USAPA also complained at the instruction stage that the jury was given no definition of “bad faith.†The Supreme Court has defined “bad faith†in this context as requiring a showing of “fraud, deceitful action, or dishonest conduct,†or personal hostility. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 348, 350 (1964); accord Conkle v. Jeong, 73 F.3d 909, 916 (9th Cir. 1995) (referring to “personal animus†as a basis for “bad faith†liability). At the same time, the Supreme Court has often resorted to the rule that a union’s discretion is subject to “good faith and honesty of purpose.†See Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 75-76 (1991); Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 707 (1983); United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 67 n.2 (1981); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 564 (1976); Humphrey, 375 U.S. at 342; Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
In civil law, the forms of fraud range to the bounds of human imagination. 17 Am. Jur. Fraud § 1 (2009). “In fact, the fertility of people’s invention in devising new schemes of fraud is so great that courts have always declined to define the term, reserving to themselves the liberty to deal with fraud in whatever form it may present itself.†Id. (listing nineteen judicial definitions of fraud); see also Keith v. Murfreesboro Livestock Market, Inc., 780 S.W.2d 751, 754 & n.2 (Tenn. App. 1989) (citing Dante Alighieri’s personification of fraud as the demon Geryon, a reptile-scorpion-mongrel of a man, to illustrate why fraud is not subject to a “hidebound definitionâ€). The “fraud†or “bad faith†at issue here is an abuse of trust akin to a deliberate breach of fiduciary duties. “Just as a trustee must act in the best interests of the beneficiaries, a union, as the exclusive representative of the workers, must exercise its power to act on behalf of the employees in good faith.†Chauffeurs, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 567 (1990) (citation omitted); accord O’Neill, 499 U.S. at 75. The jury instructions omit the phrase “fraud, deceitful action, or dishonest conduct†because those terms add nothing to the analysis. Instead, the jury was instructed on a union’s duty to represent with “good faith and honesty of purpose,†a phrase better suited to the situation here where the union is accused of brandishing a pretext to justify majority self-dealing at the expense of West Pilots. Much as a definition of fraud would add nothing to an adequate instruction on embezzlement, no further definition of “bad faith†was needed. The instructions predicate any liability on the specific facts of USAPA’s conduct.
Seniority dispute cases are conceived in terms of both “bad faith†and “discrimination.†Cases imposing liability cite both standards. See Bernard, 873 F.2d at 216 (holding that union may treat groups of employees differently “as long as such conduct is not arbitrary or taken in bad faithâ€); Barton Brands, 529 F.2d at 799 (prohibiting discrimination “on bad faith groundsâ€); Truck Drivers, 379 F.2d at 142 (faulting union for “renounc[ing] any good faith effort to reconcile†employee interests); Ramey, 378 F.3d at 276-77 (union has obligation to “exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honestyâ€) (quoting Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177); Teamsters Local Union No. 42, 825 F.2d at 611(same). In these cases, the distinction matters little. “Bad faith†and “discrimination†become two different labels for the same theory of liability. None of the applicable cases trouble over this issue of nomenclature, and perhaps rightly so. Cf. Jones v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 495 F.2d 790, 798 (2d Cir. 1974) (rejecting, pre-O’Neill, the strict compartmentalization of fair representation claims and holding that varied labels only serve to emphasize the range of a union’s broad discretion). But see Rakestraw, 989 F.2d at 945-48 & n.2 (Ripple, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (criticizing panel decision for abandoning the tripartite “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith†standard, which O’Neill reaffirmed, in favor of a “crabbed interpretation of the duty of fair representationâ€). It may be that “bad faith†and “discrimination†merge into a single concept that describes the ills at work in this case. See Bernard, 873 F.2d at 216 (prohibiting bad-faith disparate treatment of workers); Williams v. Pac. Maritime Ass’n, 617 F.2d 1321, 1330 (9th Cir. 1980) (same); Ramey, 378 F.3d at 277 (same). The terminological difference does not affect its proof or defense.