Rise In Outside Repairs Raises Questions

[local 12 proud]

Except that I'm not forcing anything. I'm not even advocating anything, other than a discussion that recognizes that, for some reason, the flying public seems to be unwilling to pay as much for maintenance these days. That hardly means that I think they're being intelligent about it.

Beating your head against the wall and moaning about how the craft is going to pot isn't changing public opinion. Do you want to fix the problem, or just complain about the problem?

[post="258137"][/post]​

I don't think the flying public has a clue, in fact I know they dont when it comes to aircraft maintenance. I also dont think the "flying public" is willing to trade safety for a cheap ticket, like everything else and i believe this was alluded to in another post until the body parts and aircraft fragments are scattered over a square mile NO ONE WHO IS NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE see's the approaching danger of cutting corners. I stated this many times and i will say it again "YOU GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR"........the problem will intensify as outsourcing continues to grow, take it from someone who started his aviation maintenance carreer over 20 years ago in a third party chop shop, I was appalled and stunned at what I wittnessed and from what ive seen coming from these places 20 years later, well its buissness as usual!

 

[mweiss]

I don't think the flying public has a clue, in fact I know they dont when it comes to aircraft maintenance.

I agree. Unless there are headlines related to downed aircraft (e.g., AA191), they don't pay much attention to it.

I also dont think the "flying public" is willing to trade safety for a cheap ticket

Certainly if they were told "you can save $10, but you're likely to die if you do," they'd opt to pay the extra $10. At the same time, if they were told that they'd have to pay an extra thousand dollars to successfully get to their destination alive, many would simply opt not to go at all. The risk is not as clear as that, and the cost isn't as great as that; I'm using the extremes to illustrate that it's somewhere in the middle.

This leads to two questions. I've already asked the first, but nobody seems willing to entertain the discussion. How about this question instead: how can you explain the risk to Joe Sixpack, such that he can make an intelligent decision? Is that even possible?

 

[whlinder]

How about this question instead: how can you explain the risk to Joe Sixpack, such that he can make an intelligent decision? Is that even possible?

[post="258176"][/post]​

There used to be a website that I can't remember the name to or seem to find through google, where you would punch in the airline, city pair and aircraft you were flying and it would tell you the odds of crashing. Obviously it was full of crap but it would take something extreme like that to get it through people's heads so they could make 'informed' decisions.

What makes getting something like this through to the masses even more difficult is that we've been hearing for years (at least for my entire life) how flying is safer than driving.

 

[mweiss]

What makes getting something like this through to the masses even more difficult is that we've been hearing for years (at least for my entire life) how flying is safer than driving.

[post="258188"][/post]​

Especially since it's true, by pretty much any metric. Even flying third-world airlines is safer than most driving, by pretty much any metric.

Is that an appropriate comparison?

Part of the subtext here is a question of the opportunity cost of airline maintenance, on a real level as well as a perceived level. What is the opportunity cost?

 

[RDU Jetblast]

"It is all about the money. The FAA, Congress, Senate, and the flying public want that seat as cheap as they can get it. They do not care who maintains the aircraft as long as it is at the gate ready to go.

Now if a relative of GWB was on an aircraft that crash you bet something would be done. If a high ranking FAA official was in a crash you bet they would look at maintenance. Until it hits home in Washington US registered aircraft will be maintained by the lowest bidder.

You get what you pay for.-gatemech 3/24/05"



Wait a minute. If it weren't for the debt load of most carriers and the high fuel costs, airlines would be making a profit and tickets would be cheaper. One was controllable the other isn't butif it weren't for the necessity to service the debt, which eats into the profits, all would be well. Wanting cheap tickets isn't the culprit here. People will drive or video conference. Affordable tickets are a necessity to airlines.

 

[NWA/AMT]

I remain uncomfortable with the "I'm forcing this upon you for your own good" philosophy.

[post="258028"][/post]​

Yet that is the basis for ANY law or regulation. If we based our society solely upon what people are willing to do for themselves or what they are willing to pay for, we would soon have anarchy. Speed limits are forced upon you for your own good, yet I don't see you advocating abolishing speed limits.

