midnight cowboy
Member
- Feb 7, 2004
- 49
- 0
Ste Mobile Aerospace , Strike-two !
- Thread starter AOG-N-IT
- Start date
midnight cowboy
Member
- Feb 7, 2004
- 49
- 0
MarkMyWords
Veteran
- Aug 20, 2002
- 1,900
- 1
AOG -
I am ashamed of you. Get the facts straight here. A/C 707 returned from BFM on SATURDAY evening and then flew a revenue leg from CLT-CHS. Sunday the plane flew 5 revenue segments before flying to MSY from PHL.
That being said......care to tell people what happened to A/C 767 in GCM after it came out of an in house check? Associating the flap problem on 707 to the check in AL is great for the IAM cause and seems to play right into your hands, but isn't it possible that the aircraft developed a mtc issue totally unrelated to the S-check? Especially given the the airplane flew 7 other flights, totally uneventful.
Yes, I do want the S-check work brought back in house where it belongs, but to sensationalize a problem to support your cause, without all the facts, is irresponsible.
I am ashamed of you. Get the facts straight here. A/C 707 returned from BFM on SATURDAY evening and then flew a revenue leg from CLT-CHS. Sunday the plane flew 5 revenue segments before flying to MSY from PHL.
That being said......care to tell people what happened to A/C 767 in GCM after it came out of an in house check? Associating the flap problem on 707 to the check in AL is great for the IAM cause and seems to play right into your hands, but isn't it possible that the aircraft developed a mtc issue totally unrelated to the S-check? Especially given the the airplane flew 7 other flights, totally uneventful.
Yes, I do want the S-check work brought back in house where it belongs, but to sensationalize a problem to support your cause, without all the facts, is irresponsible.
r·re·spon·si·ble (irÅi sponÆsà bÃl), adj.MarkMyWords said:
1. said, done, or characterized by a lack of a sense of responsibility: His refusal to work shows him to be completely irresponsible.
2. not capable of or qualified for responsibility, as due to age, circumstances, or a mental deficiency.
3. not responsible, answerable, or accountable to higher authority: irresponsible as a monarch.
–n.
4. an irresponsible person.
[1640–50; IR-2 + RESPONSIBLE]
—irÅre·sponÅsi·bilÆi·ty, irÅre·sponÆsi·ble·ness, n.
—irÅre·sponÆsi·bly, adv.
—Syn.1. unreliable, undependable, thoughtless.
Seems like a good definition of our CEO, you know, the same guy who said he didn't want to farm out our work, wanted it to stay and said it would if we voted in concession number two it would indeed stay.
So MMW, don’t preach to some lowly U employee when you can go to the top and preach where it counts!!
- Banned
- #35
Just for itrade:
Accidents in which maintenance was cited as a cause by the National Transportation Safety Board, 1995-2001
June 8, 1995 Hartsfield International Airport, Atlanta ValuJet DC-9
The right engine exploded as the jet accelerated for takeoff. The pilots stopped the jet and passengers evacuated. But shrapnel severed a fuel line and burning jet fuel engulfed the cabin. National Transportation Safety Board investigators traced the problem to a crack in an engine fan blade that should have been detectable during an engine overhaul four years earlier. The accident was blamed on the overseas maintenance facility that had done the work, Turk Hava Yollari.
Fatalities: 0
Injuries: 1 serious, 6 minor
Aug. 21, 1995
Carrollton, Ga. Atlantic Southeast Airlines Embraer EMB-120
About 20 minutes after leaving Atlanta, a blade on the left propeller broke loose. The damaged plane crash-landed in a field and caught fire. The NTSB found that Hamilton Standard, which made the blade, had not adequately inspected it for damage.
