I agree and disagree with everyone saying US brings nothing to the table. In terms of aircraft and international flights, yes, we bring very little to nothing at all. But if you consider our east coast presence with a strong CLT hub and one of the healthiest balance sheets in the industry, that would be an asset to either UA or AA. The US franchise generates lots of revenue in spite of ourselves. In 2007 we had the worst operational statistics of anyone in the industry, yet we made money....lots of money. One could argue the only reason we aren't making money right now is because of high fuel costs. The only real SE city left to hub in after ATL is CLT. For anyone to compete effectively agianst DL/NW, they will need a strong SE hub. This fact alone makes us a strong takeover target. If you put together our balance sheet, CLT hub and east coast presence, the value of all three together are as valuable as any asian routes or international operation. They will be needed by either UA or AA to compete against DL/NW.
I'm not trying to start something, I'm just trying to think all this through for myself.
1. Why would anyone need a SE hub in order to compete with a combined airline that we are competing against quite well thank you very much against both airlines separately today? Our flights to/from CLT are always full. And, since CLT is not a restricted airport, we could add additional flights if we so desired. It's not an equipment and manpower issue. We have plenty of a/c sitting in the desert and lord knows we still have a number of pilots and f/as on furlough. As far as CLT's Caribbean traffic, that would be in direct competition with our existing hub in MIA.
2. I grant you, the Shuttle is worth money, but I wouldn't see AMR purchasing all of LCC just to get that piece.
3. Though PHL has large O/D traffic, we already have similar problems with baggage handling/on-time operations/etc in PHL that LCC has. Why would we want more of the same? And pay for the privilege to boot?
4. Also, granted that LCC has a strong balance sheet. However, from what I can tell from the sidelines that strength has come at the expense of employee salaries and pensions, a/c amenities and services, and so on. I doubt that AA employees would stand for having their salaries lowered to LCC's current rates; so, ask yourself...
a.Would that balance sheet be as strong if LCC employees were being paid AA rates and still had pensions? If AMR were to buy LCC, they would either have to go into BK to shed themselves of our existing defined benefit pension plan, or under Federal law bring the newly acquired employees into the plan.
b. If the tuna burrito was gotten rid of and AMR business class food (not that ours is all that great anymore, but it ain't a tuna burrito

) started being served, and closets returned to the a/c, and F/C passengers once again had legroom and a place to put their carryons, would those profit margins remain the same?
Let's not even discuss the fleet & a/c engine differences. That would increase costs right there having to maintain more a/c and engine types than we already have.
AA pulled out of a number of SE cities, but not because of competition from DL. The reason was competition from WN. WN is not going to fold their tents and go away because of the DL/NW merger. Why would AA want to return to those markets that they have already abandoned? We still serve every major city on the East Coast anyway, and like CLT the flights are full.
Given the "slick" way we handled the TW purchase, I don't think our management is yet in the mood to try another unionized workforce combination. And, unless all of you have been lying for the past 2+ years, a unionized workforce that is not yet combined or on very good terms with each other. And, considering the fact that the current AA workforce don't exactly have management on their Christmas card lists, I don't think we've heard the last of this latest round of executive bonusses awarded the same day that the company announced a $328 million loss for Q1.