East, really? Horton and his management team have the exclusive right to reorganize the company, right now. Parker is snaking in the back door. If he were able to go in the front he would tell us to pound sand and enjoy LOA 93 for a little while longer. I cannot see how you and the others cannot see that.
Dec 2012 / Jan 2013 US Pilots Labor Discussion
- Thread starter Admin
- Start date
- Status
East, really? Horton and his management team have the exclusive right to reorganize the company, right now. Parker is snaking in the back door. If he were able to go in the front he would tell us to pound sand and enjoy LOA 93 for a little while longer. I cannot see how you and the others cannot see that.
Phoenix
Veteran
- Apr 16, 2003
- 8,584
- 7,430
People are apt to see what they hope to see, and the stronger their desire to see something the more likely they will indeed see it, in spite of cues to the contrary...
PT Barnum put it more succinctly than I ever could.
Per the NAC, this offer is better not by our own doing but because of the APA and their signing. They did this for us.
1) I've been surprisingly unable to view them as the supernatural beings you seem to see them as. If indeed "The Great and Powerful OZ has the situation well in hand", then WHY are they suddenly, as if only by magic after all these years, even offering to negotiate at all?
2) I've no confidence that it's entirely a deal breaker, but rather is, very, VERY clearly, something that's dearly wanted by team tempe, and that affords us a reasonable expectation of more than the pathetically sub-standard-and-entirely-full-of-easilly-exploitable-holes, nebulous pos that's been put forth.
Black Swan
Veteran
- Dec 13, 2009
- 2,894
- 5,045
Think about what you just said, then think about what this group gives up in every contract. Now do you see?
They didn't have to!!! We did it for them, we have subsidized them.
I'm pretty sure the IAM does have it. Have we heard from them? 700UW?
And that's why we are under and injunction and working under LOA 93 for a decade. Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. We try to outsmart, outbluff the company and we screw ourselves every time.
Black Swan
Veteran
- Dec 13, 2009
- 2,894
- 5,045
Then make them. You won't, and they know it. They know you better than you know yourself.
Black Swan
Veteran
- Dec 13, 2009
- 2,894
- 5,045
Why did you subsidize them?
Absolutely. The only question is which group is doing that?
Black Swan
Veteran
- Dec 13, 2009
- 2,894
- 5,045
Every legacy airline out there is under injunction. So what. You are a serious pu$$y.
Per the APA's NAC/cheerleaders; their first offering was also management's "last, best and final offer". Again; do you claim to have any actual point here?
- May 8, 2007
- 3,146
- 3,236
-----Forwarded Message-----
From: Wall Fly
Sent: Jan 27, 2013 4:05 PM
To: undisclosed-recipients@null, null@null
Subject: MOU need to know
The Rest of the Story
By the Fly on the Wall
The Unanimous Vote
There’s been a lot of conjecture about the possibility that 5 members of the BPR who voted to recommend membership approval of the MOU actually don’t support it and will personally vote against it during ratification. That is true, they will vote against it. In addition, 2 east pilots who sat in during a portion of deliberations as DDR’s (duly designated representatives) will also vote against the MOU. If you’re skeptical, give them a call and ask. These are the representatives and DDR’s.
Bill McKee
Steve Crimi
DeWitt Ingram
Steve Szpyrka
Mike Gilles
Paul Diorio (DDR)
Mike Martin (DDR)
This is obviously causing a lot of confusion on the line. How could 7 east pilots who had a hand in deliberating the MOU not actually be supportive of it? After all, it was a unanimous vote, right?
The reason isn’t that complicated. Here is why there was a unanimous vote without actual unanimous support of the MOU:
· The 5 members of the BPR (and 2 DDR’s) believe that President Hummel is working in collusion with the Company and he is being enabled by 6 BPR members (3 PHX, 2 DCA, 1 PHL). As a result, they believe that the MOU is the best we can do absent a recall of the Officers or a change in the BPR (PHL election), or…a rejection by the membership.
· The 5 demanded extra cash for our pilots (pay beginning on the date of ratification). When they did this, one of the 5 offered a unanimous vote to secure the pay. He did not have the consensus of the 5.
The 5 voted for you to approve the MOU not because they thought it was a good agreement but because they absolutely knew the other 6 were going to approve it with a 6-5 vote and decided if that was going to happen they needed to use their leverage to secure some additional pay, and that’s just what they did. But, and this is a monumental but….they do not want the membership to ratify the agreement.
