WorldTraveler
Corn Field
- Dec 5, 2003
- 21,709
- 10,662
- Banned
- #46
Quotes from the article:
Airlines have been trying to change this perilous dynamic. In recent years, they’ve been joining forces to cut costs and improve their competitive positioning. Delta’s (DAL) merger with Northwest and Continental’s merger with United Airlines (UAL), for instance, have clearly created stronger airlines, better built to withstand the inevitable hurdles the industry faces during economic downturns.
Then there’s AMR (AMR). We’ll never know whether the parent company of American Airlines wishes it had found its own partner,
Labor and fuel costs are only part of the problem. The recent massive wave of industry consolidation has put rivals on much better footing, and they are pressing their advantage. “Scale matters in the airline industry, and we fear that AMR’s share of corporate travel may be falling as mergers have created competitors with broader networks,” noted Merrill’s analysts. This may explain why AMR has lost market share in every region it serves (domestic, trans-Atlantic, trans-Pacific and Latin America) so far in 2011.
(As I've been noting for quite some time)
The decision to lease so many new aircraft simply makes a very weak balance sheet even weaker. Capital spending is now on track to exceed $3 billion every year beginning in 2013. This is a lot of dough for a company that hasn’t generated free cash flow since 2007 and carries nearly $9 billion in long-term debt (not to mention the $8 billion in pension underfunding).
In effect, AMR is hoping and praying that broader industry conditions remain in check, highlighted by reasonable jet fuel prices, strong demand for air travel and stabilization in market share. But is this a realistic set of expectations? This approach may work if all falls into place, but AMR is “precariously positioned should things go awry,” note analysts at UBS.
....
AMR waited so long to execute a turnaround that they now cannot afford for anything to go wrong that would derail their plan - and they also assume that they can hold onto what they do have - despite indications that airlines are stepping up their competitive assaults to pick up the premium revenue that has long been a part of AA's business model - and is necessary if AA is to remain a viable airline.
Airlines have been trying to change this perilous dynamic. In recent years, they’ve been joining forces to cut costs and improve their competitive positioning. Delta’s (DAL) merger with Northwest and Continental’s merger with United Airlines (UAL), for instance, have clearly created stronger airlines, better built to withstand the inevitable hurdles the industry faces during economic downturns.
Then there’s AMR (AMR). We’ll never know whether the parent company of American Airlines wishes it had found its own partner,
Labor and fuel costs are only part of the problem. The recent massive wave of industry consolidation has put rivals on much better footing, and they are pressing their advantage. “Scale matters in the airline industry, and we fear that AMR’s share of corporate travel may be falling as mergers have created competitors with broader networks,” noted Merrill’s analysts. This may explain why AMR has lost market share in every region it serves (domestic, trans-Atlantic, trans-Pacific and Latin America) so far in 2011.
(As I've been noting for quite some time)
The decision to lease so many new aircraft simply makes a very weak balance sheet even weaker. Capital spending is now on track to exceed $3 billion every year beginning in 2013. This is a lot of dough for a company that hasn’t generated free cash flow since 2007 and carries nearly $9 billion in long-term debt (not to mention the $8 billion in pension underfunding).
In effect, AMR is hoping and praying that broader industry conditions remain in check, highlighted by reasonable jet fuel prices, strong demand for air travel and stabilization in market share. But is this a realistic set of expectations? This approach may work if all falls into place, but AMR is “precariously positioned should things go awry,” note analysts at UBS.
....
AMR waited so long to execute a turnaround that they now cannot afford for anything to go wrong that would derail their plan - and they also assume that they can hold onto what they do have - despite indications that airlines are stepping up their competitive assaults to pick up the premium revenue that has long been a part of AA's business model - and is necessary if AA is to remain a viable airline.