This thread started with the MX side of the story. Here is the captains testimony under oath. A couple of her statements stand out. A couple comments. This is the CIRP chairman that should know how to talk and deal with people in stressful situations. Why are the MX angry at her? What was said or done to upset them? Listening to the captain it seems to me that she threw the mechanics under the bus. Read it for yourselves.
DIRECT - WELLS
Q. Do you serve on any committees for USAPA?
21 A. I serve on two committees.
22 Q. And what are they?
23 A. I serve on the Uniform Committee as a committee member. And I also serve on the Critical incident Response Committee as a chair.
1 Q. And what is the responsibility of the Critical Incident Response Committee?
3 A. We address individual pilots after an accident or incident in terms of stress and its effects physically, emotionally, psychological and behaviorally.
6 Q. To help them be able to get back on the job and fly as pilots?
8 A. To process the stress from the traumatic event, correct.
Q. Now I want to turn your attention to Tuesday June 16 of 2011. Were you flying on that day?
11 A. I was assigned to fly on that day, yes.
12 Q. And to what flight were you assigned?
13 A. Flight 718.
14 Q. And what was the destination of Flight 718?
15 A. Rome, Italy.
16 Q. What time was Flight 718 initially scheduled to take off?
18 A. 6:15 p.m. local time.
19 Q. And that would have been eastern daylight time at that point?
21 A. Yes, sir.
22 Q. Now was there an initial delay to the flight taking off?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And what occasioned the initial delay?
25 A. One of our flight crew members, a flight attendant, had a death in the family from an accident.
2 Q. Now -- and was that crew member replaced on your crew?
3 A. Yes. That crew member was replaced after a delay.
4 Q. Now, there are flight attendants on such a flight. How many crew members are there? How many pilots are there on
6 this Airbus 330 flight?
7 A. For this flight, an international flight, we were scheduled with three.
9 Q. And you served as the captain?
10 A. I was the captain on that flight.
11 Q. Who were the other two pilots and what designation did they go?
13 A. There was a first officer and also an international relief officer.
15 Q. And is it required when you're making an international flight of this length, that you have a third pilot on the plane?
18 A. Yes, it is required.
19 Q. Now, once you are, what kind of day was it in Philadelphia on June 16? What was the weather like?
21 A. It was a very hot summer day.
22 Q. Now, when you have a full crew and getting ready to get this airplane ready to fly, what do you do as a crew?
24 A. When the replacement crew member came we briefed her, both myself from the flight deck and also the lead flight attendant.
2 Q. Now, do any of the pilots make a check of the plane prior to its departure?
4 A. Yes. As part of our standard operating procedures my IRO, International Relief Officer, does what we call a walk around.
7 Q. And after the walk around, do the pilots have any sort of communication together to prepare to go on this flight?
9 A. Yes, we did.
10 Q. What do you call that?
11 A. Well, a crew briefing.
12 Q. Okay. Now at some point when the crew was in the cockpit, did there occur a malfunction?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And what was the initial malfunction or what occurred in -- on the flight deck that alerted you to the fact that there was a malfunction?
18 A. Okay. We had several malfunctions prior to our pushback, which were addressed by maintenance. But at pushback time is that where we want to talk about?
21 Q. Okay.
22 A. At pushback when we had briefed the crew and the cabin was ready, we were about ready to put call for pushback clearance when the APU auto failed.
25 Q. And what is the APU?
1 A. The APU is the auxillary power unit.
2 Q. And when that occurred, did anything else occur in the cockpit?
4 A. Yes, sir. Unexpectedly, our screens -- we have what we call a glass cockpit. All our screens went black. All the lights, our emergency lights went out and -- yes. Yes, that's what happened.
8 Q. Now, did you try at that point to alert the mechanics or ground crew as to what had occurred?
10 A. Well, our first attempt was to re-establish the power through our auxillary power unit. And that attempt was unsuccessful. And so after that attempt, I went to try to use our number one radio. Which is the radio that should be available in the configuration in which the batteries are only supplying power to the aircraft, the main batteries. And I was unable to use the number one radio.
