Twa..before We Became History, We Made It.

Not to belittle the crew but it sounds like there were some major maintenance issues that needed to be dealt with such as cracked wing spars, fuel leaks, stick shaker issues that were not fixed.

I know I will regret asking this question but is this par for the course in all the major airlines?
 
TWA 843 showed why it is that flight attendants are on the plane...the saying "...primarily for your safety..." was truely demonstrated by the professionals on 843 that day...in exemplory fashion!

I had the good fortune to fly as a passenger for an extended period with the author of the above linked website while she worked as the FSM. I remember during a flight out of JFK (N/S to SFO I might add) we talked at length about this accident. I recall thinking before I met her how I thought the Flight Attendants had done a great job with the evacuation. In my conversations with her it became clear just how great a job they did - under the ultimate pressure they found themselves that day.

I hope she and the rest of the 'fomer' SFO based FA Crews are finding their 'forced vacations' from flying to be personally fulfilling and as painless as possible. I wish them all well and hope they'll be back in the air soon! They are true professionals!
 
Reagardless of the fact, looking at the photos it is still amazing that no one lost their life and the crew is to be commended for that. I was shaking my head reading about passengers getting bags out of the overhead and the "antler hat"

Reminds me of the LIT accident when USAToday profiled a girl who manged to rescue her violin before getting out of the burning plane.
 
I was an investigator in that accident working closely with the lead FAA investigator. It was truly the most well managed evacuation ever. The crew are to be commended for their heroic professional conduct. True professionals in every sense of the word. The author was a jump seating F/A who has done an outstanding job putting the whole thing together. It was a presentation for a course she is taking as she is furloughed. She got an A. Should have been A+++++++++++++++

There are questions about the fuel leak, wing spar and stick shaker that have never been answered satisfactorily. Probably never will be answered like all the questions around TWA 800.
 
IT's sad TWA went the way it did. 1984 was not a kind year in TWA, Lorenzo or Icahn. Sounds like a choice between Mussolini and Hitler; The way this airline was sold piece by piece really killed it. Many are sour at what happened with the merger, look at the bright side; AA doesn't buy things without value, TWA brings something very special to AA and AA is the better for it.
 
twasilverbullet said:
They were New York based f/a's.
Twasilverbullet,

Thanks. I was actually referring to the author of the website who was when I met her a part of the TWA Satellite FA Base in SFO. My sentiments were in reference to her co-workers based out of SFO who (although were not on 843 that day) are also true professionals (based upon my many flights with them over the a period of a couple of years)..who I wish well in spite of their current plight.

I of course also hope all of the former TWA FAs are fairing well through the current situation...and I do hope that they'll be back in their rightful place in the air soon.
 
L1011Ret,

I recall reading something on the internet a couple of years back on this accident...I believe it was the NTSB report. I can't seem to find the link just now. That said, I seem to recall (from my memory from that reading) was that they put a fairly large set of blame on the flight crew for the pilot saying to the captian something to the effect of 'here it's yours' once the stick shaker activated and to a lesser degree to the Captain for 'landing' the plane after the takeoff roll.

That said, it's very easy (for the bureaucrats) to second guess the flight crew who have to make split second decisons which in this case could mean have meant life or death. I think the results speak for themselves. I think there's a saying...any landing you can walk away from is a good one...well nearly 300 people walked away from 843...not bad for a days work.
 
The TWA people I work with are very kind, caring people. (Even the ones that are senior to me ;) )

Perhaps some of you should see them as more than a number on a seniority list.
(I know, I know, it'd be a whole lot harder to vilify them that way.) :rolleyes:
 
nyc6035, you are correct. The statement was made, "its not going to fly" and control was transferred to the Captain who elected to land and stop. I'm not even sure if the main gear had lifted off at this point. A split second decision was made in favor of stopping rather than continuing the Take Off. Yes, the crew was criticized for their decision to stop. On the other hand it certainly seemed that stopping was just as safe as Taking Off given the amount of runway remaining on 13R. If they had elected to Take Off and the airplane had crashed taking all lives on board, the criticism would have been much greater. The signals they had, stick shaker, and visceral body experience were of the type that leave you without concrete indications of what was really happening. In other words, are these signals providing me with genuine indications that the airplane is not going to fly and something is really wrong? If you fly an aircraft of any type for a long period you develop a certain sense about when something is really wrong and when the information is just a "normal" happening particular to that type airplane. They made their decision based on their experience without a great deal of concrete indications other than the stick shaker. I cannot remember in 18000 hours of flying having a stick shaker come on. As practiced in the simulator, a stick shaker is an indication the aircraft is stalling. You don't sit and evaluate whether the stick shaker is providing true signals. You respond by recovering from stall. Then you can check out the stick shaker. Or protect the aircraft first, and check on things later. That is just what they did. Yes, they tried to put blame on the crew. But then a lot of veteran pilots said, "I don't know what I would have done" indicating there was no clear decision path in this case.
 
mjk said:
The TWA people I work with are very kind, caring people. (Even the ones that are senior to me ;) )

Perhaps some of you should see them as more than a number on a seniority list.
(I know, I know, it'd be a whole lot harder to vilify them that way.) :rolleyes:
mjk, thank you for your kind words. ;) :)
 
desertfox said:
Some of this web page is in German but the pictures of the L1011 and it's ownership history is interesting, as are the accident photos.
http://www.eucomairlines.de/unfall/twa843.html
Bei der späteren Untersuchung wurde festgestellt, daß bereits frühere Crews ein Ansprechen der Überziehwarnung in völlig sicheren Flugsituationen gemeldet hatten (Das genau 9 Mal !!) . Dieser Umstand wurde allerdings bei Wartungsarbeiten nicht berücksichtigt und somit der Fehler auch nicht behoben. Der Crew wurde nachträglich vorgeworfen, daß sie das falsche Ansprechen der Überziehwarnung leicht dem Bordbuch hätte entnehmen können.
it translates as following:

During the following investigation it was discovered, that previous crew's have reported that the stall warning sounded in secure flight (exact 9 times). This situation was not corrected during maintenance and the mistace was not corrected.

The crew was afterwards blamed that they easely could have informed them self in the log book regarding the wrong STALL warning.
 

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