Yes, AA's 2d quarter mainline CASM was higher than DL's, but not by much. If you add back the DL profit sharing that DL likes to exclude (and since AA's unions gave away their profit sharing, it's not an expense that will burden AA), the difference between AA's CASM and DL's CASM was de minimis.
What happens to AA's mainline CASM if AA adds all that capacity within five years like Horton planned in early 2012? Looks to me like that will drive down the mainline CASM by quite a bit. More ASMs against which to spread those fixed costs.
Further, AA doesn't have to have the lowest CASM, merely a healthy, large enough spread between its revenues and its costs to generate profits. As AA's mainline yield in 2012 was almost half a cent more than UA's mainline yield, and that spread continued for the first half of 2013, looks to me like AA will have little difficulty taking revenue away from UA even if AA struggles to take revenue away from DL. As AA grows its 2-class RJ operations, its regional yield should improve as well.
UA's costs are climbing and so are the costs at US. So far, the FAs have received raises. If the pilots figure out how to squeeze Parker for raises (even without a merger), then the costs at US will skyrocket.
Sure, DL could stymie AA's plans by growing its operations substantially, but so far, that doesn't look likely.
First, you are absolutely correct that AA had momentum coming out of BK either with or without US that would have been a threat to UA whose costs are rising very rapidly as a result of their still quite unfinished merger.
But UA’s revenue is improving, in part because they are making the tough decisions to cut capacity and get rid of unprofitable routes. Every airline has them and as much as you want to believe otherwise, AA has them too. I have discussed them enough that it isn’t necessary to go into it again but AA has not addressed the network deficiencies that other carriers did in their restructurings and until they do, AA cannot operate at its optimum level.
Yes, AA’s costs are not THAT much lower than DL and it is standard to exclude special items and profit sharing because they aren’t consistent between companies; running the basic operation is.
AA’s plan all along was to add capacity in order to force down costs but the question still remains as to where they are going to be able to profitably grow. We have consistently seen that the only place where AA has been able to add capacity and still be profitable is Latin America. This year’s international additions to Europe and Asia were all in highly competitive markets – and in most of them AA is the significant underdog whether we are talking about ORD-Germany, DFW-ICN, or JFK-Ireland. There is ample evidence that other carriers have been very successful in limiting AA’s growth in those very markets in the past but AA believes their costs would be low enough this time to overcome a significant market share disadvantage (which does translate into decreased average fares.) Remember BRU and a host of other European cities? AA’s costs at best will be ON PAR with other carriers which isn’t a very strong position when they have much stronger market position.
AA also is still facing significant strategic challenges that no other carrier is facing including the opening of Love Field to nationwide flights, Open Skies in most of Latin America, and the DL/Virgin Joint Venture – each of which are targeted at some of AA’s most profitable markets. The only competitor that faces a significant strategic challenge is UA’s loss of TAM in the Star Alliance – and that is much smaller in scale than any of the strategic changes AA is facing.
As for costs, DL already had a plan to cut its costs based on more efficient use of its own people and growing its own network at the expense of its regional carriers; that is precisely what the RJ for 717 plan is about. And DL is still getting 100 739ERs plus whatever additional M90s so their costs will go down. And lest you think I am only favoring DL, UA is also retiring significant numbers of its 757 in favor of 737s as well. WN is adding 738s while removing the 717s. etc. Other carriers are doing things with their fleets that will give them many of the same advantages AA would get by growing.
Yes, AA’s growth of more cost efficient large RJs will help AA’s costs but they still have to be able to find places to place their own aircraft. The notion that AA can add a bunch of large RJs and ALSO significantly grow AA’s mainline operation is something that no other carrier has ever done before and also very hard to imagine that AA can do.
Remember also that AA’s labor unions supported Parker because he intended to diminish the cuts that AA execs said needed to be done. Horton’s plan clearly recognized that AA mainline could not grow at the rate necessary to keep all of its current people while also adding hundreds of large RJs.
Somehow we are back to asking if Horton’s plan is effectively back on the table.
I don't think this will block future mergers. Keep looking to AT&T-TMobile as a parallel. Two companies in the top 5 trying to merge got shot down. T- Mobile with a smaller firm was OK.
DOJ's logic is pretty clear:
consolidation by smaller carriers = good
consolidation by larger carriers = bad
Looking back at the failed UA-US attempts, AA management now has an out clause they didn't have before. They were pressured into this by outside forces, and the unions.
They can choose not to push as hard if they want to, and the DOJ becomes the scapegoat. Or, they can try to make meaningful concessions to appease the DOJ, but I don't get a sense from DOJ's filing that there are concessions to be had which would do so. This isn't as easy as handing over a couple pairs of slots for auction.
Some of my more DC connected friends think this may just be the DOJ trying to appear like it is doing its job (as opposed to all the other examples lately where they're doing anything except upholding and following the law), and that they'll negotiate a settlement. Time will tell if that results in a deal so bad nobody wants to eat it.
It's going to be interesting to watch, though. Too many people were assuming this was a done deal and a slam dunk from the get-go, and watching the deal get stopped dead in its tracks is a bit rewarding to the pessimists who were repeatedly smacked down... 😉
The DOJ made it very clear that the biggest issues are the very uncompetitive statements that they discovered between AA and US execs, esp. from Parker and other US execs. They do not believe that there are any concessions that could meaningfully save the merger because of the comments that were uncovered.
Yes, the crowd quickly jumped into Parker’s court when “it’s not over until the fat lady sings” and she wasn’t even on the stage.
It will take time for the next phase for AA to become apparent but I would really hope they don’t spend a lot of time trying to save it because doing so will cost them precious time in figuring out to make AA viable for the longterm as a standalone.
AANotOK,
the level of politics hasn't changed but the fact that all manner of electronic communications is now completely open for all the world to see is the new reality.
Parker and others somehow didn't grasp that reality.
Forwarding emails in which US execs discuss the impact of a triple miles promotion on the industry, including back to the airline that initiated the action? What WAS he thinking?