17 Q. So how were you able to contact the ground crew or the mechanics?
19 A. Since we had no radios, we opened our sliding windows, the side windows. And because maintenance personnel and ramp personnel were down for the pushback, they were nearby and we yelled for help. In -- specifically to re-establish the power. And secondly, to get maintenance up to the aircraft.
25 Q. Now, you had flown this aircraft on a number of occasions before this flight?
2 A. I have over 5,000 hours in the A-330.
3 Q. To you and to your crew, did it appear that the only issue at this point was that the auxillary power unit had failed?
6 A. That was immediately recognizable that it was a much larger failure than the auxillary power unit.
8 Q. Now at the time that you had this failure, did you have any discussion with your crew about any conversations they had had regarding this particular aircraft prior to the cockpit going dark?
12 A. During my IRO's walk around, when he returned, he told us, the cockpit crew, that the ground crew, the ramp personnel, had told him or asked him an unusual question. Be sure -- something about, is the APU on, or to be sure it was on, because they had had electrical problems with that airplane all day.
18 Q. And when the person who makes the inspection obtains information like that, is that a part of the information that is then shared in the crew briefing?
21 A. Yes it is. Whenever they do a walk around, they share what they find, correct.
23 Q. So after you had opened the window and called down, what occurred next?
25 A. The ground personnel, ramp personnel, re-established ground power from the ground, and they returned the jetway to the aircraft and maintenance came on board.
3 Q. And what did maintenance do once they had come on board?
4 A. When maintenance came on board, they came in, they listened to what we said had happened. That the APU auto failed, that the cockpit had gone black, that we did not have our radios, that we had not had the expected overhead light. And that they listened. And one mechanic sat down in the first officer's seat and attempted a restart of the APU. And the second mechanic that was in the cockpit ran what we call a bite test for the systems on the airplane. And he said that the bite check had not shown an auto fail of the APU or any other electrical failures. And -- go ahead – you look --
16 Q. Are you finished?
17 A. Well -- and I was gonna say that the first mechanic that attempted the restart, was able to restart the APU.
19 Q. Did either of them refer to what they call this type of thing with regard to the Airbus?
21 A. In discussing the black cockpit, the mechanic that was running the bite check called it a "spurious Airbus thing".
23 Q. Now, is there another auxillary power in the aircraft beyond the APU?
25 A. Okay. On auxillary power?
1 Q. Yes.
2 A. In flight we would have the RAM air turbine as discussed earlier. Secondly, but that's not on the ground. On the ground then, our backup power then would have been the batteries, the main batteries.
7 Q. Do you have a name for them for these particular planes as the battery bus?
9 A. Yes. It is called the battery bus.
10 Q. Now, to your knowledge, have there ever been aircraft in flight which at some point were down to the battery bus as the only means of powering the aircraft?
13 A. Yes. There's been a few in the last few years.
14 Q. Do you know if any of them had been the result of an international night flight over water?
16 A. No.
17 Q. Other than referring to this as the "spurious Airbus matter" or problem, did either the mechanics appear to understand the situation with regard to the fact that the battery bus may not be properly operating?
21 A. They did not seem to understand.
22 Q. So what happened after the mechanics had at least initially gotten the APU restarted?
24 A. The mechanic asked if that APU failure had been recorded in the aircraft maintenance logbook.
1 Q. And what was the response?
2 A. That we had not.
3 Q. Did you at that point?
4 A. And then he asked if we were planning to do that.
5 Q. And what was your response?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And did you at that point?
8 A. Yes, I did.
9 Q. And what was the mechanic's response when you said, yes, and went ahead and recorded that?
11 A. He seemed to me to be frustrated. And he said that that APU had had multiple failures, and that now they would need to put it on MEL.
14 Q. What is an MEL?
15 A. A minimum equipment list.
16 Q. Now, did the mechanics then make any notation in the logbook after you had made your entry?
18 A. At that point in time they took the logbook away to add their -- their entry to the logbook.
20 Q. Is that usually what occurs, that you put something in the logbook and mechanics come in and they take the logbook away?