A Little History
The 7 pilots named above believe that the Officers, particularly Gary Hummel, are working in collusion with the Company and will be rewarded someday by the company, a la Assistant Chief Pilot Bill Pollock. These Officers are being enabled by 6 members of the BPR – 3 PHX, 2 DCA, 1 PHL (Weidner) so they routinely lose votes 6-5. On January 3rd after hours of heated debate it was obvious the 6 were going to force a vote on the MOU and there was no doubt it would pass 6-5. Immediately prior to that the 6 members of the BPR, all 4 NAC members, 3 of 4 Officers, the Comm. Chairman and the Scope Chairman and a few more had all verbalized their belief that the MOU as presented was “the best we could do” and there was “nothing more left on the table”. Only a moment before the vote would have been forced, Vice Chairman Steve Crimi asked each member of the 5 if he had permission to speak for the group and they each replied “yes”. He then addressed the BPR and informed them that if the vote was forced right then, the 5 members would call for a “division” (roll call) and the MOU would fail. (When a “division” is called each BPR member votes for each pilot they represent. In that case, the 5 members have more votes than the 6)
After a cacophony of outbursts from the 6 subsided, an ultimatum was given…If the company meets a specific demand – which was given moments later - the 5 would still vote against the MOU, but they would not call for a division to prevail and the MOU would pass 6 -5. Soon after the ultimatum was given, one of the 5 offered a unanimous vote. That offer by one member of the 5 has proved very problematic because as a result, the 5 are being censored from communicating their true feelings about the MOU.
Why Didn’t the Five Use Division to Stop the MOU if They Didn’t Support it?
Unlike at ALPA, a Division of the house can only be used for very specific purposes under the USAPA Constitution. Here’s the language
“Division of the house shall be permitted only for votes taken to approve or reject any tentative agreements affecting income, work rule change(s), and/or benefit(s); setting parameters for collective bargaining; agreements on affiliation or merger with another labor organization; agreements arising from a merger of, or successor transactions involving the employer, or its parent (including seniority integration agreements); and amendments to the Constitution and Bylaws. On a Division of the house vote, each member of the Board shall be entitled to vote equal percentages of the active members in good standing…”
The 5 did not call for a division of the house to stop the MOU because they knew if the MOU failed at the BPR level that additional actions would needed to be taken and these actions would come in the form of directives through BPR resolutions. At that point, a call for division would not be available under the Constitution and any action the 5 thought necessary would likely be voted down 6-5 again. It is also particularly difficult to direct the President and lawyers and committees to do certain things when the President - who oversees both Legal Counsel and the Committees - does not support such actions. With these things in mind, the 5 chose instead to use the threat of division to secure an additional gain for the pilots should the membership approve the MOU. Do not take this to mean they support the MOU and want you to ratify it. They do not.
The Quickest Way to a Better Lifestyle?
You may have noticed that USAPA continues telling the membership that the BPR and President “believes this MOU is the quickest and surest path to a better lifestyle for us all.” Has anyone ever seen a resolution the BPR voted on that says such a thing? No, of course no one has because it doesn’t exist. This statement was never endorsed by the BPR. It’s simply part of the USAPA sales job.
Did the 6 Support the Retro Pay Date of February 8th?
Ted Reed, who for years covered US Airways for the Charlotte Observer recently wrote an article for The Street.com that was picked up by Forbes. In it he gave credit to the CLT Reps. and 2 PHL Reps. for making a unanimous vote possible by their demand for additional pay. Subsequent to the story he sent out a revised version suggesting that some of the 6 also supported the demand for additional pay. So what happened? Why did Ted Reed change his story to now suggest that maybe the 6 also played a role? Simple; when the original story came out, the 6 were outraged that credit was being given where it was due and one of the DCA Reps. communicated to Ted Reed that they also were supportive. After Ted Reed heard from enough people demanding that he change history, he rewrote the story with the addition of the suggestion that it wasn’t only the 5 who sought a change. He got it both right and wrong by the way. The 6 Reps. were indeed supportive…right after they were made aware that they had no other choice because the 5 were going to call for division. For PHX, DCA, or Jamie Weidner to suggest they had any part in securing the retro pay is absolute hogwash. Remember, the threat of division was not made until 16 people – yes 16 total! – had given their opinion that the MOU was the best that could be done and no more was available, including the 6 BPR members who afterwards sought credit through Ted Reed. As it turned out, they were all wrong, except for the 5 of course. The 6 were going to force a vote and vote yes without the pay date being moved back to the date of ratification.
