WorldTraveler
Corn Field
- Dec 5, 2003
- 21,709
- 10,662
- Banned
- #541
Actually, E, I do agree.
The point that DOES matter is that DL has aggressively fought its way into a key – if not THE key – market in the US and has succeeded at doing so in a highly competitive environment against carriers like AA, B6, and CO which all had advantages over DL at one time or another.
Kat,
So US couldn’t figure out how to operate in a delay prone environment, didn’t invest the right equipment in the market to successfully compete, and then fails and we are supposed to blame it on the NYC market and not US?
Somehow B6, CO, and DL have all figured out how to survive in the same market and have invested what it necessary to succeed – and are enjoying the fruits of their labors.
NYC is not the problem. It is a unique market w/ unique challenges – but it has the ability to generate revenues far larger than any other market in the US and for those companies that can figure out how to succeed in it, they will reap the benefits.
If US decided it wasn’t worth competing in NYC, then there is one less carrier fighting for the market – but they also walked away from the largest market in the US – and have made it much harder for a potential merger with AA to regain the size necessary to compete with DL and UA.
007 et al,
Absolutely AA has failed to protect its market – but history is rather clear that companies that are struggling (either internally or externally) are precisely where competitors will focus their competitive efforts. From the perspective that AA has been unable to defend key markets including the city where it was formerly headquartered, absolutely AA’s mgmt needs to go.
But it also doesn’t change – as much as US would like to believe – that creditors and all of AA’s employee based do not and will not see US as the savior that AA needs. US has indeed done a good job of pulling together two failing airlines and is now generating financial results that are on par with much larger airlines.
But let’s also not forget that it has taken US 7 years since that merger, the merger process is still not complete, US employees are the lowest paid among network carriers, and US’ revenues are not on par with other carriers, esp. in the key int’l markets where AA needs the most help.
When creditors look at the options that exist for them to obtain recovery from their investments in AMR, they do not see just the two options that many AA and US employees or US management sees.
AA employees are far more vocal that they want something OTHER than their current mgmt but they are far from signing on the dotted line to commit to US.
AMR creditors look at the incomplete labor integration at US – and most importantly with the pilots which is the most significant labor issue AA has faced – and they are most certainly asking why they would want to throw their support behind a merger in an industry where mergers are highly problematic to begin with and where US’ track record is not a whole lot better than the industry as a whole.
There are a number of other carriers that could take part of AMR and succeed quite well with what they obtain; there is no doubt that AS, B6, DL, F9 or others could absorb parts of AA and succeed with what they receive within the business models that each of them already do. And any of those combinations with AMR would involve much less risk to those companies and to the creditors AND many of those companies do have higher pay and compensation than AA employees will have under the term sheets AND higher than US has under its existing wage scales.
US can promise pay raises to levels that would satisfy AA labor but it has yet to show how it can sustain those higher costs on its own network and how it would succeed at keeping AA and US employees happy as separate employees on separate pay scales.
If AMR can’t successfully demonstrate that it can turn the company around, and that is a very real possibility given that there are legions of AA employees that say they would rather burn the place down than be pushed into lower wages and still work for AA mgmt, then the creditors absolutely will look at each potential merger or asset sale transaction on the basis of each of those carrier’s abilities to generate the maximum return for the creditors.
To be quite honest, the creditors don’t care about keeping AA held together as one airline, esp. if labor will destroy whatever possibility that AA has of successfully restructuring.
And the creditors are not going to be locked into thinking that if AA is unable to successfully reorganize as a standalone company, the only option is to merge the whole company with another company that may not still be the best option for the creditors or even the employees.
The point that DOES matter is that DL has aggressively fought its way into a key – if not THE key – market in the US and has succeeded at doing so in a highly competitive environment against carriers like AA, B6, and CO which all had advantages over DL at one time or another.
Kat,
So US couldn’t figure out how to operate in a delay prone environment, didn’t invest the right equipment in the market to successfully compete, and then fails and we are supposed to blame it on the NYC market and not US?
Somehow B6, CO, and DL have all figured out how to survive in the same market and have invested what it necessary to succeed – and are enjoying the fruits of their labors.
NYC is not the problem. It is a unique market w/ unique challenges – but it has the ability to generate revenues far larger than any other market in the US and for those companies that can figure out how to succeed in it, they will reap the benefits.
If US decided it wasn’t worth competing in NYC, then there is one less carrier fighting for the market – but they also walked away from the largest market in the US – and have made it much harder for a potential merger with AA to regain the size necessary to compete with DL and UA.
007 et al,
Absolutely AA has failed to protect its market – but history is rather clear that companies that are struggling (either internally or externally) are precisely where competitors will focus their competitive efforts. From the perspective that AA has been unable to defend key markets including the city where it was formerly headquartered, absolutely AA’s mgmt needs to go.
But it also doesn’t change – as much as US would like to believe – that creditors and all of AA’s employee based do not and will not see US as the savior that AA needs. US has indeed done a good job of pulling together two failing airlines and is now generating financial results that are on par with much larger airlines.
But let’s also not forget that it has taken US 7 years since that merger, the merger process is still not complete, US employees are the lowest paid among network carriers, and US’ revenues are not on par with other carriers, esp. in the key int’l markets where AA needs the most help.
When creditors look at the options that exist for them to obtain recovery from their investments in AMR, they do not see just the two options that many AA and US employees or US management sees.
AA employees are far more vocal that they want something OTHER than their current mgmt but they are far from signing on the dotted line to commit to US.
AMR creditors look at the incomplete labor integration at US – and most importantly with the pilots which is the most significant labor issue AA has faced – and they are most certainly asking why they would want to throw their support behind a merger in an industry where mergers are highly problematic to begin with and where US’ track record is not a whole lot better than the industry as a whole.
There are a number of other carriers that could take part of AMR and succeed quite well with what they obtain; there is no doubt that AS, B6, DL, F9 or others could absorb parts of AA and succeed with what they receive within the business models that each of them already do. And any of those combinations with AMR would involve much less risk to those companies and to the creditors AND many of those companies do have higher pay and compensation than AA employees will have under the term sheets AND higher than US has under its existing wage scales.
US can promise pay raises to levels that would satisfy AA labor but it has yet to show how it can sustain those higher costs on its own network and how it would succeed at keeping AA and US employees happy as separate employees on separate pay scales.
If AMR can’t successfully demonstrate that it can turn the company around, and that is a very real possibility given that there are legions of AA employees that say they would rather burn the place down than be pushed into lower wages and still work for AA mgmt, then the creditors absolutely will look at each potential merger or asset sale transaction on the basis of each of those carrier’s abilities to generate the maximum return for the creditors.
To be quite honest, the creditors don’t care about keeping AA held together as one airline, esp. if labor will destroy whatever possibility that AA has of successfully restructuring.
And the creditors are not going to be locked into thinking that if AA is unable to successfully reorganize as a standalone company, the only option is to merge the whole company with another company that may not still be the best option for the creditors or even the employees.