US/AA merger settlement imminent!
- Thread starter AANOTOK
- Start date
Piedmont1984
Veteran
- Jan 12, 2004
- 1,737
- 897
Sorry, imminent is past.
Next would be soon.
Then eventually.
30 years next summer.
Next would be soon.
Then eventually.
30 years next summer.
Piedmont1984
Veteran
- Jan 12, 2004
- 1,737
- 897
Thanks, to you as well. Where did it go?AANOTOK said:...and congrats!
Happy reading, great heading:
Southwest Airlines wants to tell judge why American Airlines and US Airways should give up slots in Washington and New York
By Terry Maxon
[email protected]
5:25 pm on November 7, 2013 | Permalink
Southwest Airlines asked permission Thursday to file a “friend of the court” request in the American Airlines-US Airways antitrust case, saying it wants to tell the judge about how it needs more takeoff and landing slots at Reagan National Airport near Washington, D.C., and New York’s LaGuardia Airport.
U.S. District Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly quickly approved Southwest’s request, adding its name to a long list of parties that want to weigh in as amici curiae, or friends of the court.
In essence, Southwest said it cannot bring the benefit of low-fare competition to markets out of Reagan National and LaGuardia unless it has enough takeoff and landing rights, and it doesn’t have enough of those “slots.”
Said Southwest in its filing:
Southwest can provide unique information and perspective on how the proposed merger between US Airways and American Airlines would likely affect competition, and particularly how the impact of the proposed merger on service at DCA and LGA should be viewed under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
An important component of the defendants’ defense is the competitive discipline that Southwest’s low priced fares bring to the marketplace. US Airways says in its answer that the Complaint “ignore the most meaningful competitive development in the airline industry since deregulation: the emergence of low cost carriers,” emphasizing that Southwest “is now the country’s largest domestic airline.”
Southwest will discuss the competition that it provides to constrain fares of legacy carriers and enhance the benefits that passengers enjoy as a result. Southwest will explain how its entry into markets has reduced competing fares and stimulated new passenger traffic, and it can provide the unique perspective of how it could—if it were to obtain additional slots—provide an important competitive restraint on a merged US Airways and American Airlines at DCA and LGA.
Even with the limited service it provides at DCA and LGA, Southwest has already brought pro-competitive effects at those airports. Southwest will explain how — without a significant divestiture of slots at each of these airports in conjunction with the merger – the increased concentration of slots in the hands of the merged airline would substantially lessen competition.
Those anti-competitive effects could be mitigated only if a significant number of slots were divested to Southwest so it could bring the Southwest Effect to more routes served from DCA and LGA. To effectively mitigate those anticompetitive effects, Southwest will explain why a divestiture of slots must be to a LCC like Southwest, which has a nationwide low fare network that would deliver the competitive benefits of slot divestiture to the greatest number of cities and passengers throughout the country.
DCA is Reagan National. LGA is LaGuardia.
Judge Kollar-Kotelly has set a Nov. 15 deadline for all amici curiae briefs to be in. She’ll have to give Southwest the okay before it can submit a brief.
Southwest and JetBlue Airways have made no secret that they would like the Justice Department to tie approval of the American-US Airways merger to the divestiture of takeoff and landing slots at the Washington airport, one of several major airports where the federal government rations the number of takeoffs and landings.
While JetBlue focuses its New York operations mostly on New York Kennedy, Southwest also wants slots to grow its tiny LaGuardia operations.
US Airways holds about 56 percent of the Reagan slots. With American’s portfolio, the share held by the post-merger airline would control more than two thirds of the airport’s takeoff and landing rights.
Southwest said the U.S. Department of Justice, which filed the lawsuit to block the merger of American and US Airways, had no objection to the carrier’s request to file a brief. The states that joined the lawsuit on the side of DOJ and the airlines had no objection to its filing a brief, Southwest stated.
Keep reading for the filing.
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF BY SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO.