The Dividing Line
Apparently last week at the NAC roadshow in CLT, Steve Crimi more than once explained to the membership why, in his opinion, we didn’t secure real retroactive pay or an equity stake similar to APA’s. He politely dismissed the excuse the NAC had just given about us not having “a claim” in bankruptcy court and instead spoke of a dividing line amongst the BPR and also amongst the line pilots. The dividing line being between those who think we have real leverage and those who think we don’t. He explained that clearly 5 members on the BPR believe we have significant leverage and 6 members don’t. He went on to summarize that the reason we didn’t secure real retro pay or an equity stake was because the USAPA leadership (President and 6 members of the BPR) refused to use the available leverage. You could tell he had more to say, but avoiding the politics seemed to be important to him.
What Now?
It’s pretty obvious USAPA is selling this MOU to the pilots. The material mailed to you contains only the good and none of the bad. It doesn’t even contain the MOU itself and that’s what you are voting on. This MOU will get a tremendous amount of “no” votes. It would get even more - perhaps even fail - if the pilots understand that saying “no” is not the end of the game. If the pilots say “no” that would be the 3rd strike against the NAC and the President and the other Officers. The 5 member minority of the BPR would get the message (maybe even the 6 would finally get the message) loud and clear from the pilots that “we are behind you and we expect you to get more”. They would be emboldened to make use of “division” to dictate negotiations which they are allowed to do, and you can expect they would make significant changes to the NAC and our bargaining positions. It would also be likely someone in the membership would start a recall attempt against the President and maybe the entire Officer corps. It’s a very similar scenario to what happened at APA after the leadership said to pass the LBFO and it overwhelmingly failed. From there they moved forward and were able to improve on the first agreement.
The Dividing Line Revisited and the Possible Paths
Do we really have leverage? The 5 think they proved it to a degree when 16 people in positions of authority in the union said “there is no more available” and the very next day the company offered another $50 to $100 million.
If the leverage is real and the membership says “no”, the company will be back in short order to improve their offer. If the leverage is not real then the company will attempt to do the deal without us which would simply mean a delay in working under the APA contract. But since the APA contract has many, many pitfalls because of a poor MOU, is that really much of a risk at all? If there is a delay, then you would enjoy significant forward movement due to your long awaited attrition that just began in December.
The MOU and NAC Misrepresentations
Here are a few topics the NAC is misrepresenting:
· Pay protection
· Minimum block hours
· E190 fleet size
· B-Scale
· The value of your Change of Control language
Pay Protection
There are two types of pay protection in the MOU and both are being misrepresented by the NAC. They continue to pretend that if you are displaced from your equipment (pay protection I) or onto the E190 (pay protection II) you will be pay protected. It’s nonsense and it’s irresponsible for the NAC to lead pilots to believe there is pay protection in an attempt to get this MOU to pass. Why not just tell the pilots the facts and let them decide?
Here’s the pertinent language for pay protection for displacement:
Any US Airways pilot as of the Effective Date who is thereafter involuntarily displaced to a
lower paying position shall be pay protected. The pay protections of this Paragraph shall continue
unchanged if the affected pilot(s) suffer(s) multiple displacements, but shall end whenever such
pilot(s) can hold the position from which the pilot was originally displaced or an equivalent or greater
pay position.
Do you understand what it means? It means you won’t be pay protected unless you can’t hold a piece of equipment that pays the same anywhere in the system. So, if you get displaced out of your Airbus Captain seat in CLT and you can hold MD80 Captain in Chicago…no pay protection.
Here’s the E190 pay protection language:
Commencing on the date of single operating certificate for US Airways and New American
Airlines or their successors (if any), all pilots, who have established and maintain seniority on the US
Airways mainline system and who are eligible for furlough protection pursuant to Paragraph 11 above,
will be paid in accordance with the Group I pay rates as set forth in Paragraph 22 when flying a Group
I aircraft except for the following pay protection: a Group I captain shall be paid at Group III first officer
pay rates unless the captain can hold a Group III first officer or higher-paying position; a Group I first
officer shall be paid at Group II first officer pay rates unless the first officer can hold a Group II first
officer or higher-paying position.