23 A. Well, what made this unusual was that they took it away like before we had finished addressing all the issues.
25 Q. And what other issue were you expecting or needing for them to correct?
2 A. The fact that we did not have what we expected the battery power to power our primary, our most essential equipment in the case of battery power only operation, to the extent that we did not even have a radio to communicate.
6 Q. So take us on through this evening. They've now taken your logbook out. Now did the other two members of the crew agree with your assessment as you were there in the cockpit that there was more going on here than just the APU going on and off?
11 A. Yes. After the maintenance left we had a discussion and troubleshot what might have, could have happened. Because none of us had ever seen a failure like that on an A-330. And we -- I came to the decision that when we did get the logbook back, that we would add specifically what else had happened. Because in our logbooks we only write one failure on each logbook page.
18 Q. And the mechanics had taken your logbook away before you had the opportunity to put the second item on the list?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Take us on through this evening now. You have your crew, you have this concern, you're waiting for your logbook, what occurs then?
24 A. There were -- there were two things that occurred. One, I got some messages to call my chief pilot. A message from the customer service agent.
2 Q. So the customer service agent came on the plane to tell you that?
4 A. Well, actually I was standing in the jetway. But they handed me a piece of paper with a telephone number on it that was not the chief pilot's office's number, but a number to call my international chief pilot.
8 Q. And did you call?
9 A. Yes, I did.
10 Q. And what happened in that conversation?
11 A. Well, I went out to the podium to use a phone. And in that conversation our international chief pilot asked me, what was the MEL on the airplane. And he -- I told him that the MEL was the in-op APU. And his next question was, are you refusing to fly. And I responded, I want to fly. I want an airplane that's fixed. I want this airplane fixed, or I would like -- we knew there was an airplane in the hangar -- or I would like the airplane in the hangar.
20 Q. So there was another airplane available to make this flight?
22 A. At the time we spoke it was still in maintenance as well, but it had an expected return to service within two 24 hours. And he asked me that question five times, with me giving him the same answer.
2 Q. Did you make some attempt in there as he was saying, will you fly, will you fly, that there were perhaps other problems? Were you able to get that across to the chief pilot in that conversation?
6 A. I was not able to do that.
7 Q. Did he appear to have any interest in this matter other than to determine if you were refusing to fly?
9 A. His only interest, in fact, his only question was, are you refusing to fly.
11 Q. So what occurred after your conversation with the chief pilot?
13 A. I returned to the aircraft, and on my way back I met with -- I met up with my first officer. And in the jetway were two mechanic supervisors. They introduced themselves as such.
17 Q. Okay. Tell us about that, you, your first officer and the two supervisors from mechanics?
19 A. Yes. They wanted to explain to me what they called the legal APU MEL. And the operational procedures associated with that MEL.
22 Q. What was their tone or their demeanor as they were addressing you as the captain of this aircraft?
24 A. The man that was explaining the MEL was, seemed to me to be quite angry. He leaned forward into me, pointed his finger and was so angry he was spitting. I stepped back once, and he stepped forward. And I stepped back again, and he stepped forward again.
4 Q. Ultimately was there some interaction to get between you and the fella who was stepping towards you?
6 A. Yes, there was. His -- the second supervisor that was there, after he had explained the MEL twice, the second supervisor reached across the other man's body with his left arm and said, I think we're done here. It's time for us to leave.
11 Q. Now, other than calling the problem with the blackout in the cockpit a "spurious Airbus issue", had anybody at that point evidenced any desire in getting that examined and taken care of?
15 A. No.
16 Q. After your interactions with the two aircraft maintenance supervisors, what did you do?
18 A. I returned to the cockpit.
19 Q. Now, where is the -- where are the passengers at this point?
21 A. The passengers are still on board the aircraft.
22 Q. And how was the aircraft being cooled at that point?
23 A. About that time maintenance had come on board the aircraft and turned off the APU. And so at that point in time, our air conditioning was being supplied by the auxillary power unit. And so when they turned it off, we had no air conditioning on the airplane.
