dariencc
Veteran
- Dec 4, 2006
- 1,284
- 1,912
With the current hubbub over US Airways safety culture, now might be a good time to review the operational achievements of the Transatlantic Division since its inception. And these achievements are impressive indeed.
For over two and a half decades, the division has completed tens of thousands of Etops flights with a remarkably low incidence of diversions and other problems. This is a tribute to all those anonymous contributors, from many departments, who have served with distinction in this daily effort. FAA feedback to senior Training Department staff has confirmed that the division has been well regarded by the feds since the beginning.
Tempting as it may be to bang the drum of self congratulation, a more sober analysis would have to conclude that the division's record is not perfect. This is indeed a sore subject among the flight crews that daily and nightly ply the tracks and random routes of the North Atlantic. Among these professionals, it is always a cherished goal to have a zero rate of pilot induced diversions. Yet one stunning day of complacency, ineptitude and boneheaded stupidity will forever mar an otherwise perfect record.
One has to go back to the decade of the 90s, in the early days of the internets, to find a 767 crew preparing to depart Munich enroute to Philadelphia. The First Officer, tasked with entering data in the Flight Management System (FMS) for the return trip to Philadelphia, incorrectly enters the airports coordinates (lat/long). He enters the longtitude with the symbol W, as in Western Hemisphere. Alas, every point in Germany is in the Eastern Hemisphere, as any school child would know.
No major crisis, however, as the FMS, immediately recognizing the massive error, kicks back the information to the bumbling F/O. For most, this would be a moment to pause, reflect and search for one's mistake. But far from deterred, the confused lad reenters the same info two more times, at which point the FMS's internal logic is programmed to accept the data as legitimate. In hindsight, it might be surmised that this first step in the chain reflected a personality with excessive regard for one's own thoughts and opinions, while lacking the razor sharp analytical abilities of the typical crew member in such a situation.
At this point, there are a series of three mandatory crosschecks, involving both Captain and First Officer, which should have caught the mistake and resolved the situation. How this did not happen is perhaps the greatest mystery in the history of the US Airways Transatlantic Division. In any case, the flight pushed back and taxied out, but with no runway or route of flight displayed on the flight instrumentation. WTF, was this being done on purpose, a cry for help if you will?
Off the intrepid crew flew, into the wild blue yonder for 15 seconds or so, before getting the surprise of their lives. The F/O, who was flying the aircraft, quickly saw that there was no route to fly and no way to enter one into the FMS. He had fooled the aircraft into thinking it was hundreds of miles away and now it was too late to correct the error. Embarrassingly, the crew had to ask for radar vectors from the crack German controllers. If only those controllers could have vectored the hapless crew across the North Atlantic all would have been well. But after an hour or so of trying to figure a way out of their F/O induced mess, the crew was forced to divert to London to reset their navigational systems.
Of interest in this case, the aftermath caused no groundswell among his fellow pilots to have the Dilbert F/O terminated. He was retrained and returned to the line, where he remains to this day. Reticent to stick the knife in the back of a fellow employee when down, most pilots considered this to be a proper outcome. Though I am sure there are a few who today would say that he should stop violating company policy and FAA regs by pulling out his computer in flight and reading files downloaded from the internets.
For over two and a half decades, the division has completed tens of thousands of Etops flights with a remarkably low incidence of diversions and other problems. This is a tribute to all those anonymous contributors, from many departments, who have served with distinction in this daily effort. FAA feedback to senior Training Department staff has confirmed that the division has been well regarded by the feds since the beginning.
Tempting as it may be to bang the drum of self congratulation, a more sober analysis would have to conclude that the division's record is not perfect. This is indeed a sore subject among the flight crews that daily and nightly ply the tracks and random routes of the North Atlantic. Among these professionals, it is always a cherished goal to have a zero rate of pilot induced diversions. Yet one stunning day of complacency, ineptitude and boneheaded stupidity will forever mar an otherwise perfect record.
One has to go back to the decade of the 90s, in the early days of the internets, to find a 767 crew preparing to depart Munich enroute to Philadelphia. The First Officer, tasked with entering data in the Flight Management System (FMS) for the return trip to Philadelphia, incorrectly enters the airports coordinates (lat/long). He enters the longtitude with the symbol W, as in Western Hemisphere. Alas, every point in Germany is in the Eastern Hemisphere, as any school child would know.
No major crisis, however, as the FMS, immediately recognizing the massive error, kicks back the information to the bumbling F/O. For most, this would be a moment to pause, reflect and search for one's mistake. But far from deterred, the confused lad reenters the same info two more times, at which point the FMS's internal logic is programmed to accept the data as legitimate. In hindsight, it might be surmised that this first step in the chain reflected a personality with excessive regard for one's own thoughts and opinions, while lacking the razor sharp analytical abilities of the typical crew member in such a situation.
At this point, there are a series of three mandatory crosschecks, involving both Captain and First Officer, which should have caught the mistake and resolved the situation. How this did not happen is perhaps the greatest mystery in the history of the US Airways Transatlantic Division. In any case, the flight pushed back and taxied out, but with no runway or route of flight displayed on the flight instrumentation. WTF, was this being done on purpose, a cry for help if you will?
Off the intrepid crew flew, into the wild blue yonder for 15 seconds or so, before getting the surprise of their lives. The F/O, who was flying the aircraft, quickly saw that there was no route to fly and no way to enter one into the FMS. He had fooled the aircraft into thinking it was hundreds of miles away and now it was too late to correct the error. Embarrassingly, the crew had to ask for radar vectors from the crack German controllers. If only those controllers could have vectored the hapless crew across the North Atlantic all would have been well. But after an hour or so of trying to figure a way out of their F/O induced mess, the crew was forced to divert to London to reset their navigational systems.
Of interest in this case, the aftermath caused no groundswell among his fellow pilots to have the Dilbert F/O terminated. He was retrained and returned to the line, where he remains to this day. Reticent to stick the knife in the back of a fellow employee when down, most pilots considered this to be a proper outcome. Though I am sure there are a few who today would say that he should stop violating company policy and FAA regs by pulling out his computer in flight and reading files downloaded from the internets.
