would not have silently repealed the Act to the extent that collective bargaining agreements may be rejected in a Chapter 11 proceeding under 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982).

Neither does the Bildisco case mandate the result urged upon us by Briggs. The Bildisco Court simply held that a bankruptcy court may approve the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement as part of a debtor''s Chapter 11 reorganization efforts upon an appropriate showing, and that a debtor does not commit an unfair labor practice by modifying or terminating part of such an agreement after filing bankruptcy but prior to a court order authorizing rejection of the agreement. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, supra, --- U.S. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 1191, 79 L.Ed.2d at 489. The Court did not discuss the Norris-LaGuardia Act, nor did it imply that the Act should in effect be repealed in cases such as the one here before us.

The Norris-LaGuardia Act was designed in large measure to prevent federal courts from enjoining the legitimate exercise of the rights of American workers created and protected by the National Labor Relations Act. We would unnecessarily limit those rights by easing the jurisdictional restrictions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in the present case.

We note two important factors which support our affirmance of the district court herein: First, to the extent that the nature or conduct of the unions'' activities violates provisions of state or federal law, relief from such activities may be available to Briggs under established statutory and case law in the same measure as given to other employers. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 194-197, 204, 98 S.Ct. 1745, 1756-1757, 1761, 56 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978), and cases cited therein; San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243- 244 & n. 2, 79 S.Ct. 773, 778-779 & n. 2, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959), and cases cited therein; 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). Second, any Briggs employees who strike out of dissatisfaction with Briggs'' wages, benefits, and terms of employment may be considered economic strikers, and Briggs retains the right to respond in any legal manner to continue its operations. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-346, 58 S.Ct. 904, 910-911, 82 L.Ed. 1381 (1938).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court''s judgment refusing to enjoin the peaceful collective activities of Briggs'' employees and their elected representatives.

739 F.2d 341, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3169, 101 Lab.Cas. P 11,122, 10 Collier Bankr.Cas.2d 1332, Bankr. L. Rep. P 69,939

 

[AAviator]

These facts?

Briggs is a motor carrier located in the upper midwest. In 1978, it employed over 2,000 people. Since that time, it has failed to turn an annual profit and has consistently laid off many of its workers. On January 25, 1983, the company filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. At that time, it employed approximately 1,100 people. After filing its bankruptcy petition, Briggs closed thirty-five of its fifty-seven terminals and laid off around 800 more employees. It now employs nearly 400 persons, 300 of which are represented by the unions which are defendants in the present action.


Briggs is now out of business.

The court succinctly stated, "[W]hile Bildisco may have authorized Briggs to cut its employees'' wages * * *, it does not prohibit the employees from complaining." Briggs Transportation Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters

Everybody now!

God bless America, Land that I love, Stand beside her, and guide her.....


From the good book of Archie Bunker: Meathead. Dead from the neck up.

 

[KCFlyer]

AAviator - I was wondering what good it did to picket a dead company. At least they have that right.

 

[KCFlyer]

RV4 you win - the concessions didn''t gain Briggs anything. But the right to picket is small comfort to those who were downsized until there was nothing left of the company. What did this "victory" you cite do to improve the lives of the 1,600 former employees of Briggs??