It's possible to have maintenance at the same level of quality for fewer dollars than in-house (again, at some, not necessarily all, carriers), but it's easy to save even more dollars (in the short term, for sure, and possibly even in the long term) by sacrificing quality.

I'd sure like to see that legendary outsourced maintenance that is supposedly at the same level of quality as in-house, but in all my years in aviation I never have and, frankly, the trend is in just the opposite direction. Even my friends at Southwest, normally the toughest on vendors regarding quality, have seen a decrease in the quality of the product they receive.

It's this latter effect that precludes us from getting more than a taste of the former.

Mike, that's what we're trying to tell you - you ARE getting more than a taste of the former, and far more of the latter than is safe, but you just don't realize it yet.

Then again, WN has always gotten more work per employee than any legacy carrier.

My sources at WN say different. Many people I've worked with over the years have moved on to WN, and their statements directly contradict yours. I'd be interested to know what you base that statement upon.

Not true at all. Yes, one can black-or-white the specifics of the work as airworthy or not, per the manufacturers' specifications and all subsequent ADs. That gets you part of the way there. However, isn't it safer to fly with the full complement in spec than to fly with the minimums at minimum allowable specs? Wouldn't the former level be considered a higher quality, and worth more than the latter?

An entire airplane at manufacturers minumums is still airworthy, yet that isn't the issue at hand. The point I have been trying to get you to understand is that not even the minimums are being maintained. The maintenance manuals and manufacturer and FAA-approved maintenance programs are being disregarded by the airlines and the vendors. Need it more 'black-or-white' than that?

Furthermore, how do you validate the level of quality? Do you have two people look at all work? Wouldn't three be even safer? What about the work that isn't visible after the fact (e.g., caliper measurements)?

Actually, under FAR145 repair station regulations, two are required. Most FAR121 and 135 carriers, whose mechanics are required to be licensed and therefore directly responsible for their work, still employ inspectors and have a list of required inspection items. Every airline maintenance program I have ever seen also requires "in progress inspections" for work that is not visible after the fact.

Your description is more accurate, though also incomplete. We probably don't need to revisit all of the details.

Actually, my version comes directly from the NTSB report and the report of the AMFA Safety and Standards representative that served as a party to the investigation.

Except that I'm not forcing anything. I'm not even advocating anything, other than a discussion that recognizes that, for some reason, the flying public seems to be unwilling to pay as much for maintenance these days.

Certainly if they were told "you can save $10, but you're likely to die if you do," they'd opt to pay the extra $10. At the same time, if they were told that they'd have to pay an extra thousand dollars to successfully get to their destination alive, many would simply opt not to go at all. The risk is not as clear as that, and the cost isn't as great as that; I'm using the extremes to illustrate that it's somewhere in the middle.

This leads to two questions. I've already asked the first, but nobody seems willing to entertain the discussion. How about this question instead: how can you explain the risk to Joe Sixpack, such that he can make an intelligent decision? Is that even possible?

All these statements presuppose that passenger is given a choice, which they are not. No airline that I have ever heard of gives the passenger a breakdown of their ticket price, or an option to choose what portion of their ticket goes to which specific function.

 

[mweiss]

Yet that is the basis for ANY law or regulation.

Not true at all. Most laws are there to protect you from others, and others from you. Protecting you from yourself is what makes me uncomfortable.

I'd sure like to see that legendary outsourced maintenance that is supposedly at the same level of quality as in-house

So would I.

you ARE getting more than a taste of the former

Not at all. As you noted yourself, it doesn't exist.

...and far more of the latter than is safe, but you just don't realize it yet.

Safety is a relative, not absolute term. Yes, I believe that I'd be safer with you performing the maintenance. I'd even prefer to have you performing the maintenance. But that's my opinion, not that of the average flying public.

My sources at WN say different. Many people I've worked with over the years have moved on to WN, and their statements directly contradict yours. I'd be interested to know what you base that statement upon.

ASM per employee is higher at WN than at the legacies.

The point I have been trying to get you to understand is that not even the minimums are being maintained.

I do understand that. What I'm trying to point out in response is that safety is a continuum, not a binary state. Is that not clear?

Actually, under FAR145 repair station regulations, two are required.

