Agree as far as the soda/coffee/food angle, but if the airline is going ahead with a mod to the locking clip, I can't be the only one questioning if there really is a problem with the clip design and certification process.
Wouldn't it be ironic if sloppy work at TIMCO is what exposed a larger issue?...
Coffee, Coke and Popcorn: Really?, is that the best you can deliver to cover the abject failure to demand Contractor Performance; Really?, is that the best you can deliver to cover the abject failure to provide adequate oversight of significant maintenance performed on behalf of a 121 Air Carrier?
Give me a break!
Some number of years ago, LAX has an aircraft roll into the perimeter fence because it was left unchocked and the brake pressure bled down: the company answer was that going forward, we would double chock the aircraft. Nobody questioned the fact that if a well trained crew initially failed to chock an aircraft, as required under the GPM, how would the company reasonably conclude that an additional requirement to place two sets of chocks in that aircraft actually become reality.
Instead of dealing with the few individuals that did not chock the aircraft, AA went on a bender for the, "global policy," that would apply across all segments of the operation without understanding that the diversity they purport to support is the competitive advantage they need to succede while simultaneously seeking to deprive any and all stations of policy decisions that removed the diversity from global standards which optimized the strengths locally available.
The problem then, as now, is that those purportedly running the operation had a clue.
The TIMCO operation is a continuous train wreck wherein untrained, newly minted A&P Mechanics are fielded by the contractor and soley placed into a situation where the only Management Representation is from AA Production and AA QA.
To date, in my station: TIMCO Management has never been present.
The Single Representative of AA Mgt., the Production Manager, is regularly on the premises at twenty hour intervals; the AA QA comes and goes on the sliding scale.
Untrained Vendor Mechanics, without Vendor Management, relying on overstressed AA Production Managers that are tasked with a project without logistical support and vaugely supported by AA QA cannot possibly cover all the mayhem created by turning loose untrained Organ Monkeys being asked to dance without having been trained; and, whose tempo is governed by an Organ Grinder located in a cubicle in TULE.
SwissAir was brought down by a failure in the entertainment system that led to a fire propagated through the insulation leading to a complete loss of the aircraft, crew and passengers while ValueJet was brought down by the failure to adequately secure the O2 generators subsequently placed in the cargo hold and then igniting cargo hold components and leading to a complete loss of the aircraft, crew and passengers.
TIMCO has been found to be improperly securing wiring terminations in the passenger entertainment systems and power ports while simultaneously moving the overhead passenger units housing the electrical harnesses for cabin call and lighting that are located inches away from the O2 generators and the Cabin O2 Masks which must be dropped, electrically, in the event of a sudden cabin depressurization.
No one is saying that the failures of AA Management, and the OSV, TIMCO, to adequately oversee the third party maintenance actions of TIMCO will result in either a SwissAir or ValueJet disaster.
What I am saying is that based on the Human Factors training I have received at AA: I refuse to become one of the seven independant links statistically credited as a contributing factor in another aviation disaster.
The FAA, AA and TIMCO need to have a heart to heart discussion about the managerial control exercised over maintenance functions performed on behalf of AA by TIMCO, but, which are soley owned by AA as the 121 Air Carrier Certificate holder.
