Excellent point, eolesen. Negative margins (even huge negative margins) on a tiny portion of your business aren't the end of the world as long as you maintain adequate positive margins on the bulk of your business.
WT: So if AA needn't waive the white flag and exit the TPAC business, then what would you suggest AA do? My guess is that your response would be for AA to slow down its TPAC growth as you've repeatedly stressed that AA has added tons of new TPAC capacity despite the relatively low yields that AA is getting to/from Asia.
Here's the problem that I see with very slow, measured, conservative capacity additions in the Pacific region:
The pro-merger crowd insisted that AA had to get a lot bigger if it was to successfully compete against UA and DL, both of which had total revenue about 50% to 60% or so more than AMR. The pro-merger advocates said that AA would not get any new corporate contracts and would lose most of what it had and eventually cease to exist. Both UA and DL were substantially larger in some of the big cities, primarily in the East. Finally, both UA and DL have substantially larger TPAC networks compared to AA. Horton's initial Ch 11 plan was to grow organically to solve some of the domestic size disadvantage. Presumably, that would increase revenue as well. The employees and creditors went instead with the Parker plan of a merger with US. That solved the revenue shortfall compared to UA and DL. It also solved, sort of, the size problem in the East, although as we know, plenty of shrinking at DCA and LGA, so new AA won't be as big as the sum of pmUS and pmAA in some of the big Eastern cities. Oh well.
Neither Horton's plan nor Parker's plan (the merger) directly solved that third issue - the huge head-start that UA and DL have in the Pacific due in large part to their acquisitions/mergers (the PanAm and the Northwest Orient TPAC networks and NRT fifth freedom hubs). When you repeatedly decry the huge negative margins of AA's Pacific operations, and imply that AA should slow down its new capacity adds, my conclusion is that you're not posting that out of a fiscally-prudent concern for AA's finances. Rather, you're rooting for DL/UA to hold onto their legacy positions as the big fish in the Pacific.
If the all-important corporate contracts depend on AA fixing the inadequacies in the East (which have been solved as best as AA will be able to do) and depend on AA fixing its shortcomings in the Pacific, then won't those customers want to see AA catch up relatively quickly? Over how many years should AA slowly add TPAC flights? UA is still on its heels and now is the time to aggressively go after that business.