Yes, I know. That was the rhetorical lead-in to asking about three.

Every airline maintenance program I have ever seen also requires "in progress inspections" for work that is not visible after the fact.

For work that is covered by panels or other parts, yes. Tolerance measurements are squishier, as I understand it.

All these statements presuppose that passenger is given a choice, which they are not. No airline that I have ever heard of gives the passenger a breakdown of their ticket price, or an option to choose what portion of their ticket goes to which specific function.

I doubt that the passenger cares to know how many dollars are being spent. The passenger might care to know the quality of maintenance. Most passengers end up using the blunt instrument of "how many crashes have they had lately" in making that decision. I'd rather see something more useful, but I doubt that it could be produced.

 

[NWA/AMT]

Most laws are there to protect you from others, and others from you. Protecting you from yourself is what makes me uncomfortable.

[post="258361"][/post]​

Yet the primary purpose of speed limits is to protect you from yourself, with the secondary purpose of protecting others from you. The secondary purpose of the laws governing aircraft maintenance are to protect airlines from themselves in exactly this type of economic environment.

Safety is a relative, not absolute term.

Here is where you and I disagree. In aircraft maintenance, 'safe' is one of two states of being - the other, of course, being 'not safe'. It is clearly defined in the manufacturer's technical data and in the FAA regulations and a thing or action resulting in a thing is either 'safe' or 'not safe'. The definition does not change based on quarterly reports, only the willingness to adhere to it.

ASM per employee is higher at WN than at the legacies

And if all airlines maintenance programs were identical and all airlines used not only the same type of aircraft but exactly the same configuration of aircraft, that would be a valuable metric for aircraft maintenance. But they don't, and it's not.

Take, for instance, the WN 737-700s and the AS 737-700s; both operate generally under the Boeing MSG3 maintenance programs, but each carrier has very different configurations of the same airplane, requiring very different tasks at different times. For instance, WN elected to retain the earlier generation of cockpit instrumentation to retain commonality with their -300/-500s, while AS elected to get the NG glass cockpits, and all the complex systems that come with it. Cabin configurations are another area of difference.

The MSG3 standards represent the minimum standards and each airline adapts them and expands upon them to fit their individual experience. The FAA will never give public approval for an airline to do less than is required, but they're happy to approve doing more than the minimum required. God help you if you ever want to reduce that back to the minimums, however as you will find them far less accomodating.

I do understand that. What I'm trying to point out in response is that safety is a continuum, not a binary state. Is that not clear?

No, your position is clear, but, as I have tried to point out repeatedly, it is not true in aircraft maintenance.

Safety overall is a continuum made up of infinite numbers of the individual binary states of 'safe' and 'unsafe' that I explained above. Rarely do aircraft accidents have single causes anymore, but causal chains made up of individual events that by themselves would not cause the accident but are nonetheless, individually, 'unsafe'. Aircraft maintenance is the same; the overall safety of the aircraft is the sum of the safety of its parts.

Just because something has not directly resulted in a crash does not make it, by definition, 'safe'. Talk about a "slippery slope"...

For work that is covered by panels or other parts, yes. Tolerance measurements are squishier, as I understand it.

It depends on the airline and whether we are talking about an organization that uses licensed mechanics or not. Also what part of the airplane is being maintained, as engine tolerances are more critical than, for instance, passenger seat armrests.

I doubt that the passenger cares to know how many dollars are being spent.

I doubt that the knowledge would do them any good, other than to provide another possibly misleading standard by which to compare different airlines. (The one comparison I have always wanted to see but have never been able to find is one of 'maintenance cost per ASM, excluding labor'.)

The passenger might care to know the quality of maintenance.

Again, that would require a level of understanding of aircraft design and maintenance principles that most passengers, and many airline executives, do not possess.

Most passengers end up using the blunt instrument of "how many crashes have they had lately" in making that decision.

Now there is a strong argument for not leaving the decision up to them, or anyone else who is willing to apply that standard.

I'd rather see something more useful, but I doubt that it could be produced.

The reason the airlines stopped competing on the basis of safety in the 1930s was that they realized that one carrier's crashes depressed traffic for all carriers. They realized that, in certain endeavors, the lowest common denominator is not acceptable.

