Firearm discharges on US Airways flight

[oldiebutgoody]

Claiming anything is "negligent" without an investigation is, dare I say, "negligent". I know that you have crowned yourself "knower of all things", but I'm waiting to hear from real experts.

 

[john john]

Without reading all 29 pages, why would the Capt stow his weapon while on approach? Would'nt it be safer to do it while on the ground parked at the gate?

Preparing to exit the cockpit ASAP. Commuter
Its simple you either fire the weapon because you want to are you fire the weapon because you don’t
I think he didn’t want to fire the weapon but maybe I wrong maybe he wanted to fire the weapon

 

[Flyz4food]

Preparing to exit the cockpit ASAP. Commuter
Its simple you either fire the weapon because you want to are you fire the weapon because you don’t
I think he didn’t want to fire the weapon but maybe I wrong maybe he wanted to fire the weapon

Huh?

 

[john john]

Huh?

Did he want to fire the weapon?
YES or NO?

 

[FA Mikey]

Claiming anything is "negligent" without an investigation is, dare I say, "negligent". I know that you have crowned yourself "knower of all things", but I'm waiting to hear from real experts.

It can only be described as negligent. A weapon only fires when the trigger is pulled back, all the way to the rear. Whether it was by his finger, by a locking mechanism, it really doesnt matter. It is the operators responsibility to use due care. If there is a locking mechanism that could cause a discharge, than it is the operators responsibility to ensure it is done correctly, and safely. If that is impossible to do, than he should not use it or carry the weapon. Because to do so could and would be considered negligent.

 

[767jetz]

Look, there is no question that handling the weapon during a sterile cockpit is a violation of many SOPs. That is assuming there were no circumstances that would have made it prudent to do so. As with any SOP, it can be ignored if the PIC determines a safer course of action is available. In this case I'd say probably not.

But there is also the issue that current procedures with the locking mechanism increase the possibility of an accidental discharge. So why not change the suspect procedure when there are certainly other, safer options available? Like any accident, the cause is rarely one single element. It is usually a chain of events.

 

[oldiebutgoody]

It's just much easier for the anti-gun folks to call it "negligent", even though that implies hat less than ordinary safety precautions were being observed, which may NOT be the case. The "I'm right and I say so" crowd doesn't have a "CLUE" about what the legal term of "negligence" implies.

 

[LSS]

TSA "Lack of Trust" Threatens FFDO Program

APA Communications Committee: Failures within the leadership of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) tasked with managing the Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) Program have needlessly exposed the previously heralded program to harsh public criticism. In a widely publicized incident two weeks ago, an FFDO on duty experienced an accidental discharge of his weapon in the cockpit during flight. Many specific details of the event made headlines and even became the subject of late-night talk show humor. The unprofessional leak of information by the TSA didn't stop there, as TSA legal representatives failed to adhere to their own rules of identity protection and released the FFDO's name to the press.

Yet despite the conduct of the TSA leadership, FFDOs have remained silently professional. In their own defense, FFDOs could have publicly exposed the fact that the TSA leadership has ignored thousands of formal complaints concerning the onerous locking holster procedures, many specifically citing the high risk of an accidental discharge. FFDOs have not complained publicly about how the TSA leadership fails to trust these highly educated, hand-picked pilots with their imposition of ridiculous weapons carriage procedures. Any other law enforcement officer is afforded more trust by TSA, with virtually no onboard weapons carriage restrictions compared to the slew of multiple donning, locking and stowing procedures FFDOs must endure. TSA's message to FFDOs is clear: "We don't trust you." TSA's procedural guidelines for FFDOs should only reflect common law enforcement practices and should never increase risk or interfere with a pilot's cockpit duties. Is that so difficult?

Additionally, while federal air marshal (FAM) numbers have been decreasing, the number of deputized FFDOs has been increasing. FFDOs protect three times the number of flights than FAMs, at only 4 percent of the cost! Of course, the primary reason the cost is so low is that FFDO volunteers work for free, train at their own time and expense, and provide this critical layer of civil defense at virtually no cost to the TSA or the airlines. Do the TSA or airlines ever express their gratitude? Actually, in the wake of the recent accidental discharge, the FFDO was given unpaid time off by his flight department and faces possible termination. "Thanks for your sacrifice of time, effort and money, now here's an unpaid vacation."

The program has been a tremendous success, in spite of the TSA leadership failures. Since the program started in 2003, millions of U.S. passenger and cargo flights have been silently protected without incident. The treatment of these patriot volunteers would likely be of great interest to the press and public, but would another black eye motivate the TSA to finally exercise appropriate leadership of the program?

Thankfully, we have advocates like APA's Committee for the Armed Defense of the Cockpit (CADC) and the Federal Flight Deck Officers Association (FFDOA). APA CADC Chairman First Officer Mike Karn and members of the FFDOA are in Washington, D.C. this week addressing needed improvements to the program with federal legislators. Specific areas they are seeking consideration of are operational FFDO procedures (primarily weapons carriage), funding for the FFDO program (TSA has diverted millions of dollars earmarked for the FFDO program), program costs to pilots (tax credit request), and paid time off to attend FFDO training (airlines need to support the protection provided). It is also obvious to us that we need to publicly promote the continued success and value of the program if only to counter the image damage being done by the TSA. To all FFDO volunteers, we salute your continued sacrifices and professionalism in this thankless environment.