Southwest Airlines Co. (“Southwest”) respectfully moves this Court for permission to file a brief amicus curiae that will address the likely competitive effects of the merger between US Airways Group Inc. (“US Airways”) and AMR Corporation (“American Airlines”).
Southwest has sought the consent of the parties to this litigation to file a brief amicus curiae on the merits. The United States, the plaintiff States, US Airways and American Airlines have all given their consent.1
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS
Southwest is the preeminent low cost carrier (“LCC”) in the United States. Southwest’s headquarters are at 2702 Love Field Drive in Dallas, Texas. Since it began operations in 1971 Southwest has grown from a small intra-state carrier serving three Texas cities to become today the largest domestic airline measured by the number of passengers carried. Southwest was the original LCC in this country, and its popularity and growth over time created the foundation for the broader LCC segment of the airline industry, as other carriers in recent years have tried to follow in Southwest’s footsteps to offer their own brands of low cost service. Southwest provides service in competition with legacy carriers, such as US Airways and American Airlines, but at significantly lower costs and fares. Typically, when Southwest begins providing low cost service on a particular route lacking LCC competition, not only do passengers enjoy Southwest’s lower fares, but Southwest’s entry drives down the fares of competing legacy carriers. In response to the lower fares, the number of passengers traveling on the route increases significantly. This pro-competitive effect of offering lower fares and stimulating new traffic is so well documented that it has been dubbed “The Southwest Effect”2 by the U.S. Department of Transportation.
The pro-competitive effect of Southwest’s entry and service is effective, however, only when Southwest has the ability to enter a particular market. While Southwest serves over 90 destinations in the United States, it has extremely limited access to Reagan National Airport serving Washington DC (“DCA”) and LaGuardia Airport in New York City (“LGA”) due to severe entry restrictions. Service to those airports is significantly limited by the allocation of take-off and landing slots, and Southwest has been able to obtain only a very small number of slots at those two airports. Because the merger would concentrate slots at DCA and LGA in a combined airline that would restrict the availability of slots to Southwest and other LCCs that could provide meaningful competition, Southwest can provide the Court with a unique and important perspective on the legal and competitive implications of the merger for air service at those airports.
II. ARGUMENT
An amicus curiae “does not represent the parties but participates only for the benefit of the Court.” Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-1,495, 892 F. Supp. 2d 334, 337 (D.D.C. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. Civ.A.98-1232, 2002 WL 319366, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 2002). It is solely within the Court’s discretion to determine “the fact, extent, and manner” of participation by the amicus. Microsoft Corp., 2002 WL 319366, at *2. Amicus participation should be permitted, among other reasons, when an amicus “‘has unique information or perspective that can help the court beyond the help that the lawyers for the parties are able to provide.’” Jin v. Ministry of State Sec., 557 F. Supp. 2d 131, 137 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1064 (7th Cir. 1997
Southwest can provide unique information and perspective on how the proposed merger between US Airways and American Airlines would likely affect competition, and particularly how the impact of the proposed merger on service at DCA and LGA should be viewed under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. An important component of the defendants’ defense is the competitive discipline that Southwest’s low priced fares bring to the marketplace. US Airways says in its answer that the Complaint “ignore the most meaningful competitive development in the airline industry since deregulation: the emergence of low cost carriers,” emphasizing that Southwest “is now the country’s largest domestic airline.” (Defendant US Airways’ Group, Inc.’s Answer to Am. Compl. 2, Sept. 9, 2013 [Dkt. 79]). Southwest will discuss the competition that it provides to constrain fares of legacy carriers and enhance the benefits that passengers enjoy as a result. Southwest will explain how its entry into markets has reduced competing fares and stimulated new passenger traffic, and it can provide the unique perspective of how it could—if it were to obtain additional slots—provide an important competitive restraint on a merged US Airways and American Airlines at DCA and LGA. Even with the limited service it provides at DCA and LGA, Southwest has already brought pro-competitive effects at those airports. Southwest will explain how — without a significant divestiture of slots at each of these airports in conjunction with the merger – the increased concentration of slots in the hands of the merged airline would substantially lessen competition. Those anti-competitive effects could be mitigated only if a significant number of slots were divested to Southwest so it could bring the Southwest Effect to more routes served from DCA and LGA. To effectively mitigate those anticompetitive effects, Southwest will explain why a divestiture of slots must be to a LCC like Southwest, which has a nationwide low fare network that would deliver the competitive benefits of slot divestiture to the greatest number of cities and passengers throughout the country.
