WorldTraveler
Corn Field
- Dec 5, 2003
- 21,709
- 10,662
- Banned
- #31
of course we can use real numbers
in the 2nd quarter, DL carried 28% of the local passengers in the JFK-LAX market and had $262K of passenger revenue on average.
AA carried 21% of the market, and because of higher average fares, had 2% more revenue than DL in the local market on average.
VX had 18% of the local market followed by UA at 16% and then B6 at 14%.
IN the JFK-SFO market, DL has 25% of the revenue and $190K in average daily revenue and is no. 2 behind UA which has 30% share of the passengers and $290K in daily revenue. VX has 20% passenger share, B6 has 13%, and AA has 11%. Total revenue is in the same order except that AA and B6 are inverted due to AA’s higher average fares relative to B6.
IN LGA-ORD, the average fare in the market is $188. AA has 43% share but an average fare slightly below average. UA Is next with a 27% share but a $206 average fare. DL has a 20% share but $211 average fare.
No, dawg, Jesus isn’t scared of anything.
There are a lot of people here who either are scared of the truth or who don’t want to hear it.
Since DL’s buildup of NYC, DL has been handedly increasing both its share in NYC as well as the average fare in one market after another. It is no secret that average fare in the airline industry is related to market share.
AA sat on its hands for years and has lost the number one carrier size in NYC. Now AA is number 4 in the NYC domestic market behind DL, UA, and B6 and #3 of 3 behind UA and DL in the NYC market.
AA’s strategy might well be to try to play the role of niche carrier in NYC now but there is no evidence that such a strategy is viable over the long term against other carriers’ stronger hubs.
In markets such as LGA, AA is taking the strategy of continuing to keep capacity in the market at the cost of higher average fares but ending up with higher total revenue. DL is doing the same thing in the JFK transcon markets and did it quite successfully in a number of LHR markets. The difference is that DL has now closed the average fare gap so that it is not only on par with AA in the local market in terms of passenger share but because of the higher average fares has managed to close the revenue gap as well.
Further, on the JFK transcons, DL is using its larger and growing hub at JFK to keep from diluting its average fare on the JFK-LAX SEGMENT while AA’s shrinking JFK operation means it cannot fill its flights with connecting passengers without reducing the average fares they take
But AA still plays in a number of JFK markets including SFO even though it gets average fares that are below every other carrier except B6.
AA clearly realizes it has to fight to maintain its presence at LAX but so far maintains that share in some markets such as TYO by operating below average fares. It is entirely possible that AA will be able to maintain its share and average fare advantage in the LAX-LHR market but will see average fares go down. DL will likely see its average fares go up based on what has happened in other markets but may still be below AA in totals. The question is whether DL can close the gap enough to be profitable – the very same question that has been posed of AA in the LAX-Tokyo market. For years, AA has been unable to close that gap. It is very possible that AA and DL will have similar int’l route systems from LAX with DL having the advantage over the Pacific and AA having the advantage over the Atlantic.
in the 2nd quarter, DL carried 28% of the local passengers in the JFK-LAX market and had $262K of passenger revenue on average.
AA carried 21% of the market, and because of higher average fares, had 2% more revenue than DL in the local market on average.
VX had 18% of the local market followed by UA at 16% and then B6 at 14%.
IN the JFK-SFO market, DL has 25% of the revenue and $190K in average daily revenue and is no. 2 behind UA which has 30% share of the passengers and $290K in daily revenue. VX has 20% passenger share, B6 has 13%, and AA has 11%. Total revenue is in the same order except that AA and B6 are inverted due to AA’s higher average fares relative to B6.
IN LGA-ORD, the average fare in the market is $188. AA has 43% share but an average fare slightly below average. UA Is next with a 27% share but a $206 average fare. DL has a 20% share but $211 average fare.
No, dawg, Jesus isn’t scared of anything.
There are a lot of people here who either are scared of the truth or who don’t want to hear it.
Since DL’s buildup of NYC, DL has been handedly increasing both its share in NYC as well as the average fare in one market after another. It is no secret that average fare in the airline industry is related to market share.
AA sat on its hands for years and has lost the number one carrier size in NYC. Now AA is number 4 in the NYC domestic market behind DL, UA, and B6 and #3 of 3 behind UA and DL in the NYC market.
AA’s strategy might well be to try to play the role of niche carrier in NYC now but there is no evidence that such a strategy is viable over the long term against other carriers’ stronger hubs.
In markets such as LGA, AA is taking the strategy of continuing to keep capacity in the market at the cost of higher average fares but ending up with higher total revenue. DL is doing the same thing in the JFK transcon markets and did it quite successfully in a number of LHR markets. The difference is that DL has now closed the average fare gap so that it is not only on par with AA in the local market in terms of passenger share but because of the higher average fares has managed to close the revenue gap as well.
Further, on the JFK transcons, DL is using its larger and growing hub at JFK to keep from diluting its average fare on the JFK-LAX SEGMENT while AA’s shrinking JFK operation means it cannot fill its flights with connecting passengers without reducing the average fares they take
But AA still plays in a number of JFK markets including SFO even though it gets average fares that are below every other carrier except B6.
AA clearly realizes it has to fight to maintain its presence at LAX but so far maintains that share in some markets such as TYO by operating below average fares. It is entirely possible that AA will be able to maintain its share and average fare advantage in the LAX-LHR market but will see average fares go down. DL will likely see its average fares go up based on what has happened in other markets but may still be below AA in totals. The question is whether DL can close the gap enough to be profitable – the very same question that has been posed of AA in the LAX-Tokyo market. For years, AA has been unable to close that gap. It is very possible that AA and DL will have similar int’l route systems from LAX with DL having the advantage over the Pacific and AA having the advantage over the Atlantic.