Do you understand what it means? It means if you get displaced to the E190 Captain you won’t be pay protected to your previous equipment if you can hold a group III F/O (767). Both of these pay protections are useless, yet the NAC is advertising that there is pay protection. Why? NAC Chairman Dean Colello admitted that Scott Kirby himself said he probably will never pay a dime in pay protection. Why isn’t that in the mailer from USAPA?
E190 Fleet Size
Now that you know the pay protections are worthless let’s discuss how many E190’s the company is allowed. The NAC has been asked numerous times at roadshows what prevents the company from flooding the airline with E190’s. They are quick to point out it’s not allowed during the interim protections because the E190 isn’t included in the minimum block hour provision. It is true that they are not included in the minimums but that doesn’t prohibit the company from getting just as many as they want. True, they would have to be in addition to aircraft covered under the minimum block hour language so that’s OK. But let’s be clear…the company can get as many E190’s as they desire.
The bigger question of course is how many E190’s can the company get after the interim block hour protections expire? The NAC has also been asked this numerous times and Dean Colello’s answer has been ridiculous. When he was asked in CLT he answered – with a straight face – that even though the company could replace every MD-80 and old 737 with E190’s he doesn’t think it will be a problem because Embraer can’t build the airplanes fast enough. No, this isn’t a joke. Long term you have no protection from the company getting hundreds of E190’s with a new B-scale but the NAC doesn’t think it’s a problem because of limitations on manufacturing rates.
The New B-Scale
Already famous for the launch of the B-scale in the 80’s, the APA has done it again with the E190 Captain rate of $114/hr. It is true the airplane is included in the parity review on January 1, 2016 and is expected to be brought up to $147 an hour but since the parity review is done by adding a certain percentage increase to an artificially low rate, the $147 will reflect well below industry standard for the E190. To make matters worse, the NAC is avoiding telling you that contained in the APA contract is the following language:
Neither party shall, without the written consent of the other party, seek to modify the pay relationship (i.e. ratio) set forth in Section 3.E. between Group I and Groups II – V through the processes of the Railway Labor Act for a period of two (2) contract cycles or ten (10) years from DOS, whichever is later.
Do you understand what it means? It means the B-scale E190 rates will be here for over a decade before APA is even allowed to discuss it with management. They have agreed to not bring it up for 10 years or two Section 6 negotiating cycles whichever is longer.
And how did the APA go about mitigating the lower E190 pay? With this language:
Pilots flying Group I aircraft may pick-up as restricted only by FAR limits.
This is the only fleet that is allowed a cap of FAR limits. It looks like this was the APA’s way of addressing the lower hourly pay.
Block Hour Protections
The NAC is leading pilots to believe that the block hour minimums in the MOU are an improvement from your current contract. They are not. The block hour minimums you enjoy now are calculated as actual block hours. The minimums in the MOU are calculated as scheduled block hours. In an average month, actual block hours flown end up being around 95% of scheduled. When you apply this ratio you will find that the MOU number is a concession. More importantly is that the East is presently flying about 9% above the contractual limits and is very likely to reduce all the way to the new MOU limits once the code share with American is allowed. Do the math, 9 % to the current contractual limits and an additional 5% to the MOU minimums. Assuming the New American will live up to its “no furlough” commitment it is likely that they will shrink at the rate of attrition which means the East will take the brunt of the reductions since the West’s attrition rate is almost non-existent and they are already near their contractual minimums.
As a reminder, the “actual” versus “scheduled” block hour minimum is something your union fought hard to retain and won in grievance only to give it away in the MOU.
Widebody Protection
The NAC is very proud of the wide-body protections in the MOU. They continually remind you that you don’t have any widebody minimum block hour protections in your contract and they were able to negotiate them for you in the MOU. Unfortunately they aren’t telling you the whole story because you currently do have protections for every route flown by a widebody. It’s called a code share prohibition and it’s found in Section 1 of your contract. If the company wants to serve an international city with a widebody, a US Airways pilot will be in the cockpit with only a couple exceptions. For the NAC to tell you that you don’t have widebody protections in your contract is extremely misleading.
Have you looked at the widebody protection language in the MOU? Here it is:
“The number of widebody positions, either maintained or pay protected, for US
Airways pilots shall be no less than 291 US Airways widebody captain positions and 475 US
Airways widebody first officer positions.”
