Interestingly, it wouldn't get anyone in (legal) trouble. The issue is that it's very cheap and easy for Dewey to figure out that if he says he's a station attendant, that the price is lower.
What the legacies tried to do is ascertain the behavioral characteristics that differentiated business travelers from their leisure counterparts. Once you can differentiate, you can price accordingly.
The thing is, you've got to be able to consistently differentiate. Now that businesses have begun to force their travelers to masquerade as leisure travelers, the legacies are left with two broad choices. One is to figure out a new set of rules that differentiate the two modes. The other is to price as if there were only one mode.
The LCCs are, essentially, pricing as if there were only one mode. While this would reduce one's revenues in a monopoly market, what it succeeds in doing in the competitive market is siphoning the upper mode away from the legacies. The theoretical eventual net result is a higher concentration of business travelers than in the industry as a whole...which allows the airline to profitably price between the two modes.
This is the fundamental theory behind DL's new pricing.
An interesting question to ask is what happens when the entire industry shifts to this mode of pricing. In such a situation, game theory would suggest that the advantage would quickly dissipate and average yields would drop.
If that's true, then this could mean that the long-term prognosis is more attrition of the higher-cost providers.
(Now, Bob, before you go attacking me...I wholeheartedly agree that those last two paragraphs are all speculation. I don't know of any good examples from which to draw to support it.)
What the legacies tried to do is ascertain the behavioral characteristics that differentiated business travelers from their leisure counterparts. Once you can differentiate, you can price accordingly.
The thing is, you've got to be able to consistently differentiate. Now that businesses have begun to force their travelers to masquerade as leisure travelers, the legacies are left with two broad choices. One is to figure out a new set of rules that differentiate the two modes. The other is to price as if there were only one mode.
The LCCs are, essentially, pricing as if there were only one mode. While this would reduce one's revenues in a monopoly market, what it succeeds in doing in the competitive market is siphoning the upper mode away from the legacies. The theoretical eventual net result is a higher concentration of business travelers than in the industry as a whole...which allows the airline to profitably price between the two modes.
This is the fundamental theory behind DL's new pricing.
An interesting question to ask is what happens when the entire industry shifts to this mode of pricing. In such a situation, game theory would suggest that the advantage would quickly dissipate and average yields would drop.
If that's true, then this could mean that the long-term prognosis is more attrition of the higher-cost providers.
(Now, Bob, before you go attacking me...I wholeheartedly agree that those last two paragraphs are all speculation. I don't know of any good examples from which to draw to support it.)