Fatalities: 8
May 11, 1996 Everglades, Fla. ValuJet DC-9
About 6 minutes after takeoff from Miami, a fire broke out in the cargo hold beneath the cabin. The pilots attempted to return for an emergency landing, but crashed into a swamp. Everyone aboard died. Devices that produce oxygen when a jet loses cabin pressure had been removed from another jet as part of a maintenance project. The so-called oxygen generators were improperly loaded as cargo. Investigators ruled that one or more of the devices spewed pure oxygen and triggered the fire. The NTSB blamed the crash on ValuJet and a firm it had hired to perform maintenance, SabreTech. The NTSB also cited the Federal Aviation Administration's failure to require smoke detection and fire suppression in cargo holds.
Fatalities: 110
Aug. 8, 2000 Near Greensboro, N.C. AirTran Airways DC-9
An electrical part caught fire 4 minutes after takeoff. The cockpit filled with smoke so thick that the pilots could not see each other, but they managed to reach the airport. The NTSB traced the fire to an electrical component that had been improperly repaired by Turkish Airlines, the jet's previous owner.
Fatalities: 0
Jan. 6, 2003 Charlotte/Douglas International Airport, Charlotte, N.C. Air Midwest Airlines Beech 1900D
The plane's nose shot skyward after takeoff despite the pilots' attempts to level it off. The plane went out of control and hit the ground near the runway, killing everyone aboard. NTSB investigators discovered that the device that raises and lowers the plane's nose had been improperly adjusted in maintenance shortly before the accident. A full load of passengers and cargo exacerbated the condition. The NTSB has not concluded what caused the crash, though sources familiar with the investigation say it revolves around maintenance.
Fatalities: 21
Accidents in which maintenance was cited as a cause by the National Transportation Safety Board, 1995-2001
June 8, 1995 Hartsfield International Airport, Atlanta ValuJet DC-9
The right engine exploded as the jet accelerated for takeoff. The pilots stopped the jet and passengers evacuated. But shrapnel severed a fuel line and burning jet fuel engulfed the cabin. National Transportation Safety Board investigators traced the problem to a crack in an engine fan blade that should have been detectable during an engine overhaul four years earlier. The accident was blamed on the overseas maintenance facility that had done the work, Turk Hava Yollari.
Fatalities: 0
Injuries: 1 serious, 6 minor
Aug. 21, 1995
Carrollton, Ga. Atlantic Southeast Airlines Embraer EMB-120
About 20 minutes after leaving Atlanta, a blade on the left propeller broke loose. The damaged plane crash-landed in a field and caught fire. The NTSB found that Hamilton Standard, which made the blade, had not adequately inspected it for damage.
Fatalities: 8
May 11, 1996 Everglades, Fla. ValuJet DC-9
About 6 minutes after takeoff from Miami, a fire broke out in the cargo hold beneath the cabin. The pilots attempted to return for an emergency landing, but crashed into a swamp. Everyone aboard died. Devices that produce oxygen when a jet loses cabin pressure had been removed from another jet as part of a maintenance project. The so-called oxygen generators were improperly loaded as cargo. Investigators ruled that one or more of the devices spewed pure oxygen and triggered the fire. The NTSB blamed the crash on ValuJet and a firm it had hired to perform maintenance, SabreTech. The NTSB also cited the Federal Aviation Administration's failure to require smoke detection and fire suppression in cargo holds.
Fatalities: 110
Aug. 8, 2000 Near Greensboro, N.C. AirTran Airways DC-9
An electrical part caught fire 4 minutes after takeoff. The cockpit filled with smoke so thick that the pilots could not see each other, but they managed to reach the airport. The NTSB traced the fire to an electrical component that had been improperly repaired by Turkish Airlines, the jet's previous owner.
Fatalities: 0
Jan. 6, 2003 Charlotte/Douglas International Airport, Charlotte, N.C. Air Midwest Airlines Beech 1900D
The plane's nose shot skyward after takeoff despite the pilots' attempts to level it off. The plane went out of control and hit the ground near the runway, killing everyone aboard. NTSB investigators discovered that the device that raises and lowers the plane's nose had been improperly adjusted in maintenance shortly before the accident. A full load of passengers and cargo exacerbated the condition. The NTSB has not concluded what caused the crash, though sources familiar with the investigation say it revolves around maintenance.