It jumps out that the number of protected positions is less than those in the March bid – 9% by the way. What is often overlooked is this important language, “…either maintained or pay protected…”. It is the “or pay protected” that you need to be acutely aware of. What it means is if the company decides to retire the entire A330 fleet, all they would need to do to abide by the MOU would be pay the pilots the difference between the A330 hourly rate and what the pilot was displaced to.
The Value of Your Change of Control
The NAC sent you a Q & A on January 25th. It was another in a series of educational pieces meant to persuade you to vote “yes” on the MOU. In it the NAC provided you with their take on the valuation of the change of control being triggered versus signing onto the MOU. Their valuation is pointless because the value of the Change of Control does not come from it being triggered. The value of the Change of Control is to force the company to the table. The Change of Control is for sale, and right now your President, NAC and 6 members of the BPR are encouraging you to sell it for a fraction of its true worth. Only a few years ago, Doug Parker in an interview with Ted Reed said a merger couldn’t be done with the Change of Control language in place. Vote “no” and the company will be back.
Sincerely,
The Fly on the Wall
From: Wall Fly
Sent: Jan 27, 2013 4:05 PM
To: undisclosed-recipients@null, null@null
Subject: MOU need to know
The Rest of the Story
By the Fly on the Wall
The Unanimous Vote
There’s been a lot of conjecture about the possibility that 5 members of the BPR who voted to recommend membership approval of the MOU actually don’t support it and will personally vote against it during ratification. That is true, they will vote against it. In addition, 2 east pilots who sat in during a portion of deliberations as DDR’s (duly designated representatives) will also vote against the MOU. If you’re skeptical, give them a call and ask. These are the representatives and DDR’s.
Bill McKee
Steve Crimi
DeWitt Ingram
Steve Szpyrka
Mike Gilles
Paul Diorio (DDR)
Mike Martin (DDR)
This is obviously causing a lot of confusion on the line. How could 7 east pilots who had a hand in deliberating the MOU not actually be supportive of it? After all, it was a unanimous vote, right?
The reason isn’t that complicated. Here is why there was a unanimous vote without actual unanimous support of the MOU:
· The 5 members of the BPR (and 2 DDR’s) believe that President Hummel is working in collusion with the Company and he is being enabled by 6 BPR members (3 PHX, 2 DCA, 1 PHL). As a result, they believe that the MOU is the best we can do absent a recall of the Officers or a change in the BPR (PHL election), or…a rejection by the membership.
· The 5 demanded extra cash for our pilots (pay beginning on the date of ratification). When they did this, one of the 5 offered a unanimous vote to secure the pay. He did not have the consensus of the 5.
The 5 voted for you to approve the MOU not because they thought it was a good agreement but because they absolutely knew the other 6 were going to approve it with a 6-5 vote and decided if that was going to happen they needed to use their leverage to secure some additional pay, and that’s just what they did. But, and this is a monumental but….they do not want the membership to ratify the agreement.
A Little History
The 7 pilots named above believe that the Officers, particularly Gary Hummel, are working in collusion with the Company and will be rewarded someday by the company, a la Assistant Chief Pilot Bill Pollock. These Officers are being enabled by 6 members of the BPR – 3 PHX, 2 DCA, 1 PHL (Weidner) so they routinely lose votes 6-5. On January 3rd after hours of heated debate it was obvious the 6 were going to force a vote on the MOU and there was no doubt it would pass 6-5. Immediately prior to that the 6 members of the BPR, all 4 NAC members, 3 of 4 Officers, the Comm. Chairman and the Scope Chairman and a few more had all verbalized their belief that the MOU as presented was “the best we could do” and there was “nothing more left on the table”. Only a moment before the vote would have been forced, Vice Chairman Steve Crimi asked each member of the 5 if he had permission to speak for the group and they each replied “yes”. He then addressed the BPR and informed them that if the vote was forced right then, the 5 members would call for a “division” (roll call) and the MOU would fail. (When a “division” is called each BPR member votes for each pilot they represent. In that case, the 5 members have more votes than the 6)
After a cacophony of outbursts from the 6 subsided, an ultimatum was given…If the company meets a specific demand – which was given moments later - the 5 would still vote against the MOU, but they would not call for a division to prevail and the MOU would pass 6 -5. Soon after the ultimatum was given, one of the 5 offered a unanimous vote. That offer by one member of the 5 has proved very problematic because as a result, the 5 are being censored from communicating their true feelings about the MOU.