Conclusion
Southwest respectfully requests that this Court permit it to submit a brief amicus curiae on the merits of this matter, on such terms established by the Court.
Dated: November 7, 2013
Respectfully submitted, /s/ Alden L. Atkins
1 Southwest is mindful of the admonition the Court has made to other amici to limit their discussion to facts available to the parties. Southwest will comply with that instruction and will rely upon facts already in the record. Southwest understands that the United States has produced approximately 150,000 Southwest documents to Defendants in this litigation that Southwest had previously produced to the government, and Southwest has produced more documents in response to subpoenas from Defendants in this litigation. In addition, a senior Southwest representative was deposed in this litigation.
2 Randall D. Bennett & James M. Craun, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., The Airline Deregulation Evolution Continues: The Southwest Effect (May 1993); see also U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-10-778T, Airline Mergers: Issues Raised by the Proposed Merger of United and Continental Airlines 6 (2010) (“over the last decade, airfares have generally declined (in real terms), owing largely to the increased presence of low-cost airlines, such as Southwest Airlines, in more markets and the shrinking dominance of a single airline in many markets”); Austan Goolsbee & Chad Syverson, How Do Incumbents Respond to the Threat of Entry? Evidence from Major Airlines, 123 Q.J. of Econ. 1611 (Nov. 2008); Sholnn Freeman, Southwest Airlines Feeling Squeezed out at National Airport, Wash. Post, Mar. 23, 2010, available at http://www.washingto...032203312.html; Marco Santana, Southwest Effect Slashes Des Moines Prices, Des Moines Reg., Sept. 27, 2013, available at http://www.iowadot.g...effect slashes% 20Des%20Moines%20prices.pdf.
Southwest Airlines wants to tell judge why American Airlines and US Airways should give up slots in Washington and New York
By Terry Maxon
[email protected]
5:25 pm on November 7, 2013 | Permalink
Southwest Airlines asked permission Thursday to file a “friend of the court” request in the American Airlines-US Airways antitrust case, saying it wants to tell the judge about how it needs more takeoff and landing slots at Reagan National Airport near Washington, D.C., and New York’s LaGuardia Airport.
U.S. District Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly quickly approved Southwest’s request, adding its name to a long list of parties that want to weigh in as amici curiae, or friends of the court.
In essence, Southwest said it cannot bring the benefit of low-fare competition to markets out of Reagan National and LaGuardia unless it has enough takeoff and landing rights, and it doesn’t have enough of those “slots.”
Said Southwest in its filing:
Southwest can provide unique information and perspective on how the proposed merger between US Airways and American Airlines would likely affect competition, and particularly how the impact of the proposed merger on service at DCA and LGA should be viewed under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
An important component of the defendants’ defense is the competitive discipline that Southwest’s low priced fares bring to the marketplace. US Airways says in its answer that the Complaint “ignore
Southwest will discuss the competition that it provides to constrain fares of legacy carriers and enhance the benefits that passengers enjoy as a result. Southwest will explain how its entry into markets has reduced competing fares and stimulated new passenger traffic, and it can provide the unique perspective of how it could—if it were to obtain additional slots—provide an important competitive restraint on a merged US Airways and American Airlines at DCA and LGA.
Even with the limited service it provides at DCA and LGA, Southwest has already brought pro-competitive effects at those airports. Southwest will explain how — without a significant divestiture of slots at each of these airports in conjunction with the merger – the increased concentration of slots in the hands of the merged airline would substantially lessen competition.
