Bob Crandall distilled what this proposed merger is all about. "Animal spirits being what they are, three big tough guys will rough each other up more frequently than only two big tough guys. That’s the argument for the merger in its simplest form – and I think it is right," Crandall said.
except that there really is no more evidence that 3 large competitors generate more competition than 2 but it sounds mean and tough.
Crandall does have a dog in this fight.
320pilot,
Yes, the judge wants mediation and compromise. The US and most western legal systems rarely use punishment with no chance of rehabilitation. The DOJ has specific reasons they are against this merger and those can be addressed; when you accept the real issues that the DOJ has and admit they aren’t the same as with other mergers, then there can be an opportunity to address those deficiencies.
10 slots equates to about a 1.5% share of flights. US is facing issues w/ the sheer size of DCA ops relative to other carriers plus lack of nationwide competition. US has far less low fare competition at DCA than at other hubs.
There are currently about 40 flights/day by low fare carriers at DCA – most to BOS or Florida/SJU. Only 13 are to hubs/large operations that are large enough to provide access to the majority of the US.
Parker’s comments about US using X% of slots but a much lower percentage of seats doesn’t sit well with legislators. They want to see DCA’s limited slots generate the most amount of seats to keep prices down PLUS satisfy all of those unique political concerns that are what DCA is all about. US operates a number of markets from DCA with 50 seat RJs that have 3 or more flights/day. Given that it is very unlikely that any other carrier would serve most of those markets, US could easily offer a competitive schedule with one less flight on a larger RJ.
The notion that US can’t give up slots and still serve as many markets or as many seats as possible is simply not accurate; remember DL took 125 slot pairs per day and added 4 million seats per year to LGA even though many of the new markets are still on RJs, albeit large RJs.
Many of the markets have a large gov’t-military component on the other end of the route which explains a lot about why the US gov’t doesn’t want to see a single carrier dominate DCA so much that there is no way a competitor can realistically challenge US’ fares. DCA IS the airport to the nation’s capital.
US serves about 10 cities with only 1 or 2 flights/day for a total of 15 flights/day on an RJ which means the primary purpose for the flight is to serve political interests. They just don’t carry enough passengers on those flights to really make a difference to their DCA hub. US could let those slots go to another carrier with stipulations that the service remain and the effect on US from a pricing and network standpoint would be minimal.
Those slots have political but no real monetary value which means US would essentially be giving them up and getting nothing in return which is part of why they are so opposed to the idea. The other part is that DL – who gave them many of the slots as part of the slot deal – could end up with many of those slots again, at no cost but with greater exposure in Washington.
Yet if WN operated at DCA using a similar number of slots, they could add 3X as many seats and satisfy the need to see more increased service and would also could add enough service to create a true nationwide lower fare competitor at DCA (to the extent that WN will be a lower fare competitor, which as I have noted, they will continue to push their fares up as much as possible).
While it is a risky to predict what it will take to solve the DCA part of the merger, it is doubtful that there is a need to divest a whole lot more than about a dozen slot pairs going to a low fare carrier that will add true nationwide service and not just Florida or BOS service (which is why B6 is at a disadvantage) and about half involving small city slots that would go to another network carrier.
US could easily divest as many as 25 more slots involving small cities (whether the slots themselves are regional carrier slots) and have minimal effect on their hub. The DOJ could force slot divestitures equal to the entire size of AA’s slot portfolio but the chances are real high that they could satisfy DOT concerns with less than that amount.
The option is to retain the small city slots and end up divesting even more slots that could be used for large jet service. If US had to divest even 18 slots like UA did at EWR, the impact on the hub would be much, much larger.
The behavioural remedies are even harder to predict but don’t underestimate the enormous competitive impact any of those remedies could have on US and their ability to generate the revenues necessary to get benefits from the merger – if not pay for it. New AA’s competitors will absolutely take advantage of the limitations that are put on new AA and the cost of that shouldn’t be underestimated.