Why Didn’t the Five Use Division to Stop the MOU if They Didn’t Support it?
Unlike at ALPA, a Division of the house can only be used for very specific purposes under the USAPA Constitution. Here’s the language
“Division of the house shall be permitted only for votes taken to approve or reject any tentative agreements affecting income, work rule change(s), and/or benefit(s); setting parameters for collective bargaining; agreements on affiliation or merger with another labor organization; agreements arising from a merger of, or successor transactions involving the employer, or its parent (including seniority integration agreements); and amendments to the Constitution and Bylaws. On a Division of the house vote, each member of the Board shall be entitled to vote equal percentages of the active members in good standing…”
The 5 did not call for a division of the house to stop the MOU because they knew if the MOU failed at the BPR level that additional actions would needed to be taken and these actions would come in the form of directives through BPR resolutions. At that point, a call for division would not be available under the Constitution and any action the 5 thought necessary would likely be voted down 6-5 again. It is also particularly difficult to direct the President and lawyers and committees to do certain things when the President - who oversees both Legal Counsel and the Committees - does not support such actions. With these things in mind, the 5 chose instead to use the threat of division to secure an additional gain for the pilots should the membership approve the MOU. Do not take this to mean they support the MOU and want you to ratify it. They do not.
The Quickest Way to a Better Lifestyle?
You may have noticed that USAPA continues telling the membership that the BPR and President “believes this MOU is the quickest and surest path to a better lifestyle for us all.” Has anyone ever seen a resolution the BPR voted on that says such a thing? No, of course no one has because it doesn’t exist. This statement was never endorsed by the BPR. It’s simply part of the USAPA sales job.
Did the 6 Support the Retro Pay Date of February 8th?
Ted Reed, who for years covered US Airways for the Charlotte Observer recently wrote an article for The Street.com that was picked up by Forbes. In it he gave credit to the CLT Reps. and 2 PHL Reps. for making a unanimous vote possible by their demand for additional pay. Subsequent to the story he sent out a revised version suggesting that some of the 6 also supported the demand for additional pay. So what happened? Why did Ted Reed change his story to now suggest that maybe the 6 also played a role? Simple; when the original story came out, the 6 were outraged that credit was being given where it was due and one of the DCA Reps. communicated to Ted Reed that they also were supportive. After Ted Reed heard from enough people demanding that he change history, he rewrote the story with the addition of the suggestion that it wasn’t only the 5 who sought a change. He got it both right and wrong by the way. The 6 Reps. were indeed supportive…right after they were made aware that they had no other choice because the 5 were going to call for division. For PHX, DCA, or Jamie Weidner to suggest they had any part in securing the retro pay is absolute hogwash. Remember, the threat of division was not made until 16 people – yes 16 total! – had given their opinion that the MOU was the best that could be done and no more was available, including the 6 BPR members who afterwards sought credit through Ted Reed. As it turned out, they were all wrong, except for the 5 of course. The 6 were going to force a vote and vote yes without the pay date being moved back to the date of ratification.
The Dividing Line
Apparently last week at the NAC roadshow in CLT, Steve Crimi more than once explained to the membership why, in his opinion, we didn’t secure real retroactive pay or an equity stake similar to APA’s. He politely dismissed the excuse the NAC had just given about us not having “a claim” in bankruptcy court and instead spoke of a dividing line amongst the BPR and also amongst the line pilots. The dividing line being between those who think we have real leverage and those who think we don’t. He explained that clearly 5 members on the BPR believe we have significant leverage and 6 members don’t. He went on to summarize that the reason we didn’t secure real retro pay or an equity stake was because the USAPA leadership (President and 6 members of the BPR) refused to use the available leverage. You could tell he had more to say, but avoiding the politics seemed to be important to him.
What Now?
It’s pretty obvious USAPA is selling this MOU to the pilots. The material mailed to you contains only the good and none of the bad. It doesn’t even contain the MOU itself and that’s what you are voting on. This MOU will get a tremendous amount of “no” votes. It would get even more - perhaps even fail - if the pilots understand that saying “no” is not the end of the game. If the pilots say “no” that would be the 3rd strike against the NAC and the President and the other Officers. The 5 member minority of the BPR would get the message (maybe even the 6 would finally get the message) loud and clear from the pilots that “we are behind you and we expect you to get more”. They would be emboldened to make use of “division” to dictate negotiations which they are allowed to do, and you can expect they would make significant changes to the NAC and our bargaining positions. It would also be likely someone in the membership would start a recall attempt against the President and maybe the entire Officer corps. It’s a very similar scenario to what happened at APA after the leadership said to pass the LBFO and it overwhelmingly failed. From there they moved forward and were able to improve on the first agreement.