Those anti-competitive effects could be mitigated only if a significant number of slots were divested to Southwest so it could bring the Southwest Effect to more routes served from DCA and LGA. To effectively mitigate those anticompetitive effects, Southwest will explain why a divestiture of slots must be to a LCC like Southwest, which has a nationwide low fare network that would deliver the competitive benefits of slot divestiture to the greatest number of cities and passengers throughout the country.
DCA is Reagan National. LGA is LaGuardia.
Judge Kollar-Kotelly has set a Nov. 15 deadline for all amici curiae briefs to be in. She’ll have to give Southwest the okay before it can submit a brief.
Southwest and JetBlue Airways have made no secret that they would like the Justice Department to tie approval of the American-US Airways merger to the divestiture of takeoff and landing slots at the Washington airport, one of several major airports where the federal government rations the number of takeoffs and landings.
While JetBlue focuses its New York operations mostly on New York Kennedy, Southwest also wants slots to grow its tiny LaGuardia operations.
US Airways holds about 56 percent of the Reagan slots. With American’s portfolio, the share held by the post-merger airline would control more than two thirds of the airport’s takeoff and landing rights.
Southwest said the U.S. Department of Justice, which filed the lawsuit to block the merger of American and US Airways, had no objection to the carrier’s request to file a brief. The states that joined the lawsuit on the side of DOJ and the airlines had no objection to its filing a brief, Southwest stated.
Keep reading for the filing.
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF BY SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO.
Southwest Airlines Co. (“Southwest”) respectfully moves this Court for permission to file a brief amicus curiae that will address the likely competitive effects of the merger between US Airways Group Inc. (“US Airways”) and AMR Corporation (“American Airlines”).
Southwest has sought the consent of the parties to this litigation to file a brief amicus curiae on the merits. The United States, the plaintiff States, US Airways and American Airlines have all given their consent.1
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS
Southwest is the preeminent low cost carrier (“LCC”) in the United States. Southwest’s headquarters are at 2702 Love Field Drive in Dallas, Texas. Since it began operations in 1971 Southwest has grown from a small intra-state carrier serving three Texas cities to become today the largest domestic airline measured by the number of passengers carried. Southwest was the original LCC in this country, and its popularity and growth over time created the foundation for the broader LCC segment of the airline industry, as other carriers in recent years have tried to follow in Southwest’s footsteps to offer their own brands of low cost service. Southwest provides service in competition with legacy carriers, such as US Airways and American Airlines, but at significantly lower costs and fares. Typically, when Southwest begins providing low cost service on a particular route lacking LCC competition, not only do passengers enjoy Southwest’s lower fares, but Southwest’s entry drives down the fares of competing legacy carriers. In response to the lower fares, the number of passengers traveling on the route increases significantly. This pro-competitive effect of offering lower fares and stimulating new traffic is so well documented that it has been dubbed “The Southwest Effect”2 by the U.S. Department of Transportation.
The pro-competitive effect of Southwest’s entry and service is effective, however, only when Southwest has the ability to enter a particular market. While Southwest serves over 90 destinations in the United States, it has extremely limited access to Reagan National Airport serving Washington DC (“DCA”) and LaGuardia Airport in New York City (“LGA”) due to severe entry restrictions. Service to those airports is significantly limited by the allocation of take-off and landing slots, and Southwest has been able to obtain only a very small number of slots at those two airports. Because the merger would concentrate slots at DCA and LGA in a combined airline that would restrict the availability of slots to Southwest and other LCCs that could provide meaningful competition, Southwest can provide the Court with a unique and important perspective on the legal and competitive implications of the merger for air service at those airports.