Fatalities: 21
- Banned
- #36
Here is some info on ST MAE@BFM
Personnel
Certificated Mechanics: 532
Repairmen: 74
Non-Certificated Mechanics: 1173
Total Employees: 1776
http://av-info.faa.gov/repairstation.asp?c...certno=MZAR013L
Personnel
Certificated Mechanics: 532
Repairmen: 74
Non-Certificated Mechanics: 1173
Total Employees: 1776
http://av-info.faa.gov/repairstation.asp?c...certno=MZAR013L
usfliboi
Veteran
- Aug 20, 2002
- 2,070
- 270
I wont let you down CAV! Anyone have the figures on how many of our aircraft broke down shortly after it was "refurbished" by in house maint? Just curious since we have stooped this low. ? I mean if it cost less and both makes mistakes which no ones perfect doesnt it pay to stay the cheaper way ? I want out work done in house but i hope the guys working on them are stable enough . That does concern me some since some of our guys are stressed beyond full throttle. I know most of our guys are great guys and andle stree well however there are the few who have shown areas of the seams coming apart.? Any imput on that ?
- Banned
- #38
The ScabA320 Driver said:
"After God had finished the rattlesnake, the toad, and the vampire, he had some awful substance left with which he made a scab."
"A scab is a two-legged animal with a corkscrew soul, a water brain, a combination backbone of jelly and glue. Where others have hearts, he carries a tumor of rotten principles."
"When a scab comes down the street, men turn their backs and angels weep in heaven, and the devil shuts the gates of hell to keep him out."
"No man (or woman) has a right to scab so long as there is a pool of water to drown his carcass in, or a rope long enough to hang his body with. Judas was a gentleman compared with a scab. For betraying his master, he had character enough to hang himself." A scab has not.
"Esau sold his birthright for a mess of pottage. Judas sold his Savior for thirty pieces of silver. Benedict Arnold sold his country for a promise of a commision in the british army." The scab sells his birthright, country, his wife, his children and his fellowmen for an unfulfilled promise from his employer.
Esau was a traitor to himself; Judas was a traitor to his God; Benedict Arnold was a traitor to his country; a scab is a traitor to his God, his country, his family and his class."
Author --- Jack London (1876-1916)
Dilligas
Veteran
A hell of a lot less than 100%. :blink:usfliboi said:
ITRADE
Veteran
700, you should never, ever attempt to aspire to any type of proofreading skills.700UW said:
You've provided an alleged report for "Accidents in which maintenance was cited as a cause by the National Transportation Safety Board, 1995-2001."
The Air Midwest crash was a 2003 crash. How does that relate to a 2001 list?
Alaska Air was a maintenance related crash (2001). Why was that not in your list?
The AirTran incident was not an accident as there was no crash.
Don't quit your day job.
- Banned
- #41
Why don't you ask the NTSB they investigated it and the USA Today published it!
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-1...nance-table.htm
Becareful, calling it usless diatribe might end you up in Iowa at the cornfied.
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-1...nance-table.htm
Becareful, calling it usless diatribe might end you up in Iowa at the cornfied.
- Banned
- #42
Another series showing the quality of third party maintenance:
http://www.charlotte.com/mld/charlotte/new...ackages/planes/
http://www.charlotte.com/mld/charlotte/new...ackages/planes/
ITRADE
Veteran
Ahh, but your authoritative piece was detailing 1995-2001 accidents, wasn't it?700UW said:
- Banned
- #44
Even More:
Union leader: Airline series didn't cover this
No drug testing, background checks required of outside contractors
From Jim Atkinson, president, AMFA Local 33, Bloomington, Minn.: Thank you for your insightful series on the state of aircraft maintenance in the aviation industry. As president of Minneapolis-based Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Association (AMFA) Local 33, representing workers at Northwest and Mesaba Airlines, I know the difficulties arising when airlines try to balance outsourcing with safety.
