WorldTraveler
Corn Field
- Dec 5, 2003
- 21,709
- 10,662
- Banned
- #1
Here is information on fuel cost/ASM for a number of fleet types as reported by airlines to the DOT for the year ended Dec. 2004. Obviously, fuel prices have gone up since then so the efficiency of each aircraft type relative to others has an even bigger impact. Also, the hedging positions for airlines today is not the same as it was in 2004. It should also be apparent that smaller aircraft have higher fuel CASMs so aircraft of similar size and for similar missions should be compared.
Type Operator Fuel CASM
73G WN 1.37
753 NW 1.50
321 US 1.53
757 DL 1.55
330 NW 1.65
738 AA 1.68
M90 DL 1.68
320 NW 1.68
764 CO 1.78
319 NW 1.88
763 UA 1.89
777 UA 1.92
744 NW 1.95
717 FL 1.99
318 F9 2.01
735 CO 2.28
M80 AA 2.32
762 AA 2.32
D10 NW 2.37
742 NW 2.42
E70 US 2.55
CR7 EV 2.56
732 DL 2.81
D95 NW 3.11
D93 NW 3.12
CRJ OH 3.29
ER3 AE 3.52
It can be seen that NW’s recent aircraft purchases have been of the most fuel-efficient models. It can also be seen that NW’s older aircraft are significantly more expensive to operate on a fuel basis than comparably classed aircraft operated by other airlines.
As NW people consider their future, the reality cannot be escaped that NW cannot be profitable if 1/3 of its fleet is composed of fuel thirsty models such as the 747-200, DC-10, and DC-9 when no other US passenger carriers operate those same models. While A330 and 787 orders might allow the widebody fleet to become cost competitive by grounding the D10 and 742 fleets, NW is incurring fuel CASMs for its DC-9s comparable to what regional carriers are incurring operating much smaller regional jets; the regional carriers obviously have much lower labor costs to offset the higher CASM nature of small jets. In fact, with the exception of the few 732s left in the US passenger fleet (most of which are intended to be grounded in the next couple years at the latest), NW has at least a 1 cent penalty on every ASM it produces when compared to other carriers’ narrowbody aircraft.
Obviously, that cost disadvantage has to be made up somewhere if NW is going to attempt to be cost competitive on an overall basis. As many of you look at concessions, you might consider NW’s predicament. It’s possible that given NW’s current fleet and sustained high fuel prices, NW cannot continue to operate the size fleet it currently does. Since most of the older aircraft are owned, there are little benefits from bankruptcy for obtaining a more fuel-efficient fleet mix.
AA employees might also want to consider the inefficiency of the MD-80 relative to other carriers’ core narrowbody aircraft.
Type Operator Fuel CASM
73G WN 1.37
753 NW 1.50
321 US 1.53
757 DL 1.55
330 NW 1.65
738 AA 1.68
M90 DL 1.68
320 NW 1.68
764 CO 1.78
319 NW 1.88
763 UA 1.89
777 UA 1.92
744 NW 1.95
717 FL 1.99
318 F9 2.01
735 CO 2.28
M80 AA 2.32
762 AA 2.32
D10 NW 2.37
742 NW 2.42
E70 US 2.55
CR7 EV 2.56
732 DL 2.81
D95 NW 3.11
D93 NW 3.12
CRJ OH 3.29
ER3 AE 3.52
It can be seen that NW’s recent aircraft purchases have been of the most fuel-efficient models. It can also be seen that NW’s older aircraft are significantly more expensive to operate on a fuel basis than comparably classed aircraft operated by other airlines.
As NW people consider their future, the reality cannot be escaped that NW cannot be profitable if 1/3 of its fleet is composed of fuel thirsty models such as the 747-200, DC-10, and DC-9 when no other US passenger carriers operate those same models. While A330 and 787 orders might allow the widebody fleet to become cost competitive by grounding the D10 and 742 fleets, NW is incurring fuel CASMs for its DC-9s comparable to what regional carriers are incurring operating much smaller regional jets; the regional carriers obviously have much lower labor costs to offset the higher CASM nature of small jets. In fact, with the exception of the few 732s left in the US passenger fleet (most of which are intended to be grounded in the next couple years at the latest), NW has at least a 1 cent penalty on every ASM it produces when compared to other carriers’ narrowbody aircraft.
Obviously, that cost disadvantage has to be made up somewhere if NW is going to attempt to be cost competitive on an overall basis. As many of you look at concessions, you might consider NW’s predicament. It’s possible that given NW’s current fleet and sustained high fuel prices, NW cannot continue to operate the size fleet it currently does. Since most of the older aircraft are owned, there are little benefits from bankruptcy for obtaining a more fuel-efficient fleet mix.
AA employees might also want to consider the inefficiency of the MD-80 relative to other carriers’ core narrowbody aircraft.