3 Q. Is there a way that as a captain you can get some relief when you're in that situation where the aircraft is now providing power?
6 A. Our lead air, or in this case the air conditioning. Yes, there is. There is a ground air that's available. However, because the airplane, when we had arrived that day had been parked in the wrong spot, the ground air hoses did not reach the outlets or the intakes for the aircraft.
11 Q. So how did you deal with that?
12 A. The ramp people looked for extensions to the ground air hoses. And my first officer at least twice went to
tell the customer service that the aircraft was indeed becoming too hot for our passengers.
16 Q. What was the initial response from the gate crew?
17 A. Well, they -- they were relying on the hopes that the extensions for the ground air would in fact cool the aircraft off. And of course the second time we said they're not cooling them off. And at one point I went to say the airplane is too hot we have to give our passengers an option. And they said they needed some time.
24 Q. They're standing out in the cool of the gate and you're asking them to get your passengers off of that airplane?
1. A. Yes. They were at the gate, the podium area when I went to speak with them the first time.
3 Q. Did at some point after the gate crew had not taken any action, did you take some action yourself with regard to your passengers?
6 A. There came a point where my flight attendants, using very good CRM said our passengers are requiring ice and water, they're showing visible signs of heat stress. We need to cool -- we need cooling air. And when they told me that, I went to the gate agent, and they referred me then to the supervisor, and she was on her phone. And did I say it's been 20 minutes now. So I said, we have to allow these passengers to deplane because some of them are way -- are showing -- for the safety of their health, is the way I phrased it, we have to let them know they may deplane. And she said we need five more minutes. And I said we're -- the passengers are -- their health is at stake. The safety of their health. And I -- she never got off her phone. And so I went to the passenger address system in the cabin and I made an announcement that we were still trying to figure out what -- how we would proceed with this aircraft repair. And that I understood it was very hot on the aircraft. And that the door -- the front door was open if they would like to deplane into the boarding area that they might do so, but to remain in the boarding area because decisions were still being made.
4 Q. Now, at some point during this event, did another US Air pilot appear there at the aircraft?
6 A. Yes. About the time, maybe slightly before or after that, the maintenance removed or turned off the APU, a first officer, a reserve first officer came down and said that he was our replacement first officer. He came down to the cockpit which is where we were.
11 Q. Well, had your first officer shown any signs of distress that -- was it a gentleman that was your first officer that night?
14 A. My first officer's, yes, a gentleman.
15 Q. So had he shown any signs of distress that he needed replacing?
17 A. No, we were --
18 Q. Did --
19 A. We were surprised that we -- that the first officer was replaced. And the replacement first officer said that the entire crew in the cockpit had been replaced.
22 Q. But at that point he was the only one there?
23 A. He was the only one there.
24 Q. Did you have a discussion with this gentleman? Do you recall what his name was?
1 A. His name is Jim Dyson.
2 Q. Did your crew explain to First Officer Dyson what had occurred earlier with regard to the cockpit, the loss of APU, then the total blackout in the cockpit?
5 A. Yes. That was the discussion.
6 Q. Now you had your passengers out, those who felt like they needed relief. You're still there at the plane. Once the passengers got out, what occurred?
9 A. After I made that PA, I went back to the cockpit and my first officer and I were there as well, and at some point maintenance came to the cockpit and they said that they would like the crew off the airplane as well, and they wanted us to deplane now. So my crew, the flight attendants and the pilots, we all got off the aircraft and waited in the secure area that Customs uses, that's between the jetway and the boarding area.
18 Q. Now at that point had any US Air management person, the chief pilot, the assistant chief pilot, has anyone contacted you to tell you that your crew was going to be replaced?
21 A. No one contacted us.
(She testified that she spoke to the chief pilot)
22 Q. So you're out now, out of the aircraft per the request of the maintenance folks?
24 A. Yes, sir.
25 Q. Take us on through this night.
1 A. Well, because things had now, you know, our passengers were safe and we were off the airplane and maintenance was working on it, I thought now is the good time to resolve the issue about the replacement crew and what's going on with us. So I went to the podium to use the phone at the podium. And the gate agents were very busy with passengers. And so I walked to the far end -- it's a very long podium -- to use the phone at the other end. But I wasn't able to get the phone to get me an outside line, and so after a few minutes I was frustrated and I thought I'd go back and get someone else's cell phone to use.