II. ARGUMENT
An amicus curiae “does not represent the parties but participates only for the benefit of the Court.” Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-1,495, 892 F. Supp. 2d 334, 337 (D.D.C. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. Civ.A.98-1232, 2002 WL 319366, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 2002). It is solely within the Court’s discretion to determine “the fact, extent, and manner” of participation by the amicus. Microsoft Corp., 2002 WL 319366, at *2. Amicus participation should be permitted, among other reasons, when an amicus “‘has unique information or perspective that can help the court beyond the help that the lawyers for the parties are able to provide.’” Jin v. Ministry of State Sec., 557 F. Supp. 2d 131, 137 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1064 (7th Cir. 1997
Southwest can provide unique information and perspective on how the proposed merger between US Airways and American Airlines would likely affect competition, and particularly how the impact of the proposed merger on service at DCA and LGA should be viewed under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. An important component of the defendants’ defense is the competitive discipline that Southwest’s low priced fares bring to the marketplace. US Airways says in its answer that the Complaint “ignore
Conclusion
Southwest respectfully requests that this Court permit it to submit a brief amicus curiae on the merits of this matter, on such terms established by the Court.
Dated: November 7, 2013
Respectfully submitted, /s/ Alden L. Atkins
1 Southwest is mindful of the admonition the Court has made to other amici to limit their discussion to facts available to the parties. Southwest will comply with that instruction and will rely upon facts already in the record. Southwest understands that the United States has produced approximately 150,000 Southwest documents to Defendants in this litigation that Southwest had previously produced to the government, and Southwest has produced more documents in response to subpoenas from Defendants in this litigation. In addition, a senior Southwest representative was deposed in this litigation.
2 Randall D. Bennett & James M. Craun, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., The Airline Deregulation Evolution Continues: The Southwest Effect (May 1993); see also U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-10-778T, Airline Mergers: Issues Raised by the Proposed Merger of United and Continental Airlines 6 (2010) (“over the last decade, airfares have generally declined (in real terms), owing largely to the increased presence of low-cost airlines, such as Southwest Airlines, in more markets and the shrinking dominance of a single airline in many markets”); Austan Goolsbee & Chad Syverson, How Do Incumbents Respond to the Threat of Entry? Evidence from Major Airlines, 123 Q.J. of Econ. 1611 (Nov. 2008); Sholnn Freeman, Southwest Airlines Feeling Squeezed out at National Airport, Wash. Post, Mar. 23, 2010, available at http://www.washingto...032203312.html; Marco Santana, Southwest Effect Slashes Des Moines Prices, Des Moines Reg., Sept. 27, 2013, available at http://www.iowadot.g...effect slashes% 20Des%20Moines%20prices.pdf.
MetalMover
Veteran
- Sep 16, 2013
- 3,543
- 2,410
SWA has had a pretty good, profitable and efficient philosophy side their inception. Now they want more into the major airports and even are going international wherever their 7373's can take them.eolesen said:Hmmm. Southwest believes the merger would adversely affect their ability to compete?
They must not be reading all the blogs and this forum...
One has to wonder if they can maintain that leadership once they go to LGA and DCA...Two congested airports.
I suppose they'll do well but time will tell.
Overspeed
Veteran
- Jun 27, 2011
- 3,245
- 1,065
eolesen said:Hmmm. Southwest believes the merger would adversely affect their ability to compete?
They must not be reading all the blogs and this forum...
Their rapid growth fueled much of their profitability. Looks like they are moving more towards fees like the rest of the industry.
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304799404579155741368853418
Probably need to do so because competitors are hiding increased fare hikes in fees, next you will smugly cite that they are starting to look at what they are paying their workers with more scrutiny. Would it make your day if they took pay cuts and gave up benefits like us, and the vicious circle continues?Overspeed said:
IMO-- I think SWA was testing the differences of AT still charging and the SWA side not charging. Now they have seen the results side by side. In 2014 AT is going to be 100% gone and so would have been the baggage fees. SWA more than likely will not want to lose the baggage fees and now can see what bag fees will bring in, and they are desperate to hit the 15% ROI. I don't see any bag fees added in 2014. But 2015 is another story, or at least once the bag fees are suppose to go away from AT then they will adapt the bag fees across the board once SWA/AT become SW.Bob Owens said:
nycbusdriver
Veteran
Piedmont1984 said:
Congrats, Junior!
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