Your series covered many issues that contribute to the uneven regulatory playing field in our industry, but one not specifically addressed is drug testing and background checks. The FAA requires pre-employment background checks for in-house airline technicians like us, as well as continuing drug testing.
No such requirements exist for mechanics who work for outside contractors and are doing work that is just as crucial to an airplane's safe operation. Some contractors conduct limited drug testing or background checks voluntarily, but this approach is not consistent enough to provide the assurances the public deserves. We see this as a potential threat to public safety.
I am happy to report that our work on this issue led to inclusion in the recently-enacted Federal Aviation Administration reauthorization bill of a mandatory drug-testing requirement for employees of foreign repair stations who perform maintenance work on U.S. aircraft. Unfortunately, the new regulations do not cover outsourced contractors located in the United States. This gap is particularly worrisome in the riskier post-9/11 environment.
Three Malaysia Airlines mechanics were recently arrested shortly before a plane with 300 people on board took off in Kuala Lumpur when a flight engineer discovered several steering-related wires had been cut. The new FAA regulations are aimed at preventing future overseas incidents like this, but no such preventative measures are in place yet for U.S.-based outsourced repair stations.
Efforts to tighten the lax regulation of contractors, while not a panacea, are prudent responses to the increase in outsourcing and in maintenance-related accidents. Extending regulations to outsourced U.S. repair facilities could reduce the dangers of intentional sabotage and maintenance-related accidents.
Union leader: Airline series didn't cover this
No drug testing, background checks required of outside contractors
From Jim Atkinson, president, AMFA Local 33, Bloomington, Minn.: Thank you for your insightful series on the state of aircraft maintenance in the aviation industry. As president of Minneapolis-based Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Association (AMFA) Local 33, representing workers at Northwest and Mesaba Airlines, I know the difficulties arising when airlines try to balance outsourcing with safety.
Your series covered many issues that contribute to the uneven regulatory playing field in our industry, but one not specifically addressed is drug testing and background checks. The FAA requires pre-employment background checks for in-house airline technicians like us, as well as continuing drug testing.
No such requirements exist for mechanics who work for outside contractors and are doing work that is just as crucial to an airplane's safe operation. Some contractors conduct limited drug testing or background checks voluntarily, but this approach is not consistent enough to provide the assurances the public deserves. We see this as a potential threat to public safety.
I am happy to report that our work on this issue led to inclusion in the recently-enacted Federal Aviation Administration reauthorization bill of a mandatory drug-testing requirement for employees of foreign repair stations who perform maintenance work on U.S. aircraft. Unfortunately, the new regulations do not cover outsourced contractors located in the United States. This gap is particularly worrisome in the riskier post-9/11 environment.
Three Malaysia Airlines mechanics were recently arrested shortly before a plane with 300 people on board took off in Kuala Lumpur when a flight engineer discovered several steering-related wires had been cut. The new FAA regulations are aimed at preventing future overseas incidents like this, but no such preventative measures are in place yet for U.S.-based outsourced repair stations.
Efforts to tighten the lax regulation of contractors, while not a panacea, are prudent responses to the increase in outsourcing and in maintenance-related accidents. Extending regulations to outsourced U.S. repair facilities could reduce the dangers of intentional sabotage and maintenance-related accidents.
longing4piedmont
Veteran
- May 19, 2003
- 1,291
- 6
If I were in US management I would be looking very closely at the following three things very closely.
1. Who was the US representative that signed off on this plane before it left our friends in AL.
2. Every one who signed a log on the check concerning any one of the issues that resulted in a failure. Do the same names show up on both 707 and 700's records?
3. Everyone who has been near this plane since it left AL. (Just in case some one has an axe to grind).
For this to happen twice, something is terribly wrong. :angry:
1. Who was the US representative that signed off on this plane before it left our friends in AL.
2. Every one who signed a log on the check concerning any one of the issues that resulted in a failure. Do the same names show up on both 707 and 700's records?
3. Everyone who has been near this plane since it left AL. (Just in case some one has an axe to grind).
For this to happen twice, something is terribly wrong. :angry:
