Here Comes the 'term sheet"

Point is, for the most part - there are no new hires here. All of us knew what we were voting against on that last TA! Your pinning the blame on Bob is BS. I feel the same way he does on the issue, and so do most of the guys you work with! Define replaceable. Good god, even when a 20 year guy transfers in, he needs time to come up to speed on local rules, and where everything is etc.. As far as your assertion on NWA maintenance recovering quickly, I'll take issue with that. Even though they are Delta now - they still haven't recovered. It's more like they are doing a good job covering up their shortcomings. I have family there, and I'm told just how great they really are. I especially like the part where after NWA lost most of there AMTs and then had a miserable collection of scabs and previously unemployable retreads; anyway, it was so bad that they had to dumb down the maintenance manuals. So, yeah there are a lot of qualified AMTs waiting to replace us....not.
The company is about to replace some of us. Your point about replacement quality is correct and some of Bob's points may be correct but you are both assuming that the company gives a damn about quality, cost comparisons, or even what is best for the long term. Horton is a bean counter not a maintenance guy.
So yes we are replaceable and we are about to see it.
 
While the sentiment is finally setting in that the AA of the past is going to be permanently changed and the possibility exists that AA might not recover, there is little to be gained – and it shows a lack of understanding of the real root problem – by continuing to blame one side vs. the other.
The simple fact is that AA is the last of the legacy airlines to go through the BK process – and part of what that process has done is to significantly break labor’s back to provide whatever airline used the process the opportunity to rebuild its business model.
What cannot be disputed is that the historic legacy airline labor relations model is broken and no one has any clue on how to fix it. The best answer has been to use BK as a powerful enough tool to wound labor sufficiently to provide time to reconstruct the business plan at that specific airline.
Blaming one party or the other doesn’t change the fact that there is not a single example of a long term viable legacy airline in N. America that is predominantly unionized. What is clear is that there have been dozens of legacy airlines fail based on that model.
UA is so far the closest example of a viable network airline – but it still has yet to resolve labor integration as part of its CO merger/acquisition – and all the indications are that UA mgmt does not have the resources necessary to pay the price to achieve that labor integration – so they want to drag the process out as long as they can. Given that a big part of making the UA/CO merger work requires cooperation of labor, it is far too early to know if the UA/CO merger will be a success or not – and if UA will have to pay a price for labor peace that will cost the airline its ability to compete long term. Given that UA’s labor rates will likely become the highest in the industry after labor integration and AA’s BK, the outcome cannot be viewed with hope.
Specific to AA, labor relations have been nothing short of horrid for decades – and there are more than enough examples of how both mgmt and labor has failed to grasp the severity of the situation or address the real underlying issue – which is that mgmt has taken as often as it can from labor, has rarely followed through on what it said it would do with the benefits it gained while labor has used every opportunity to hold onto everything they have and fought any sort of change the company has needed to adapt to the rapidly changing airline business model.
Compound labor mgmt issues with some spectacular strategic failures directly from AA mgmt (including believing that other airlines would suffer if not fail so AA did not need to address its problems w/ urgency) and it becomes clear that what AA is facing today has been in the making for a long time.
Crandall’s best answer is to reregulate the industry, demonstrating that he is no more capable of turning AA around than anyone else. What Crandall did was build a strong airline with enormous revenue generating potential – but AA still relies on the same broken labor relations model that has grounded a number of airlines.
You can debate the cause of the broken business model but it doesn’t change the fact that it is broken and won’t be fixed in time to solve AA’s problems.
What is true is that the airlines that have succeeded in the US – and Canada – where together deregulation has prioritized market forces over preservation and protection of labor - have all succeeded because they have rebuilt the traditional labor mgmt model or stayed far enough away from it to prevent their airlines from being influenced by it.
WN of course is the classic example of cooperative labor mgmt relations in a heavily unionized company – but Herb knew before WN was ever created that he had to rebuild the traditional labor mgmt model and he did just that by creating a fun place to work, maintaining a strong dialogue with labor, and paying premiums to labor relative to their peers in order to give the company what it needed.
CO is probably the best labor turnaround story among legacy US airlines – but the employees were completely broken and then the company was put back together by a mgmt team that had a high regard for labor and used the low costs relative to its peers to rapidly grow the company; all they had to do was find a core group of people who had hope they could get off the bottom of the industry – and they were able to do just that.
There are a host of low fare carriers that have never followed the traditional labor mgmt business model and their employees have expressed no desire to go after the a model which has crippled far too many airlines.
And then there is Delta Air Lines which has religiously protected its largely non-union labor relations model and managed to get along relatively well with its unionized pilots by paying them average or better relative to its peers, the same strategy it has used with its non-contract employees. And the benefit of DL’s business model has been the flexibility to adapt to the rapidly changing business conditions.
The number one reason why the legacy airline labor relations model has not worked while others have succeeded is the ability to adapt… a key hallmark of the low cost carrier model.
Whether the root of the problem is labor, mgmt, or the RLA can be debated but what cannot be denied is that the legacy airline labor- mgmt model has not worked – and AA is only the most recent airline to go through the process, even if it is the last airline.
The real fear is that AA, an airline that had enormous revenue generating capability sufficient to overcome its labor issues in the past, may be subject to forces outside of AA’s control that could negatively affect the outcome of the BK process.
What people need to stop doing is blaming one party or the other – because the problem is way bigger than AA or its unions.
Until someone can come up with a model that restores the power of labor while also providing management with the flexibility it needs to adapt to the rapidly changing deregulated airline industry, the process will continue to repeat itself.
.
The worst thing that can be done in the coming months is for AA and its labor to shoot each other and eliminate any chance that AA might return to some semblance of its former self.
 
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WT,

I will promise to learn shorthand if you promise to use it... :blink:
WT could dictate audio files and we could listen to them while we are reading all the other postings or even driving back and forth to work.
 
Anything other than an AFL-CIO organization. I prefer AMFA and we'll have the numbers soon.
At AA MRO?
UMFA: Unlicensed Mechanics Fraternal Association
or Underpaid Mechanics Fraternal Association
or Underappreciated Mechanics Fraternal Association
 
At AA MRO?
UMFA: Unlicensed Mechanics Fraternal Association
or Underpaid Mechanics Fraternal Association
or Underappreciated Mechanics Fraternal Association
AA MRO states that all their mechanics have A&P's.
 
I'll be laid off but I'll vote for anything you guys want
Does your move possibly indicate that the fear the membership has had is easing, and that a union election is in our future?
 
I've signed every card drive since 03 and was an amfa organizer, and can prove every bit of that if I used my name
 

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