Now they wish to apply the principle of comparative risk, whether paying the families of the victims of a crash is more cost effective than preventing the crash in the first place. You'll have to pardon me if I decline to endorse this path.

 

[mweiss]

Yet the primary purpose of speed limits is to protect you from yourself, with the secondary purpose of protecting others from you.

We could argue this point for weeks. The stack ranking is not as clear as that.

In aircraft maintenance, 'safe' is one of two states of being - the other, of course, being 'not safe'.

Among aircraft mechanics (i.e., within the craft), this is true. However, among aircraft engineers, the same statement is false. Are you saying that you're right and they're wrong?

And if all airlines maintenance programs were identical and all airlines used not only the same type of aircraft but exactly the same configuration of aircraft, that would be a valuable metric for aircraft maintenance. But they don't, and it's not.

And yet WN manages to be more productive across all lines of the business. Clearly they're doing something right in that regard. I'd be more inclined to buy the apples-and-oranges argument if it weren't consistent.

The FAA will never give public approval for an airline to do less than is required, but they're happy to approve doing more than the minimum required.

And why would someone do more than the minimums? After all, the minimums are "safe," and doing more than that, according to you, isn't any "safer". Therefore, you must believe that doing more than the minimums is throwing money away.

Rarely do aircraft accidents have single causes anymore

Indeed that's true. Among my sources of information is an aircraft accident investigator in my family. We have had many discussions about this very topic. In fact, it is from these discussions that I came to realize that the chain of events would often be broken had just one system been above the minimums. Yet an AMT wouldn't have considered the aircraft to be any safer. Why is that?

Just because something has not directly resulted in a crash does not make it, by definition, 'safe'.

Nor do I mean to imply that it does. Rather, I mean to imply that the customers' perception is that it does. Since they're paying the bills...

So how do you convince them to pay for better maintenance?

 

[NWA/AMT]

We could argue this point for weeks. The stack ranking is not as clear as that.

[post="258620"][/post]​

Actually, according to the NHTSA, the primary type of accidents in which excessive speed has been the primary causal factor was single vehicle accidents in which the excessive speed resulted in loss of control, so I'm comfortable with my position.

Among aircraft mechanics (i.e., within the craft), this is true. However, among aircraft engineers, the same statement is false. Are you saying that you're right and they're wrong?

[post="258620"][/post]​

No, because I don't accept the premise that their standards are different. You say that aircraft mechanics and aircraft engineers have different standards of safety, yet the standards the mechanics use are those determined by the engineers.

And yet WN manages to be more productive across all lines of the business. Clearly they're doing something right in that regard. I'd be more inclined to buy the apples-and-oranges argument if it weren't consistent.

I did not say they were not more efficient, I said that the standard you attempted to apply was skewed and therefore invalid and that the many people that I know who work there say that the differences, at least in maintenance, are slight.

And why would someone do more than the minimums?

Because experience and different operating environments have shown them that while the minimum may be acceptable in one circumstance it is not acceptable in all circumstances. For instance, different airlines operating the same airplanes in different weather environments will have different standards for acceptable brake and tire wear based on anticipated RTO conditions. Also, even whether an airline owns it's tires or simply leases them can be a determining factor, as allowing an aircraft tire to wear to minimums increases the risk that it will be worn too badly to recap, something a lessor cares less about.

After all, the minimums are "safe," and doing more than that, according to you, isn't any "safer". Therefore, you must believe that doing more than the minimums is throwing money away.

That is a extreme misinterpretation of what I said, and it should in no way be attributed to me. The conclusion you reach is so incorrect as to be an insult and, at best, represents a logical fallacy because it takes the conclusion, C, to a result not predicated by either proposition A or B. Indeed, your proposition B, "...and doing more than that, according to you, isn't any "safer".", is directly opposite of the point I have been trying to make.

I said that the safety of the aircraft is the sum of the safety of its parts and, earlier, said that by their standards the manufacturer would consider an airplane with every part at minimums airworthy or 'safe'. Yet the minimums allowable for one part are often relative to the condition of another part, or have a time limitation on the amount of time they're allowed to be at minimums, so even the manufacturer understands that 'safe' can be 'safer'.

