That case does not support your conclusion at all.Well "REA Express INC vs Brotherhood of Railway (1973SDNY)" covers that. The court ruled:Union did not surrender right to strike by forebearance of such right while it pursued further efforts to reach peaceful settlement of labor dispute.
So the flight atendants did not surrender their right to engage in self help because they delayed. Under the RLA they are still free to strike.
You left out a couple of crucial facts. To start, here is a summary of the case (from Lexis), REA Express, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, 358 F. Supp. 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), with relevant portions bolded:
Following unsuccessful bargaining between the union and the carrier, the National Mediation Board, pursuant to § 5 First of the act, notified the parties that its services were terminated, leaving the union free to strike 30 days thereafter. However, no strike was then called, and the parties eventually entered into an agreement under which, inter alia, the union agreed it would not strike at that time. The agreement was subject to unilateral termination upon 10 days notice. Eventually, the union gave notice of cancellation and went on strike. The carrier argued that the agreement had voided the union's right to strike on its original notices under § 6 of the act, codified at 45 U.S.C.S. § 156. However, the court held that the union had not, by its forbearance in calling a strike, surrendered the right to strike which had matured when the mediation board's 30-day notice had expired. The court also held that the union had not violated § 2 First of the act, which required the parties to exert every reasonable effort to settle disputes. The fact that the union had adhered to its demand for a substantial wage increase did not establish a breach of its duty under § 2 First.
So in that case we have (1) a release by the NMB, and (2) an agreement concerning the strike action between the employer and the union, a portion of which (the unilateral ten day notice provision) the employer basically tried to make unenforceable. Neither of those facts exist in the NWA/AFA case, and both are vital to this decision. Therefore that case is all but irrelevant to the present dispute.
Oy. You still appear to be unable to comprehend that (for the trillionth time) collective bargaining agreements are treated differently than other executory contracts under the bankruptcy code. Collective bargaining agreements are addressed under 11 U.S.C. S 1113; other executory contracts are addressed under 11 U.S.C. S 365. So this example is not relevant either (even assuming it were accurate, a point which finman addressed, but I don't know enough about fuel contracts to comment on).Now, BK code. If NWA decided to pay Exxon only 50 cents a gallon after the judge abrogated their $3/gallon contract and Exxon did not immediately cut off delivering fuel could the court force Exxon to continue to provide fuel at 50 cents/gallon?
Anyway, since you didn't ask, here is where I think Marrero got it wrong. He made too much of the supposed distinction that the NLRA's primary goal is to protect the right to strike, while the RLA's is to delay or prevent strikes. He used this to create an artificially wide distinction to distinguish all of the NLRA bankruptcy precedent cited by AFA holding that unions can strike once their contracts have been abrogated in bankruptcy.
I think that distinction is bunk. IMO, he already decided that he was going to find the strike illegal, so he had to justify a distinction between the NLRA bankruptcy cases and the situation before him. While it is true that the RLA makes it more difficult to strike than the NLRA and has procedures in place to delay the process, he could just as easily have noted that the primary purpose of the NLRA is "to promote industrial peace" (as the Supreme Court has noted in many cases), which sounds suspiciously like how he was describing the RLA, and therefore they should be treated the same.
His reasoning that a major goal of the RLA is to delay strikes and prevent disruptions in commerce may have been enough to support his conclusion if there weren't all those NLRA bankruptcy cases out there on the issue. However, IMO the policy goals of the NLRA and the RLA aren't sufficiently different to justify his rejecting the NLRA bankrupcty cases totally and striking out in the opposite direction.
If he is going to be reversed, I suspect it will be on that reasoning.
Now you're making more sense. I'm not sure courts will ultimately agree with you, but expressing it like that is a lot more persuasive.The fact is that the BK code does not grant the court such powers. It allows the court to terminate contracts but it does not give the court the right to impose new terms that are unfavorable to those who do business with the BK company. The court can write new terms but the other party still has the right to reject them.