WT, The W/A does not go away until late (Oct I believe) 2014, so the growth of Dallas will not happen in 2013. However, Dallas will in fact grow largely after the W/A goes away. So will ATL, and SWA will grow ATL very fast. Denver will also be a very KEY city that will continue to grow very fast. ATL will more than likely become the largest city SWA operates out of. This statement has come from GK himself.
While I certainly respect Mr. Kelly, anything a CEO says when a merger is announced needs to be taken with a grain of salt. Kelly also said one year later that WN would "wind down" the AT ATL hub.
A good analysis can be found here:
http://aviationplanning.com/Boyd%20Group%20WN%20FL%20Merger%20Review.pdf
Some of the highlights:
Southwest will, as it has indicated, pull down the FL hubbing operations. Connectivity between WN flights will be predominantly random.
•There is no factor in this analysis that addresses the possible consumer reactions to the very different service product of Southwest v AirTran. The elimination of seat selection, XM-Radio, and a business cabin offering could have effects on consumer decisions going forward.
•There will not be any material fare stimulation with the entry of Southwest at ATL. AirTran has already done so in 24 of the top 25 ATL O&D markets. The potential for new nonstops to other markets with the entry of WN is certainly there, but it is limited by the lack of connecting traffic support.
•No review has been made of the potential of an aggressive marketing counter-strike by Delta. The new Delta has considerable management DNA from Continental and Northwest, and it is possible that the airline may see the change in product offered by Southwest an opportunity to gain market share at ATL.
Southwest, however, has made clear that it intends to “wind down” the FL connecting operations. Without question, this means that when the dust settles from the merger, the WN operation will represent fewer passengers than the current AirTran schedule.
•Southwest has already indicated a reduction in total daily flight operations compared to AirTran levels at ATL. This signals that WN will fundamentally restructure – and in some cases, drop – a portion of the route/revenue generation that AirTran now operates
As a practical matter, however, there will be some connectivity with any WN/ATL schedule, but at best (most) it would represent support for capacity in the range of 170 – 180 daily flights – equating to perhaps as few as 90 daily ATL departures
•Atlanta is not new territory for low fare stimulation. The “Southwest effect” – market stimulation with low fares – has largely already been registered at ATL by lower-cost AirTran. Twenty-four of the top 25 O&D markets are already “stimulated” by AirTran. The remainder have only limited potential for nonstop service that is not already operated by AirTran.
Southwest inherits a route system from AirTran, parts of which it simply cannot operate as cost-efficiently as did AirTran, which could outsource ground handling. Southwest cannot, and its union agreements do not allow other operational and cost flexibilities enjoyed by AirTran.
•Funnel-Route Strategy. ATL does represent strong new system revenues. Southwest can aggressively “funnel” connecting flows over MDW, BNA, DEN, SLC, MCI, to generate maximum ATL O&D revenues across its system.
•The hard conclusion: The Southwest-AirTran merger will result in lower enplanement levels at ATL, and will end low-fare flights at several communities where AirTran’s costs allowed viable service, but where the costs and operational systems at WN cannot.