Net Income (Loss) by year (millions of dollars):
Code:
1999 $985
2000 813
2001 (1,762)
2002 (3,511)
2003 (1,228)
2004 ( 761)
2005 ( 861)
2006 231
2007 504
2008 (2,118)
2009 (1,468)
2010 ( 471)
Total net loss 2003-2010 (eight full years) = ($6.172 billion).
Years 1999-2002 included for comparison purposes (and in case anyone wants net losses including 2001 and 2002 which alone total almost $5.3 billion, almost as much as 2003-2010). AMR's aggregate losses from 2003 to present appear to be less than at UA, DL and NW, but I have not checked the numbers.
The losses above include all special items, which are usually non-cash deductions and writedowns/writeoffs of worthless assets and extraordinary expenses which are non-recurring (station closures, etc). They're non-cash because they don't represent cash actually spent in the year of the deduction or big writedown/writeoff - they represent cash spent in prior years to buy the planes or routes or slots or other asset that has now become worthless and must be written down/written off. If AA buys a plane for $35 million, it typically deducts 4% or 5% of that value each subsequent year unless the asset suddenly drops in value - then the accounting rules require that AA writeoff a much larger portion all at once. That happened with the AB6 fleet and the 37 seat RJs.
Aggregate net losses of over $6 billion are not enviable (especially in light of the huge wage givebacks of the AA unionized workers), but given the residual effects of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the SARS epidemic, the unprecedented fuel price spike and the Worst Recession Since the Great Depression (according to Obummer), I'd say that until recently, AA's financial performance wasn't all that bad compared to the other legacy airlines like UA, DL, NW and US which between them filed for Ch 11 protection five times during the last nine years.
AA's turnaround this past year is very disappointing and there's lots of blame to go around. Management was too slow to buy new 738s in the middle of the decade when profits returned, meaning that AA spent hundreds of millions (perhaps even a billion or two) more than it would had management ordered new 738s in 2005 or 2006 instead of waiting a couple years too long.
AA's unit revenue improvement appears to lag that of DL, UA and CO (nobody really cares about US). Reasons for that could include news all last year about the possibility of TWU and APFA strikes which might have caused some bookaway to other airlines. I realize that strikes were not imminent, but many people don't understand the ins and outs of the RLA's procedures and the media did not adequately explain that strikes were very unlikely. That might have cost AA some revenue.
AA's pilots and FAs are less productive than at most other airlines yet are near top pay of any legacy airline. That's worth a few hundred million dollars annually according to management, so without the labor cost disadvantage, AA would have reported a small profit in 2010 instead of yet another loss.
There are probably many other reasons that AA's numbers are lagging DL and UA. Give WT a few hours and I'm certain we'll see many more of them posted here. B)