The Dividing Line Revisited and the Possible Paths
Do we really have leverage? The 5 think they proved it to a degree when 16 people in positions of authority in the union said “there is no more available” and the very next day the company offered another $50 to $100 million.
If the leverage is real and the membership says “no”, the company will be back in short order to improve their offer. If the leverage is not real then the company will attempt to do the deal without us which would simply mean a delay in working under the APA contract. But since the APA contract has many, many pitfalls because of a poor MOU, is that really much of a risk at all? If there is a delay, then you would enjoy significant forward movement due to your long awaited attrition that just began in December.
The MOU and NAC Misrepresentations
Here are a few topics the NAC is misrepresenting:
· Pay protection
· Minimum block hours
· E190 fleet size
· B-Scale
· The value of your Change of Control language
Pay Protection
There are two types of pay protection in the MOU and both are being misrepresented by the NAC. They continue to pretend that if you are displaced from your equipment (pay protection I) or onto the E190 (pay protection II) you will be pay protected. It’s nonsense and it’s irresponsible for the NAC to lead pilots to believe there is pay protection in an attempt to get this MOU to pass. Why not just tell the pilots the facts and let them decide?
Here’s the pertinent language for pay protection for displacement:
Any US Airways pilot as of the Effective Date who is thereafter involuntarily displaced to a
lower paying position shall be pay protected. The pay protections of this Paragraph shall continue
unchanged if the affected pilot(s) suffer(s) multiple displacements, but shall end whenever such
pilot(s) can hold the position from which the pilot was originally displaced or an equivalent or greater
pay position.
Do you understand what it means? It means you won’t be pay protected unless you can’t hold a piece of equipment that pays the same anywhere in the system. So, if you get displaced out of your Airbus Captain seat in CLT and you can hold MD80 Captain in Chicago…no pay protection.
Here’s the E190 pay protection language:
Commencing on the date of single operating certificate for US Airways and New American
Airlines or their successors (if any), all pilots, who have established and maintain seniority on the US
Airways mainline system and who are eligible for furlough protection pursuant to Paragraph 11 above,
will be paid in accordance with the Group I pay rates as set forth in Paragraph 22 when flying a Group
I aircraft except for the following pay protection: a Group I captain shall be paid at Group III first officer
pay rates unless the captain can hold a Group III first officer or higher-paying position; a Group I first
officer shall be paid at Group II first officer pay rates unless the first officer can hold a Group II first
officer or higher-paying position.
Do you understand what it means? It means if you get displaced to the E190 Captain you won’t be pay protected to your previous equipment if you can hold a group III F/O (767). Both of these pay protections are useless, yet the NAC is advertising that there is pay protection. Why? NAC Chairman Dean Colello admitted that Scott Kirby himself said he probably will never pay a dime in pay protection. Why isn’t that in the mailer from USAPA?
E190 Fleet Size
Now that you know the pay protections are worthless let’s discuss how many E190’s the company is allowed. The NAC has been asked numerous times at roadshows what prevents the company from flooding the airline with E190’s. They are quick to point out it’s not allowed during the interim protections because the E190 isn’t included in the minimum block hour provision. It is true that they are not included in the minimums but that doesn’t prohibit the company from getting just as many as they want. True, they would have to be in addition to aircraft covered under the minimum block hour language so that’s OK. But let’s be clear…the company can get as many E190’s as they desire.
The bigger question of course is how many E190’s can the company get after the interim block hour protections expire? The NAC has also been asked this numerous times and Dean Colello’s answer has been ridiculous. When he was asked in CLT he answered – with a straight face – that even though the company could replace every MD-80 and old 737 with E190’s he doesn’t think it will be a problem because Embraer can’t build the airplanes fast enough. No, this isn’t a joke. Long term you have no protection from the company getting hundreds of E190’s with a new B-scale but the NAC doesn’t think it’s a problem because of limitations on manufacturing rates.