I will go so far as to say that I believe that an 100% 'safe' aircraft is impossible to achieve, because the complexity of the machine involved virtually guarantees that even a brand new airplane has one broken or 'unsafe' part. However, differences in the state of the sum of the parts from aircraft to aircraft, and the nature of which part is 'unsafe', determines the overall state of the aircraft.

When talking about maintenance programs in general, whether the minimums are acceptable is left to the FAA, and no carrier that I am aware of is allowed to do the absolute minimum in every case.

Contrary to your conclusion, I believe that doing the absolute minimum is unsafe because the act of operating a part worn to minimums guarantees that it will exceed minimums. It is also throwing money away, because if you run every part until failure and repair none, it is far more expensive than removing them before failure and repairing them.

In fact, it is from these discussions that I came to realize that the chain of events would often be broken had just one system been above the minimums. Yet an AMT wouldn't have considered the aircraft to be any safer. Why is that?

Again, a radical misinterpretation of the text. An AMT would be the one to determine whether the system was within limits, or as you put it, "above the minimums", or out of limits ("below the minimums") in the first place. He would be placing his license, his future and the future of his family on the line when he did so. Like the pilots we are liable both administratively and also in criminal and civil court for our actions, but unlike the pilots we are usually around to suffer the consequences

You say that "In fact, it is from these discussions that I came to realize that the chain of events would often be broken had just one system been above the minimums.", yet you are the one seeking to justify the reduction of maintenance to the minimums, not I. An interesting dichotomy, don't you think?

Rather, I mean to imply that the customers' perception is that it does. Since they're paying the bills...

So how do you convince them to pay for better maintenance?

While the customer does have a serious influence on pricing, I still say that they do not have that much influence on how an airline spends the money it does take in, so I remain unconvinced that it is they that we need to convince. While the public certainly has an influence on the marketeers who run the airlines, the politicians who write the laws and the bureaucrats who, ostensibly, enforce them, I am not certain that the time effort and money required to educate and convince them would result in a proportionally worthwhile outcome. I would expect such efforts to be dismissed by the authorities as 'union propoganda' and the usual number of 'spokespersons' be deployed to refute them and explain that "the emperor" was, indeed, "fully clothed".

Even as Valujet was burning up aircraft taxiing on the ramp and taking maintenance delays on almost every flight, people were lining up to fly them. Even after a planeful got killed for their troubles, anyone who stated publicly that a Valujet passenger might be unsafe - even as the FAA moved to ground the entire airline - was dismissed as an alarmist. The conventional wisdom was that they were safe and even after the conventional wisdom had killed a planeful of people, the conventional wisdom was not to be refuted.

As for getting anyone to pay for BETTER maintenance, we're too busy trying to keep the standards from becoming WORSE to worry about BETTER.

 

[mweiss]

You say that aircraft mechanics and aircraft engineers have different standards of safety, yet the standards the mechanics use are those determined by the engineers.

I say they have different perceptions of safety. The engineers determine the minimums based on projected maximum conditions, multiplied by an additional factor (about 1.5 for military, and 2.0 for commercial, have been the standards). The line is drawn in the sand because to do otherwise would result in a set of tolerance "standards" too complex to follow. In other words, they do it to ensure that you spend more time focused on doing the work, and less on determining whether or not you should be doing work at all. In other words, it's a matter of convenience, not absolutism.

...allowing an aircraft tire to wear to minimums increases the risk that it will be worn too badly to recap, something a lessor cares less about.

Wait a second...are you suggesting that the determination would be based on money?

That is a extreme misinterpretation of what I said, and it should in no way be attributed to me. The conclusion you reach is so incorrect as to be an insult

Of course it is, because the starting points are absurd. That's precisely my point.

I said that the safety of the aircraft is the sum of the safety of its parts and, earlier, said that by their standards the manufacturer would consider an airplane with every part at minimums airworthy or 'safe'.

And yet, if safety is a binary condition, then the minimums are as safe as brand-new, perfectly manufactured, perfectly assembled parts. Safety is not a binary state, and clearly the latter condition is safer than the former.