To all participants of the FFDO program, I too salute you!

 

[ClueByFour]

Look, there is no question that handling the weapon during a sterile cockpit is a violation of many SOPs. That is assuming there were no circumstances that would have made it prudent to do so. As with any SOP, it can be ignored if the PIC determines a safer course of action is available. In this case I'd say probably not

That's the about the second rational thing that's been said on this thread.

It's just much easier for the anti-gun folks to call it "negligent", even though that implies hat less than ordinary safety precautions were being observed, which may NOT be the case. The "I'm right and I say so" crowd doesn't have a "CLUE" about what the legal term of "negligence" implies.

The gun fired. That implies that safety precautions were not being observed. That firearm will not fire itself.

Who said anything about the legal definition of negligent? Google it's definition and get back to us.

If the gun goes off unintentionally, it's negligent. It's not a difficult concept to grasp, unless you are trying to imply that it was somehow the gun or holster's fault. Neither of those elements, in the absence of incorrect handling by the operator, is capable of moving the trigger to the rear in a way to make the firearm discharge.

I realize you think pilots are not capable of doing wrong, and (as is typical for commercial pilots) will blame the procedures, equipment, or anything else. Firearms (especially this one) don't discharge themselves. Let us know when you have a snappy retort to address that fact.

 

[EastUS]

That's the about the second rational thing that's been said on this thread.



The gun fired. That implies that safety precautions were not being observed. That firearm will not fire itself.

If the gun goes off unintentionally, it's negligent. It's not a difficult concept to grasp, unless you are trying to imply that it was somehow the gun or holster's fault. Neither of those elements, in the absence of incorrect handling by the operator, is capable of moving the trigger to the rear in a way to make the firearm discharge.

I realize you think pilots are not capable of doing wrong, and (as is typical for commercial pilots) will blame the procedures, equipment, or anything else. Firearms (especially this one) don't discharge themselves. Let us know when you have a snappy retort to address that fact.

Just "Perhaps"...It "might" imply that the supposed "Safety precautions" are wholly inadequate..."It's not a difficult concept to grasp,"..unless anyone's willfully blind to such an obvious notion. "unless you are trying to imply that it was somehow the gun or holster's fault." Hardly!!...I can't even imagine a more truly safe, sound and practical solution for mandated, repetitive stowage than to require anyone to shove a freaking lock/foreign object directly within the trigger guard of a weapon that's without any selectable safety...and, (this is really my favorite part) evidently without any direct means for visually confirming the trigger's position versus the inserted lock's. That type of "Brilliance" can normally only be seen at actual insane asylums..or by way of select government programs. Having some amount of supposed "Expert" qualification with various weapons via the USAF; it was the completely insane nature of the carrying/stowage/repeat interminably BS that drove me from wishing to participate as an FFDO. The entire process struck me as entirely, and literally insane....period. My honest thoughts on the carrying protocol was/is "You've seriously GOT to be kidding?!!?".

"I realize you think pilots are not capable of doing wrong" That's hardly the case for myself sir, or for any experienced aviator, and that is indeed the point. I fully know that ALL human beings (clearly with the singular exception of yourself I'll naturally assume) routinely commit errors of varying degrees on a continual, and constant basis. Why bother with such things as checklists otherwise? I DO however, also realize that a certain segment of human society, equipped only with unbounded narcicissm and limitless egocentric propensities...sometimes delusionally imagines otherwise....IE: "If the gun goes off unintentionally, it's negligent." is an utterly mindless accusation in this instance, and any/all of the least reasonable perspectives might prefer seeking to know the series of events that led to this, any/ALL difficulties with equipment and procedures, and strive for methods to prevent any similar future occurences.

 

[dariencc]

I realize you think pilots are not capable of doing wrong, and (as is typical for commercial pilots) will blame the procedures, equipment, or anything else. Firearms (especially this one) don't discharge themselves. Let us know when you have a snappy retort to address that fact.

Since we are not privy to the ongoing TSA investigation of this incident, how fortunate that we have someone of your vast knowledge to educate us. At the risk, however, of being chastised for blaming the "procedures, equipment, or anything else," I would like to offer one small factoid for you to stew over.

Prior to the introduction of the Rube Goldberg-esque trigger locking "procedure" there had not been a single accidental discharge associated with the FFDO program.

Since that time, there have been three. One occured on our aircraft, the others at the training center. All three involved the trigger padlock. Perhaps a reasonable person would conclude that there is something wrong with this harebrained procedure. Ya think?

Oops, there I go blaming the procedures.

 

[sharktooth]

Let us know when you have a snappy retort to address that fact.

By your logic, cars would never crash, Cheney would never have "pinked" his partner and pharmaceuticals would never kill nor maim.

