Group:
I wish no harm to UA and its fine employees, but there are conflicting reports on UA’s bankruptcy exit strategy and one has to wonder why Jake Brace called the Wall Street Journal so Susan Carey could write her article discussing a “possible early exit from bankruptcyâ€. Every US employee has a special interest in UA because of our business relationship and the multiple attempts to merge companies, so it’s understandable why there is discussion on this topic.
However, lets look at a couple of facts.
Yesterday UBS Warburg airline analyst Sam Buttrick upped his earnings estimates for every major airline he covers, except one, UA. Buttrick is now predicting a larger second quarter loss when he widened the per-share loss estimates for UA to $6.00 from $5.57.
Chip comments: Why is that? Because UA’s revenue is lagging the industry, which has to be deeply concerning to those parties interested in the bankruptcy process.
Yesterday CBS.MW said “the International Air Transport Association said world-wide global passenger traffic plunged 18.5 percent in April as war and pestilence kept people grounded. The biggest hurt came to carriers in the Asia-Pacific region as fears of the flu-like severe acute respiratory syndrome helped send traffic down a breathtaking 44.8 percent. The average load factor in the region was 48 percent -- a fall of 28 points year-over-year.â€
Chip comments: What U.S. airline has the highest exposure to this problem? How much effect does this fundamental problem have on UA and its bankruptcy requirements?
Chip’s OpEd comments: It is my understanding TPG has been on and off about being UA’s equity plan sponsor since last fall because they are unsure of whether or not the Plan of Reorganization (POR) is sound. McKinsey Consulting has been leading the effort for the Low Cost Operator (LCO) (in fact, McKinsey is the driver behind the project and reportedly convinced Tilton of the strength of the concept) and there is disagreement within WHQ on how to implement the plan and the LCO may never get off of the ground. Moreover, I understand that Doug Hacker and McKinsey do not see eye to eye and there is deep dissent between them.
From what I have heard, the unsecured creditors committee and four debtor-in-possession financiers (J.P. Morgan, Bank One, CIT Group, and Citigroup) are generally happy with UA’s progress because of the new labor agreements and new federal aid, but there are still glaring problems that threaten the carrier’s existence.
From this observer’s perch the major problems are:
Why is UA’s revenue performance significantly worse than its peers?
Why is there no in-house agreement on the POR and no clear-cut exit strategy?
Without a viable POR, will the ATSB re-visit the loan guarantee application and if the ATSB rejects UA’s application again, what is “Plan B�
In conclusion, there are wide spread reports of dissention within the “executive suiteâ€. People close to the company say management, the advisors, and the creditors committee cannot agree on how to proceed, and the LCO project has been dead for months. In fact, some observers believe the LCO concept was simply a union diversion strategy so Tilton could use the threat of a “spin off†division as a means to get labor to accept very deep cuts. I’m not sure I agree with that point because of McKinsey’s desire to operate the LCO as a means to compete with other low cost carriers, but it was definitely a collateral benefit to obtain unpalatable labor concessions.
Also noteworhty, it’s important to not the only reason UA is going to make its April and May DIP financing revenue and cash flow targets is because of reduced fuel prices, the IRS tax refund, and the May 16 federal aid payment, but things look bleak for this fall. With revenue and traffic soft and expected to climb only 1 percent over last year’s dismal numbers, the company must be cash flow positive in October and this is when travel traditionally drops. UA is clearly at risk of violating its bankruptcy financial requirements in the fall and if the DIP financiers do not provide relief, I believe UA and its employees could have a very difficult holiday season.
Finally, I agree with Avek00’s comments of “The bottom line is that for all of the hoopla, UAL is no better suited to emerge from BK as a VIABLE enterprise today than it was on the date of the filing. IMHO, Brace did a real disservice to UAL's employees by misleading them into thinking that re-emergence is right around the corner.â€
In my opinion, Brace’s comments to Carey were nothing more than a “smoke screen†to deflect criticism that UA executives have been slow to release details of their POR and UA has along way to go if it’s going to exit bankruptcy intact.
Best regards,
Chip
P.S. If ACA is successful in breaking its agreement with UA at next Thursday's bankruptcy hearing, this would be a devastating blow to UA’s formal reorganization and Dulles International Airport. With its new agreement, if a J4J deal could be arranged with both the US and ACA pilot groups, it would not surprise me if ACA moved its RJ fleet to Philadelphia and/or Pittsburgh to provide US Express with a turn key spool up. However, I have no inside knowledge if this would ever happen, but I do know that ACA has been talking to other airlines and with its new ALPA RJ authorization, presumably US is one of the major airlines ACA has discussed a new arrangement with.