An AMT would be the one to determine whether the system was within limits, or as you put it, "above the minimums", or out of limits ("below the minimums") in the first place.

Or "within acceptable tolerances" in engineering parlance. In any case, the AMT is legally covered as long as everything was within acceptable tolerances, and it is rare for a catastrophic failure to occur under those conditions. It does happen, however, and gets blamed on pilot error in the majority of such cases.

...you are the one seeking to justify the reduction of maintenance to the minimums, not I.

Am I? I haven't sought to justify anything in this thread thus far other than a recognition that safety is a continuum. You've come tantalizingly close to agreeing that it is.

In fact, I'm more interested in seeking a method by which safety could be better quantified, in part because I can't help but wonder if there's some sort of collective mob intelligence at work here. Perhaps we're wrong, and the collective mob is right.

Even if they are, I'd hardly suggest that it's better for you to be forced to reduce the quality of your work, if for no other reason than the unbearable guilt one feels when one's decisions resulted in the deaths of others.

While the customer does have a serious influence on pricing, I still say that they do not have that much influence on how an airline spends the money it does take in, so I remain unconvinced that it is they that we need to convince.

They don't yet, because there's still plenty of slack in other areas of the industry. At the rate we're going, however, someone's going to have to make the hard decision between safety and keeping the doors open. We're already seeing the early examples of this. What makes you think that a customer's preferences wouldn't influence a company's spending? It happens all the time in a competitive world. Why do you think Volvo's number one brand association is "safety?"

I am not certain that the time effort and money required to educate and convince them would result in a proportionally worthwhile outcome.

So how else would you ensure safer flying? The FAA doesn't have the staffing to adequately manage the inspection system, and even if they did they're still too soft in many respects. Congress is mostly interested in getting reelected, and these days that means corporate money. Unions spend the bulk of their time on self-preservation, rather than the results of the work.

As for getting anyone to pay for BETTER maintenance, we're too busy trying to keep the standards from becoming WORSE to worry about BETTER.

By doing what? From where I sit, you haven't been all that effective. You may have slowed the process down somewhat, but you certainly haven't stopped it.

 

[High Iron]

I find it interesting that when the mechanics who are actually looking at the airplanes say that the maintenance standards are slipping and that vendor maintenance is not equal to in-house maintenance, they are dismissed as having an agenda or as union propaganda.

Yet, when airline spokespersons, FAA spokespersons, airline consulting spokespersons, or vendor association spokespersons - people who rarely, if ever, see the aircraft and have an agenda, and obvious motives, of their own - say that all is well and all maintenance is equal, the public, and the pundits, accept it as absolute truth.

[post="257635"][/post]​

You absolutely nailed it. It just depends on whose ox is getting gored. As of late ( a slow morphing since the mid-80's actually ) it is the pinstriped pinheads that have the soapbox.

 

[NWA/AMT]

And yet, if safety is a binary condition, then the minimums are as safe as brand-new, perfectly manufactured, perfectly assembled parts. Safety is not a binary state, and clearly the latter condition is safer than the former.

As I have clearly stated here, repeatedly, safety of the overall aircraft is a continuum made up of the binary states of its individual parts, but that the continuum is also broadly defined by a binary state. The overall state of the aircraft is determined by the sum of the binary states of the parts, and not all parts are equal in that some parts have a more direct effect on the binary state than others.

According to the wear limits established by the manufacturers, there is no difference in the binary states of a new part or a part worn to, but not beyond, limits. That's why they're called limits. But a part at minimums soon exceeds those limits where a new part does not. An airline that operates at minimums is subject to the same effect.

Am I?

It certainly appears so:

And why would someone do more than the minimums? After all, the minimums are "safe," and doing more than that, according to you, isn't any "safer". Therefore, you must believe that doing more than the minimums is throwing money away.

The fact that you attempted to put the words in my mouth rather than expressing them yourself does not change the apparent intent of your conclusion.

I haven't sought to justify anything in this thread thus far other than a recognition that safety is a continuum.

And that "the public doesn't seem willing to pay as much for maintenance these days", but we'll come back to that later.

You've come tantalizingly close to agreeing that it is.