The procedure is grossly flawed, the mere holstering and/or locking of a weapon should never demand 100% focus. Most guns are engineered to maximize profit to the manufacturer and not provide safety to an operator or their surroundings. It sounds like the trigger lock mechanism was hacked out one night over a six-pack. A trigger lock should not involve a blind insertion point, the lock position should be positive and easily identified with no possibility of mistake, as apparently not in this case. This is a gross design flaw that has been ignored. The negligence belongs to the manufacturer and the procedure "designers".

When you learn about guns you are indoctrinated with the very thoughts you profess. Great. It seems, however, most of the "rules" you have stated seem more about a manufacturer covering their tutu under cover of "gun safety" giving them legal cover for lazy engineering than actually preventing an unintended discharge.

 

[ClueByFour]

By your logic, cars would never crash, Cheney would never have "pinked" his partner and pharmaceuticals would never kill nor maim.

A car is orders of magnitude more complex than an H&K USP (there are far more mechanical opportunities for failure), Cheney should not have pinked his parter (if he's not the VP, he's probably charged) and the last example ain't even close.

What you really did was practice a logical fallacy of debate: the classic straw man. I never said any of those things, nor does anything I did say follow to that effect. Nice try, though.

The procedure is grossly flawed, the mere holstering and/or locking of a weapon should never demand 100% focus.

Really? I'll try the straw man back at you: landing an airplane should never demand %100 focus.

And if you want to claim that it does, I'd suggest that it's negligent to attempt two things at once that require %100 focus at the same time. And then we get what we have here.

Most guns are engineered to maximize profit to the manufacturer and not provide safety to an operator or their surroundings. It sounds like the trigger lock mechanism was hacked out one night over a six-pack. A trigger lock should not involve a blind insertion point, the lock position should be positive and easily identified with no possibility of mistake, as apparently not in this case. This is a gross design flaw that has been ignored. The negligence belongs to the manufacturer and the procedure "designers".

Then the proper action is not to sign off on the procedure and refuse to carry it out. Attempting such a flawed procedure while in a sterile cockpit environment might be characterized as negligent. If the individual in question felt capable of performing the procedure, tried it, failed, and did all this while in a sterile cockpit, one might reasonably call that negligent

When you learn about guns you are indoctrinated with the very thoughts you profess. Great. It seems, however, most of the "rules" you have stated seem more about a manufacturer covering their tutu under cover of "gun safety" giving them legal cover for lazy engineering than actually preventing an unintended discharge.

No, they are taught to properly keep the operator from doing anything stupid. Not causing the trigger of a reliable handgun (and make no mistake, the H&K USP was not hacked out one night over a six-pack) to move to the rear with a round chambered is an easy way of avoiding this sort of thing.

 

[oldiebutgoody]

Let's face fact. You're just someone that likes to jump to conclusions without examining evidence. Ego can be a terrible thing.

 

[sharktooth]

A car is orders of magnitude more complex than an H&K USP (there are far more mechanical opportunities for failure), Cheney should not have pinked his parter (if he's not the VP, he's probably charged) and the last example ain't even close.

You are claiming "negligence" of the operator. All three examples require some focus to avoid an "accident", properly. You replied to the Cheney situation (he cannot claim a "pass" because of his self-appointed office). The pharmaceutical example is most relevant, the focus required in administrating the proper chemical in the proper dosage is pretty simple yet demands focus.

Really? I'll try the straw man back at you: landing an airplane should never demand %100 focus.

It absolutely should.

Um, and that is not a "straw man" argument. Not only is landing a very complex operation, done properly, but you "proved nothing" by it.

And if you want to claim that it does, I'd suggest that it's negligent to attempt two things at once that require %100 focus at the same time. And then we get what we have here.

Nope.
No one ever suggested that the two operations were performed at the same time, just you.
I would agree that attempting to stow a weapon while in landing configuration below a couple of thousand feet on final would be considered flawed judgement, but that did not happen. Not even close, by some ten to fifteen minutes.

Then the proper action is not to sign off on the procedure and refuse to carry it out. Attempting such a flawed procedure while in a sterile cockpit environment might be characterized as negligent. If the individual in question felt capable of performing the procedure, tried it, failed, and did all this while in a sterile cockpit, one might reasonably call that negligent.

Let me see here. Known flaw that will result in undesired weapon discharge, eventually?

I, personally, would stand down the program until the flaw is addressed. Based on a YouTube video by APA (where is ALPA in this?) I would ensure the entire trigger mechanism is exposed for easy verification of proper lock installation.

A possible explanation of badly designed locking mechanism.

As I said. It is a cheap, poorly implemented mechanism and procedure, now.

No, they are taught to properly keep the operator from doing anything stupid. Not causing the trigger of a reliable handgun (and make no mistake, the H&K USP was not hacked out one night over a six-pack) to move to the rear with a round chambered is an easy way of avoiding this sort of thing.

Well, what is the "H&K USP"? Is that the weapon, the case or the lock? or the "package"? I referenced the hack job to the locking mechanism, not the weapon itself, though, from looking at what is used, I would have to say that craftsmen seem in short supply at gun factories and "cheap" rules the assembly line, "modular construction", indeed.

No, I don't google throwaways.

BTW, Heston. R.I.P.