12 Q. Who were you trying to call at this point?
13 A. Scheduling.
14 Q. What does scheduling do for US Air?
15 A. Well, they crew the flights.
16 Q. So they're the folks who assigned a crew to a particular flight?
18 A. Yes, sir.
19 Q. Were you ever able to get in touch with them?
20 A. No, I wasn't.
21 Q. So now everyone is out of the plane except the mechanics who apparently are still on the plane?
23 A. Yes, sir.
24 Q. You haven't been able to get scheduling. What then occurs?
1 A. I walk back. It was less than five minutes. I realized I wasn't going to have much luck and the agents didn't have time to help. So I walked back to my crew, and it turns out my first officer had been able to get a hold of crew scheduling and he informed me that we had been released.
(After trying to get a hold of scheduling for less than 5 minutes she is frustrated. How is that from someone trained to deal with stressful situations ans help other people?)
6 Q. Now what does release mean in that situation?
7 A. We were no longer on duty or responsible for that flight.
9 Q. Were you and your crew though, still responsible until another crew arrives since you have all these passengers in the area?
12 A. Well, once we -- well, because the passengers were all in the boarding area, they were now then more or
less the responsibility of the gate agents. And we were -- my flight attendants had not been released, because they were to stay to reboard the passengers when -- to be ready for the next crew when they arrived.
18 Q. So there you are released, your flight attendants are still there, your passengers are there, what occurred
then?
20 A. Well, I felt that I should stay because our flight attendants had such a tough day and we are a crew, and I thought that I would stay with them until they were released as well.
24 Q. Now did you have any -- make any announcements once the passengers were out of the airplane regarding what – first of all, how much time has elapsed by now?
2 A. At this point in time it's 11:10 p.m., so that approximately five hours.
4 Q. So did you make any announcement to the passengers to at least give them some information about what was occurring?
6 A. No. Not -- my last announcement was the one on board the aircraft about the heat.
8 Q. Now at some point did the other crew arrive?
9 A. Not while I was there.
10 Q. So you're there --
11 A. Well, I'm sorry, with the exception of the first officer.
13 Q. Right.
14 A. Who happened to be --
15 Q. Officer Dyson is there but the other two pilots are not?
16 A. No, they're not.
17 Q. So you're there with -- your other two pilots stay with you at that point?
19 A. Yes. They elected to stay as well.
20 Q. At that point were you approached by someone else who was employed by US Air?
22 A. Two US Air employees came into the secure area in which we were waiting and asked to speak to the captain. They identified themselves to me as corporate security. And they asked me to go down the jetway with them. And my first officer and my IRO started to come with us, and the two men told them that if they came -- say it right -- told them they had to leave or they would call the police.
4 Q. So what did the two folks who identified themselves as the US Air security folk do with you?
6 A. Well, my first officer and my IRO, we kind of negotiated that they would stand at the end of the jetway and I was maybe only 6 feet in -- within the jetway. And the two men began to tell me that they had been instructed by the ramp tower to have me removed from the gate area. And I asked who -- I asked first, why.
12 Q. And did you get a response to why?
13 A. They said they did not know why, but they have been instructed by the ramp tower.
15 Q. Okay. Other than saying we've got our orders from above, is that all that they told you as far as an explanation?
18 A. I asked who had ordered -- told the ramp tower to have me removed? And one man said Yarco (phonetic spelling), which is the name we use for -- we call our international chief pilot Yarco. And the other man spoke over him and said, we do not know who. We just know that we have been instructed to have you removed from the gate area. And so I basically repeated that back to him to be sure that I understood what they had said. Because it was very -- in all my years I have never seen or heard anything like this. So I repeated it, and they agreed that I had understood what they said. So then I walked out the jetway to my bags and my crew and told them that corporate security had asked me to leave. And I was sorry that I could not stay. And I got my bags and my first IRO, International Relief officer, walked with me. And these two men followed us, like 10 feet behind, not just to the edge of the gate area, but all the way out till we exited security. Which at this particular place is probably as far as you can be from exiting to baggage claim. So it's about a quarter of a mile.
