Who says the slots have to go to low fare carriers? Define " low fare carrier"
precisely..... there are indeed rules about controlling the carriers that gain the low fare carrier slots...so the only option is codesharing
and then we still have people who believe that a partnership with B6 is supposed to help AA despite the fact that B6 has pushed AA out of more markets in NYC, only to watch DL begin service in many of those markets.... but again, somehow, we are supposed to believe it will be different this time around?
First, you might want to rethink the average seat comparisons at DCA: the letter to employees is implying moving some connection flying out of DCA as a result of the divestiture. Upgauging from the 76 seaters to A319's and larger is going to limit the 15% of the slot portfolio to 15% of the traffic.
The other factor you're glossing over... the Southwest effect ain't what it used to be. Maybe you don't live where they fly (are they serving South America yet?), but in almost all cases I've looked at when traveling this year, WN's fares are the same as AA's, almost without exception.
They're not undercutting as they used to because they can't afford to. Their costs are close enough to where everyone else's have fallen, and many of the other advantages they held thru the 90's have been negated by workrule changes the other carriers won in bankruptcy.
They still have a powerful brand, certainly, but it's not the same competitor they were when they were growing by 15-20% a year.
Your ORD-LGA analogy is also an interesting choice. When you compare a few surgical frequencies on e-Jets against carrier with hourly frequencies & larger capacities, the guy with the fewer frequencies will typically show a higher yield.
But you left out an important other half of that situation: the carrier with the most frequencies almost always winds up with a disproportionate amount of the revenue, especially higher yielding pax who want the flexibility to miss a flight and catch the next one.
With AA finally getting back into the NYC-DCA shuttle business, they'll have hourly service to ORD, DCA, BOS, and LAX.
With that, it's hard to see AA remaining "a distant 3rd" as you've put it, especially if the Jetblue partnership remains untouched.
There are lots of sports teams who won titles after sucking wind at the start of the season, and WW-II didn't start out too well for the allies.
To try and claim victory in NYC is probably a bit premature right now. It's a marathon, not a sprint.
it doesn't matter that if 44 slot pairs are divested and they all go to low fare carriers, AA/US' combined operation will be much smaller as a percentage of the airport than it was before while low fare carriers will be much larger.
The average seat size is taken from schedule data TODAY. US has the smallest average aircraft size at DCA of any hub and the smallest average aircraft size of any carrier at DCA. They use small aircraft because they don't want to put more seats in the market.
If low fare competitors - who don't use RJs - gain all 44 slot pairs - AA-US will see a significant increase in the amount of low fare competition. They will have to respond with larger aircraft which will push down their yields at the very time that their costs will be going up as part of the merger integration process.
And then we have the whole question of service to small and medium sized cities which AA/US are presumably going to be able to walk away from even though that was a key part of the discussions by many of the states and communities when the case was first filed.
We are supposed to believe now that AA/US is going to be able to dramatically reduce the number of flights it operates to small/medium cities so it can flood the market with mainline jets in order to fend off the 44 new low fare carrier flights?
Methinks either the DOJ screwed the entire rest of the country in favor of getting a lot more low fare competition in DCA or you don't have the full story.
I'm going with the latter.
As for NYC, you still want to believe that AA can become something significAAnt in NYC with a focus-city strategy to multiple hubs/other focus cities despite the fact that DL and UA serve all of those cities PLUS have service to many more cities.
AA has a lower fare in LGA-ORD because they are dumping capacity into the market in order to maintain their market share, the same thing they are doing in LAX, even though some people think that flying to Asia from LAX is good for their brand. There is nothing about this merger that is going to improve AA's presence in the local LGA-ORD market. AA has more seats but do you realize that DL with its Ejets (the same ones that you and others seem to think is going to save AA's operation at ORD from UA's competitive pressures but are insignificant if DL uses them) has more frequencies in LGA-ORD than UA?
You still want to believe that AA/US will be able to effective compete against DL and UA yet DL has lower costs than AA/US now and DL's are getting lower while AA/US' costs will increase. AA/US hasn't solved its strategic problems in Asia or NYC as much as you think that combining two focus city operations against two other carriers with full-sized hubs is going to fix that. It also doesn't change that DCA and DFW, AA and US' highest margin hubs are going to be significantly degraded in terms of profitability because of low fare competition, even though AA and US have done a very poor job of defending their hubs from low fare competition for years.... but somehow we're supposed to believe that it all changes today?
Your right, E. It's a marathon, not a sprint. But AA and US and your and others' support of them hasn't been based on competitive logic but wishful hope for years - and that isn't changing one iota with this merger.