mweiss said:
I hate to drop out in mid-topic like this, as it's really not my style...but my job has sapped the free time I had left for this board...I'm going to have to take a breather.
🙁
[post="260661"][/post]
That's OK, it's apparent we're done here. Considering the high level of participation in this board you have maintained for an impressive 3300+ posts, I'd say you've earned a breather.
While we have been having this discussion, (a mechanic), an employee of (an airline), has worked on two aircraft that had recently come from heavy maintenance at the same vendor. In both cases (a mechanic) was the first mechanic to perform a line check after the vendor produced the aircraft, and in both cases (a mechanic) found defects that should be subject to FAA fines, but somehow I doubt that will happen. It would require the airline to report to the FAA that it had not conformed to the FARs, an admission that outsourcing is not equal to in-house maintenance.
On both aircraft (a mechanic) found several emergency light exit identifiers, those small electric signs mounted about knee high at each exit that are there to guide passengers from a smoke-filled aircraft to safety, to have been removed not by removing the lens and then removing the attach screws, but by having been forcibly pried from their mountings with a screwdriver. Rather than being replaced by the vendor, they were reassembled with glue and stuck to their mounting points with RTV, and were so badly damaged that they were completely inoperative. Someone at the vendor signed for removing them, someone signed for installing them, someone signed for inspecting them and someone signed for their ops check, an ops check they could
not have passed.
You are allowed to have some of these signs inoperative on most aircraft types according to the manufacturer's FAA-approved specifications, but it limits the number of passengers you are allowed to carry because the exit must be considered completely inoperative as well. No such limitation was in effect, because the vendor had said that the emergency light system was working. The planes had been in revenue passenger service for several days.
Because (an airline) did not have enough spare parts to replace all the damaged signs and because the planes were oversold, (an airline) took significant delays in both cases until the parts could be shipped in. Despite the fact that he was quite aware that (a mechanic's) assigned task required (a mechanic) to check these lights, (an mechanic's) supervisor implied that (a mechanic) had found them intentionally as part of some mythical union job action. He might have attempted to intimidate (a mechanic) into signing them off, unrepaired, if it weren't that (a mechanic) had a union interested in air safety and willing to protect it's members jobs.
The lesson here? Because (a mechanic) found the problem and fixed it, (a mechanic) is the bad guy. Because the vendor created the problem and then ignored it, but got the plane out on time and on budget, (regardless of the fact it was not legal for passenger operations), they're the good guy. The analysts get more data to back up their (upcoming) contention that in-house
line maintenance is really the problem after all, the spokespersons stand ready to contribute to future messenger shootings and the pundits get to opine about how inefficient union labor is compared to the vendors. The passengers continue to serve as the unwitting canaries in the outsourcing coal mine, the airline shoots at the messenger, and misses for a change, and the FAA remains exactly where they want to be - blissfully unaware.
The system works.
For the moment.