WorldTraveler
Corn Field
- Dec 5, 2003
- 21,709
- 10,662
- Banned
- #31
It was 4% and it was entirely driven by decreased fuel costs.
If you look at the breakdown of costs by category, nearly every expense category was up except for fuel.
As I have previously noted, AA is getting a "get out of jail card" for its revenue underperformance and merger expenses because of lower fuel costs - but the fundamentals of AA's operating business - the ones AA controls, not the Saudis - are not what it should be one year into the merger.
factor in that AA said it is planning on $100/bbl oil and they really have little ability to increase growth now because of training due to refleeting, and the notion that AA is going to be able to take advantage of lower oil prices which other carriers cannot is not realistic - and it isn't what AA execs are saying. Other carriers are also saying they can't ramp up growth and are not counting on low long-term fuel prices.
and, again, AA's results still don't account for the unusable currency in Venezuela which at some point AA will have to impair. If they ever recover it, they can make an adjustment again but companies can't leave revenue off of the table indefinitely.
again, the primary issue and the one that came up over and over was the increased competition that AA is seeing on its network which are really efforts by competitors to limit AA's strength as a larger company. Further, a number of key global markets that are also major AA markets including DAL/DFW, LHR, and Latin America are becoming more open to competitors while DCA and LGA divestitures were part of the price of the merger. Some of the new competition was coming whether AA merged or not while other parts are due specifically to the merger.
other carriers do not face the same level of competition.
and then there is the factor of weaker economies in Latin America which are due in part to the stronger dollar, again an issue that is beyond AA's control but one which has enormous implications for AA. On an annual basis, AA gets more than $6 billion from Latin America. A reduction in RASM of 11% wipes out more than $600 million in revenue. Just like hedging for some carriers, everything that was good in Latin America is now a bigger liability for AA than for any other carrier.
AA is fighting global factors such as the strong dollar which are just as big if not bigger than hedge losses at other carriers. But AA also has to deal with merger integration including labor's expectation of more money for supporting the merger which no other carrier has to deal with right now. AA also has a much larger presence in Latin America which is softening at the very time new competition is showing up and markets are opening up.
so, yes, AA has core strengths which will pay off in time but they also face a set of challenges which right now have to be successfully overcome before AA can see its financial performance stabilize - which is exactly what Credit Suisse said in reducing its outlook on AAL stock.
If you look at the breakdown of costs by category, nearly every expense category was up except for fuel.
As I have previously noted, AA is getting a "get out of jail card" for its revenue underperformance and merger expenses because of lower fuel costs - but the fundamentals of AA's operating business - the ones AA controls, not the Saudis - are not what it should be one year into the merger.
factor in that AA said it is planning on $100/bbl oil and they really have little ability to increase growth now because of training due to refleeting, and the notion that AA is going to be able to take advantage of lower oil prices which other carriers cannot is not realistic - and it isn't what AA execs are saying. Other carriers are also saying they can't ramp up growth and are not counting on low long-term fuel prices.
and, again, AA's results still don't account for the unusable currency in Venezuela which at some point AA will have to impair. If they ever recover it, they can make an adjustment again but companies can't leave revenue off of the table indefinitely.
again, the primary issue and the one that came up over and over was the increased competition that AA is seeing on its network which are really efforts by competitors to limit AA's strength as a larger company. Further, a number of key global markets that are also major AA markets including DAL/DFW, LHR, and Latin America are becoming more open to competitors while DCA and LGA divestitures were part of the price of the merger. Some of the new competition was coming whether AA merged or not while other parts are due specifically to the merger.
other carriers do not face the same level of competition.
and then there is the factor of weaker economies in Latin America which are due in part to the stronger dollar, again an issue that is beyond AA's control but one which has enormous implications for AA. On an annual basis, AA gets more than $6 billion from Latin America. A reduction in RASM of 11% wipes out more than $600 million in revenue. Just like hedging for some carriers, everything that was good in Latin America is now a bigger liability for AA than for any other carrier.
AA is fighting global factors such as the strong dollar which are just as big if not bigger than hedge losses at other carriers. But AA also has to deal with merger integration including labor's expectation of more money for supporting the merger which no other carrier has to deal with right now. AA also has a much larger presence in Latin America which is softening at the very time new competition is showing up and markets are opening up.
so, yes, AA has core strengths which will pay off in time but they also face a set of challenges which right now have to be successfully overcome before AA can see its financial performance stabilize - which is exactly what Credit Suisse said in reducing its outlook on AAL stock.