14 Q. So they followed you until you went out of the secure area of the airport?
16 A. The TSA secured area.
17 Q. Now, did you learn at what time the flight actually departed?
19 A. The flight actually departed at 5:17 a.m.
20 Q. What time had they escorted you out?
21 A. This would be about 11:30 p.m.
22 Q. And have you learned what happened between 11:30 and 5 plus a.m. with regard to the plane and it's electrical problems?
25 A. There were a couple of things. I know that at about 12:20, the IRO called me to say that the airplane did exactly what I said it was doing, because he tested the system. And about 1:40 the man who had been assigned as captain called me to say that it had done exactly what I said it had done. And subsequently, I have seen, you know, the logbook.
7 Q. What does the logbook show?
8 A. Well, for my write-up about the lack of the H1 and no battery bus, it says in part, "standby power checks" okay.
10 Q. Now does this particular aircraft have such standby power?
12 A. No, sir it does not.
13 Q. So someone had written in the logbook about the standby power, which is not a system on this airplane; is that correct?
16 A. Yes, sir. That's a Boeing term.
17 Q. Now following you being escorted from the secure area of the airport, was there a period of time in which you were placed out of service as a pilot?
20 A. Yes, sir. When I woke up the next morning and went on to what we call Cat Crew, I saw that I had been removed from flying status as of the day before actually, on the sixteenth. And later that morning I received a phone call from the chief pilot's office informing me that I had been removed from flying status, pending a Section
19 disciplinary investigation hearing.
2 Q. Now, were at some point you returned to flying status?
3 A. Yes. I was returned to flying status over 20 days later on July 6th.
5 Q. Anytime in between did you receive any write-up, any official documentation, anything at all to show that you had acted less than properly on the night of this flight?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Now, you indicated that you were aware of several aircraft that it had to operate at some point only on a battery bus, in other words --
12 A. Battery.
13 Q. -- for whatever reason, the other systems that applied electricity had failed. What happens if you get down to just power from the battery bus?
16 A. When you get down to the battery bus, the aircraft powers only the most essential equipment to run navigation and flight instruments. And down to just one radio. And down to the minimum amount of lighting.
20 Q. What would happen if the other systems failed and the battery bus wasn't operable?
22 A. Well, we would have blank screens. We would have no lights. And we would have no radio.
24 Q. And this was a flight that took you across the Atlantic?
25 A. Yes, sir.
1 Q. Now you indicated if just the battery bus was operating, it would operate just the most essential functions of the airplane?
4 A. That's correct.
5 Q. What happens to the passengers back there. What happens to the air conditioning, the lights, the toilets at that point?
8 A. They have their -- if -- if it's powered, they would have their emergency exit lighting to show them the way to the exits.
11 Q. Other than that, would they have any power back there?
12 A. Not that I'm aware of.
13 Q. Did you understand that you were carrying out the appropriate functions as the captain of this aircraft when you took the actions which you took on the night of June 16?
16 A. I was exercising my authority as captain to operate the aircraft safely.
18 Q. And did you believe that as long as there was an issue where there was something beyond the APU was affecting this aircraft, that it was your obligation to ensure that those matters had been corrected before you took those passengers across the Atlantic?
23 A. It was indeed my obligation. But I feel stronger about it then it's my job. It's -- those are friends and family. Those are people I know. That's the aircraft that the company owns. It's their asset. I have a great responsibility to my passengers, my crew, and the company for their asset. And I felt especially that night, that that all those things were -- were in danger.
MR. GRESHAM: Thank you, Captain Wells.
6 THE COURT: Any Cross?
7 MR. SIEGEL: We won't do Cross, Your Honor. We had no advanced declaration. We'll reserve for rebuttal.