I think I have been very clear on that point and do not think that I have, or will, come close to agreeing with your definition. However, if you wish to declare victory it is fine with me. If your perception or the public perception is that safety is a continuum, that does not change the reality that it is not.

In fact, I'm more interested in seeking a method by which safety could be better quantified...

And what method would you propose? You've made it clear that you do not accept the standards currently in use or the methods currently in use to educate the public about them. I have told you my opinion on both those facets of your question, but all you have done so far is repeat the question. I'd like to hear your ideas for improvement.

Even if they are, I'd hardly suggest that it's better for you to be forced to reduce the quality of your work, if for no other reason than the unbearable guilt one feels when one's decisions resulted in the deaths of others.

Yet that is exactly what is expected of us.

At the rate we're going, however, someone's going to have to make the hard decision between safety and keeping the doors open.

I'm sorry, but to me that's not a hard decision at all.

What makes you think that a customer's preferences wouldn't influence a company's spending? It happens all the time in a competitive world.

To cause a business to consistently act in a way detrimental to its long term survival and possibly to the short term survival of the customer is not a business model that will survive long.

Why do you think Volvo's number one brand association is "safety?"

Because "Ugly" and "Boxy" did not test well in their focus groups? It might also be that they have spent millions to create that image in their advertising and millions more to back it up in their vehicles. Yet when someone crashes a Volvo, people don't stop driving Fords and BMWs as well, so the example does not transfer well to the airlines.

So how else would you ensure safer flying?

Again, I'd be interested to hear how you would accomplish this yourself.

As for me, I'd like to accomplish it by not allowing airline executives to make safety of flight decisions based on cost and by having an FAA that ensured that the minimums do not become the norm. (You'd be amazed at how rarely the FAA actually looks at the airplanes they're allegedly overseeing.)

You've stated several times that you believe that passengers aren't willing to pay as much for maintenance anymore, and I've stated that I don't believe that they're being given a choice, any more than they're given a choice on what the airline pays for fuel or landing fees. I'd be interested to know how you arrived at your assessment.

By doing what? From where I sit, you haven't been all that effective. You may have slowed the process down somewhat, but you certainly haven't stopped it.

It's good to know that all the hard work and sacrifice is appreciated. Some of us have been fighting this battle since the effects of deregulation began to be felt in the early 1980s, and many people have lost their jobs, homes and marriages fighting it, but from where you sit we haven't been all that effective.

Yet, you haven't died in an aircraft crash or had a piece of one land on you either.

Maybe you should tell the president of AMFA Local 33 in MSP how unsatisfied you are with our efforts, as NWA tries to fire him for stating in public what has been obvious to all of us for a while.

When he brought his legitimate concerns forward to the company, they were ignored because they contradicted the conventional wisdom currently in place. When he brought them forward in public, the standard NWA procedures were put in effect: appropriate spokespersons were deployed to refute his allegations and execution of the messenger is in progress. The fact that the problem he was trying to bring forward still exists goes ignored.

What I do for a living and who I work for are easily determined from my screen name, but are not so clearly determined from yours. While I have so far refrained from asking this question because I dislike unjustified Ad Hominem arguments, I must now ask: What airline do you work for? What function do you perform there? What contribution have you made to the effort which you are so quick to criticize?

 

[mweiss]

The overall state of the aircraft is determined by the sum of the binary states of the parts, and not all parts are equal in that some parts have a more direct effect on the binary state than others.

OK, I get your point now. It's accurate to a significant digit or two, though on the margins breaks down a bit. To illustrate my point, when you get close to allowable tolerance, you may find yourself in a situation where the pilot is forced to execute a maneuver that is outside of the "acceptable boundaries," but is nonetheless necessary to avert disaster. Parts close to the edge might fail, where parts closer to new spec would not. Similarly, being outside allowable tolerance by a bit would likely cause no problems...until executing a maneuver close to, but within, acceptable boundaries as dictated by the manufacturer.

According to the wear limits established by the manufacturers, there is no difference in the binary states of a new part or a part worn to, but not beyond, limits.

As I noted before, this is done as a form of shorthand, because the costs of recalculating systems individually is extraordinary relative to the benefits.

