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I was in CCY during the 2nd chapter 11, was on the NC for the IAM M&R, , Triple B and Glass led the presentation, nothing about US becoming an ULFC.
All of which I know. So why not say unit cost or CASM if that is what you mean? If you say, for example, that DL's costs are not much higher than WN's it obviously a false statement. If your intent is that DL's unit costs are not much higher than WN's they say that. Someone with the tag line of "The Whole Truth" should know that spoken communications are imprecise and written communications are moreso so make every attempt at being as precise in their choice of words as possible to avoid confusion.Jim,
of course revenue and costs are scaled by the size of the enterprise...that is why the revenue and cost per ASM metric is used - since no two airlines are exactly the same size. Not a perfect metric but it is the basis of comparison in the airline industry just as sales per square foot is for the retail industry.
because I presumed (perhaps incorrectly - or maybe you just felt argumentative) that someone who injects themselves into discussions about airline finances understands that the metric for comparison is unit costs and not absolute costs.All of which I know. So why not say unit cost or CASM if that is what you mean? If you say, for example, that DL's costs are not much higher than WN's it obviously a false statement. If your intent is that DL's unit costs are not much higher than WN's they say that. Someone with the tag line of "The Whole Truth" should know that spoken communications are imprecise and written communications are moreso so make every attempt at being as precise in their choice of words as possible to avoid confusion.
Jim
precisely... every US network airline that has gone through restructuring has looked at significant changes to its business model... but as Jim noted, the cost is very high and the larger the airline, the more difficult it is to change the business model (a principle not unique to the airline industry). When you consider that changing strategies is also risky, US' creditors likely would not support a change in BK and the BOD would not support it outside of BK unless there were clear benefits that didn't require a lengthy recovery time - and changing strategies on a large scale basis just doesn't happen.Without betraying any confidences there were high level discussions about re-branding US Airways.
One of the things that given serious consideration was changing the name back to Piedmont in order to shed the negative image of US Airways. The primary reason it didn't happen was US didn't have enough money to repaint the fleet and redo the stations & Hubs.
One of the business models they looked at seriously right down to web page design was British Midland (BMI). IIRC their business model is similar to what US has now.
I'm not surprised that this wasn't shared as they never really made up their minds as financial reality set in and the merger took place and the Killer B's left before that by a few months. Lime boy couldn't spin that one.
because I presumed (perhaps incorrectly - or maybe you just felt argumentative) that someone who injects themselves into discussions about airline finances understands that the metric for comparison is unit costs and revenue and not absolute costs.
Show me an article about comparison of costs between two airlines that is based on absolute and not unit costs and attemping to make a point about cost competitiveness and you will have made your point.
Show me an article about comparison of costs between two airlines that is based on absolute and not unit costs and attemping to make a point about cost competitiveness and you will have made your point.
Don’t forget the money men
The activities of these people further dispirit the creators, the product engineers and designers, and also crimp the firm’s ability to add value to its customers. But because the accountants appear to be adding to the firm’s short-term profitability, as a class they are also celebrated and well-rewarded, even as their activities systematically kill the firm’s future.
In this mode, the firm is basically playing defense. Because it’s easier to milk the cash cow than to add new value, the firm not only stops playing offense: it even forgets how to play offense. The firm starts to die. NOTE: Sound like US or NK?
If the firm is in a quasi-monopoly position, this mode of running the company can sometimes keep on making money for extended periods of time. But basically, the firm is dying, as it continues to dispirit those doing the work and to frustrate its customers. NOTE: US DOT stats support the contention
As the managers find it steadily more difficult to make money playing solely defense, they become progressively more desperate and start doing ever more perilous things, like looting the firm’s pension fund or cutting back on worker benefits or outsourcing to a foreign country in ways that further destroy the firm’s ability to innovate and compete. NOTE: Sound like US or NK?
what would happen if the firm opted to keep playing offense and focus totally on adding value for customers? The result? The firm makes tons and tons of money. In fact, much more money than the companies that are milking their cash cows and focused on making money.
Why do managers keep on this path that is systematically killing their firm? For one reason, it’s more difficult to add value than to cut costs. For another, the executives have found ways to reward themselves lavishly. As Upton Sinclair has noted, “It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends upon his not understanding it.”
That is why I stay out of "cost" discussions. They only work when comparing companies exactly competing with each other with everything the same. It may offer only trend information to a knowledgable analyst. When a corporation gets serious about only cutting costs, that is when I start looking for the death spiral.Did Mr Jobs know Mr Parker and the Tempe Clown Posse? Sounds like he did. Given the above is it any wonder NK out performs US?
If I'm not mistaken, top pay at Spirit DOS+5 which is full maturity is north of $180 for CA and around $105 for FO's.
MORE HERE
Spirit has 36 planes with a hard order for 33 more and a "Memo of Understanding" for another 75 from Airbus.
US Airways has continually reduced or managed capacity.
Spirit is hiring! 39 openings on their web site. There are Pilot and F/A openings that may be for more than one person so the actual number of open positions is unclear.
Nice catch! It did say West rates on the web site. Pretty pathetic, yet somehow Spirit is debt free and more profitable on a percentage basis. How could that be? What with all that scary talent in Tempe, US should be running rings around Spirit. Hell, what could two "Dummies" from old US know? Except how to grow a business.
The notion that baggage charges define or not a "valid" airline is bogus at best. Consumers don't like unbundled pricing but EVERY airline has their fair share of non-transportation revenue (ticket change fees, reservation charges, in-flight fees, etc). According to DOT data, WN gets a higher percentage of its total revenue from incidential charges than do some network carriers that charge for baggage.BBB has made it clear that Spirit isn't in business to promote that it flies to all 50 states (Delta from a few years ago) or that it dominates a market. Quite simply every flight has to make money. If it doesn't, then it's changed to a time that makes money or pulled to go to a route that makes money. 89% load factor at fares that make money can't be wrong. In the 10 + years at Spirit, there has been a complete change in the business model. The best of the best is emphasized. It's fun to be a part of that!
My best wishes are for all my former (although not many are left) co-workers at US Airways.
While the "Killer B's" ended up at NK as you say, they certainly didn't start the airline. NK traces it's routes back to 1980, when it began as Charter One, primarily flying junkets to Atlantic City from cities in the northeast - at that time the only place with legalized gambling east of the Rockies. About 1990 they converted to a more traditional low cost scheduled carrier and in 1992 changed their name to Spirit Airlines. In 2007 Spirit adopted their current model of ULFC.When Tempe took over, they fired all of the talent now at Spirit... they decided to compete with USAirways... and started a new airline....