The New B-Scale
Already famous for the launch of the B-scale in the 80’s, the APA has done it again with the E190 Captain rate of $114/hr. It is true the airplane is included in the parity review on January 1, 2016 and is expected to be brought up to $147 an hour but since the parity review is done by adding a certain percentage increase to an artificially low rate, the $147 will reflect well below industry standard for the E190. To make matters worse, the NAC is avoiding telling you that contained in the APA contract is the following language:
Neither party shall, without the written consent of the other party, seek to modify the pay relationship (i.e. ratio) set forth in Section 3.E. between Group I and Groups II – V through the processes of the Railway Labor Act for a period of two (2) contract cycles or ten (10) years from DOS, whichever is later.
Do you understand what it means? It means the B-scale E190 rates will be here for over a decade before APA is even allowed to discuss it with management. They have agreed to not bring it up for 10 years or two Section 6 negotiating cycles whichever is longer.
And how did the APA go about mitigating the lower E190 pay? With this language:
Pilots flying Group I aircraft may pick-up as restricted only by FAR limits.
This is the only fleet that is allowed a cap of FAR limits. It looks like this was the APA’s way of addressing the lower hourly pay.
Block Hour Protections
The NAC is leading pilots to believe that the block hour minimums in the MOU are an improvement from your current contract. They are not. The block hour minimums you enjoy now are calculated as actual block hours. The minimums in the MOU are calculated as scheduled block hours. In an average month, actual block hours flown end up being around 95% of scheduled. When you apply this ratio you will find that the MOU number is a concession. More importantly is that the East is presently flying about 9% above the contractual limits and is very likely to reduce all the way to the new MOU limits once the code share with American is allowed. Do the math, 9 % to the current contractual limits and an additional 5% to the MOU minimums. Assuming the New American will live up to its “no furlough” commitment it is likely that they will shrink at the rate of attrition which means the East will take the brunt of the reductions since the West’s attrition rate is almost non-existent and they are already near their contractual minimums.
As a reminder, the “actual” versus “scheduled” block hour minimum is something your union fought hard to retain and won in grievance only to give it away in the MOU.
Widebody Protection
The NAC is very proud of the wide-body protections in the MOU. They continually remind you that you don’t have any widebody minimum block hour protections in your contract and they were able to negotiate them for you in the MOU. Unfortunately they aren’t telling you the whole story because you currently do have protections for every route flown by a widebody. It’s called a code share prohibition and it’s found in Section 1 of your contract. If the company wants to serve an international city with a widebody, a US Airways pilot will be in the cockpit with only a couple exceptions. For the NAC to tell you that you don’t have widebody protections in your contract is extremely misleading.
Have you looked at the widebody protection language in the MOU? Here it is:
“The number of widebody positions, either maintained or pay protected, for US
Airways pilots shall be no less than 291 US Airways widebody captain positions and 475 US
Airways widebody first officer positions.”
It jumps out that the number of protected positions is less than those in the March bid – 9% by the way. What is often overlooked is this important language, “…either maintained or pay protected…”. It is the “or pay protected” that you need to be acutely aware of. What it means is if the company decides to retire the entire A330 fleet, all they would need to do to abide by the MOU would be pay the pilots the difference between the A330 hourly rate and what the pilot was displaced to.
The Value of Your Change of Control
The NAC sent you a Q & A on January 25th. It was another in a series of educational pieces meant to persuade you to vote “yes” on the MOU. In it the NAC provided you with their take on the valuation of the change of control being triggered versus signing onto the MOU. Their valuation is pointless because the value of the Change of Control does not come from it being triggered. The value of the Change of Control is to force the company to the table. The Change of Control is for sale, and right now your President, NAC and 6 members of the BPR are encouraging you to sell it for a fraction of its true worth. Only a few years ago, Doug Parker in an interview with Ted Reed said a merger couldn’t be done with the Change of Control language in place. Vote “no” and the company will be back.
Sincerely,
The Fly on the Wall
How's it even possible for people not to see anything so utterly obvious as that?
Sigh! Point sadly taken brother. I suppose that what I find most mind-boggling is the apparent ease with which many are so eagerly wanting to (yet once again) do so.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wIE_ITidaKY
Sigh! Point sadly taken brother. I suppose that what I find most mind-boggling is the apparent ease with which many are so eagerly wanting to (yet once again) do so.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wIE_ITidaKY
It's not me, it's us. You have been subsidizing them too through the "me too." They have gained from it and in bad times lost from it. But do you notice we always go first? It's just the way it is.
I tell you what. If it's voted down by those smarter than me, I will support that decision.
- Status