The fact that you attempted to put the words in my mouth rather than expressing them yourself does not change the apparent intent of your conclusion.

Not at all. My intent was to illustrate the absurdity of your assertion, not to suggest that it was anything close to my actual beliefs.

And what method would you propose?

I don't have any complete proposals. However, I assert that the one we have today isn't working anymore, since it has done nothing to prevent the rapid increase in the use of chop shops.

I'd like to throw out a few ideas to chew on, though. Certainly, better FAA oversight would be extraordinarily helpful, particularly if their aggregate findings could be reported in the same way that RASM, CASM, ASMs, and P&L are reported monthly, quarterly, and yearly. Feeding those to the press makes it easy for the information to get to the traveling public.

Yet [sacrificing quality] is exactly what is expected of us.

You think I don't know that? That's the whole point in my attempt to stimulate conversation around this very topic. You're being asked to sacrifice quality, and your unions have been unsuccessful at stopping it. Rather, every attempt they have made to stop it has resulted in an increase in outsourcing to chop shops. Clearly, something else has to be tried...or, perhaps, even if the public were truly informed, they would still take a pass. Who knows? We don't have enough information to answer that question. My gut says that they would pay for it, because they're not looking at it from a strict fiscal perspective, but I could be wrong.

I'm sorry, but to me that's not a hard decision at all.

It's not a hard decision to you, because you don't have a fiduciary responsibility to the shareholders. We live in a country that legally mandates the people at the top to maximize returns to the shareholders. That is a mandate in direct conflict to your mandate to refuse to sign off on an airplane that isn't airworthy. No, you don't have to make the hard decision, but somebody does.

To cause a business to consistently act in a way detrimental to its long term survival and possibly to the short term survival of the customer is not a business model that will survive long.

But this is where the fiscal analysis comes from. As callous as it sounds, people end up choosing the path that costs the least. If people have to die in order to take the least expensive path, so be it. I don't like that approach at all, but fixing it requires realignment of goals, which requires better education outside of the hangars.

It might also be that they have spent millions to create that image in their advertising and millions more to back it up in their vehicles.

Not "might." That's precisely what happened.

Yet when someone crashes a Volvo, people don't stop driving Fords and BMWs as well, so the example does not transfer well to the airlines.

No, they don't. But people who value safety above all else gravitate toward Volvos...assuming that they can afford them. People who don't, buy something else. I posit that more people would treat safety more seriously in airlines than in automobiles, because of the element of control. As such, I believe that safety would play better, not worse, in the airline industry. But, as you noted, the early days of air travel created a different model in that respect. It seems to me that the time for that model has passed, and it is now not only feasible, but important, to differentiate on safety.

As for me, I'd like to accomplish it by not allowing airline executives to make safety of flight decisions based on cost and by having an FAA that ensured that the minimums do not become the norm. (You'd be amazed at how rarely the FAA actually looks at the airplanes they're allegedly overseeing.)

That's pretty close to what I said above. I'm aware of how rarely the FAA inspects, and I don't see an obvious answer there. Yes, additional funding, etc., would help, but it's clearly not something of great enough importance to the traveling public, as evidenced by their lack of clamoring for more spending on inspections. This is why I fall back on education. If they really knew, they'd probably be more interested in pushing for it.

 

[mweiss]

You've stated several times that you believe that passengers aren't willing to pay as much for maintenance anymore...I'd be interested to know how you arrived at your assessment.

Nobody's made maintenance a point of differentiation in the industry. To be fair, that's probably not a good metric to use, since nobody but Southwest has spent much energy on martketing differentiation anyway. Perhaps it's just really bad marketing departments, and not a reflection of the public's desires. If so, then it's a ripe opportunity for someone to make a ton of money.

It's good to know that all the hard work and sacrifice is appreciated.

Hey, now, you don't have to get testy with me. If it were actually working, we wouldn't be having this conversation at all, because maintenance wouldn't be moving to chop shops. Appreciating the desire, efforts, and sacrifice is one thing. Recognizing that it hasn't achieved its goal in the end is something else entirely.

What airline do you work for? What function do you perform there?

I do not work for any airline.