AA is almost certainly still losing money on most of its Asia flights on a standalone basis, and yet if current projections are accurate is on track to apparently produce the largest single profit (non-inflation-adjusted) in company history. It's no different than the loss leaders Delta no doubt operates because of the positive halo effect on corporate contracts, business travel demand, network connectivity, etc.
except that DL doesn't have loss leaders anywhere near the size of what AA is doing in Asia... that is why it draws such attention. DL lost about $40M to/from Latin America in a couple quarters and yet was profitable on a year round basis.
it is NOT the same thing.
If AA can make money to Asia, I won't be saying anything further. But to be talking about all this growth when AA doesn't make money flying what it has, it is hard to believe it is a viable strategy.
No, no, no ... how quickly we forget ... Delta is poised to "win in N. Texas," don't you know!
Like I said - always good for a laugh! 🙂
you are free to define 'Win' as you want including being profitable in what it does serve.
yet it is hard to argue that AA is profitable on key routes like JFK-LAX when it walks away from 40% of the capacity per aircraft.
Likewise, all the talk about AA's plans to/from Asia don't correct the problem that they get significantly less revenue in markets directly competitive with DL and/or UA and in O&Ds where they directly compete even over different hubs.
According to Figure 4 (pg.11) in this document, 38% of US-EU air passenger traffic was UK:
http://www.ita.doc.gov/media/publications/pdf/openskies_2007.pdf
Granted, it is a little old, and things may have changed a bit, I still think that "close to 40%" of USA-Europe market being to/from UK is pretty close. (Yes, I do understand that UK has more than 1 airport (LHR), but I'm pretty sure LHR dominates quite nicely).
If you still doubt it, read this somewhat more recent (2009) document:
http://www.nextor.org/pubs/Shen_NAT%20Report_2009.pdf
except that this is TRAFFIC - not the origins and destinations where people are going. Traffic is heavily concentrated at LHR because it is a large hub and BA (and now AA via the JV) connects a lot of traffic there.
but it doesn't change that less than 20% of all US-Europe passengers are going to LHR.
I think similarly to what AA has done in Europe for years - that is serving only "major" business markets, it will only be interested in serving the "major" Asian business centers.
except that is a strategy of Crandall that doesn't work today because other carriers are not interested in doing the same. If there is a market for service to secondary cities and AA chooses not to fly them while others do, AA can't be competitive.
AA has stated it is taking a looking in secondary China markets. I would not be shocked if it launches the 3-4w flights to Chengdu, Xi'An, Chongqing or some other smaller market from LAX with the 787 2-3 years down the line.
again, if AA wants to throw even more money away, they can answer to the shareholders but the notion that AA, as the smallest of the 3 US carriers to Asia, is going to develop secondary markets when it can't make money flying to the primary markets and doesn't have a significant Chinese partner is more than a stretch.
With the merger, AA is no long as heavily focused on just the "major" business markets of Europe - that's still AA's primary network focus, but USAirways brings a far more diversified network of flights to smaller and/or different cities that AA did not previously (or no longer) serve(d) - some primarily business (BRU, AMS, etc.) and some primarily leisure (VCE, LIS, etc.).
That being said, the big difference with Asia is the distances involved, so it's harder to serve smaller, non-"major" markets. Put another way - nobody is flying a 757 from the U.S. on thinner routes to East Asia like AA, Delta and United all do to Europe. On the other hand, the "second-tier" cities in Asia are, in many cases, larger than even "first-tier" markets in Europe. That's where the 787 comes in, and is already proving itself to be a real game changer. As already discussed, United has a clear, distinct, structural and insurmountable advantage that no U.S. competitor can replicate because it has SFO - which is without question the preeminent U.S. gateway to Asia (again, similar to AA's equally-insurmountable structural advantage in Latin America because it dominates MIA).
I'm sorry but there are a number of markets that are served by 757s from the US to Europe that are absolutely larger than markets in China.
And it may well be true that the 787 will open some of them up for nonstop service from the US, but DL can do the same thing with paid for 767s from SEA - just like what CO did with 757s from EWR.
and again talking about the network US brings means little until it becomes apparent how well those cities will do when the Star alliance connection is fully removed, we are outside of the peak summer season when just about anything to Europe works, and after labor costs go up and US' historic pricing strategies of undercutting competitors have ended -and none of that has happened.
While the reconfiguration to the 772s will dramatically increase the number of economy seats, current rumours are that they will feature just 37 new lie-flat J seats.
AA's 2013 yield in the Pacific region was about 12 cents, far lower than UA or DL. What I don't see is how the reconfiguration is going to dramatically increase the yields. Sure, the 772s slanted J seats probably depressed sales of those seats, but with 14 First Class suites to offer those who paid for business class (after any F sales were accommodated), I doubt that it was AA's poor J seats that caused such a big disparity in yields.
With a rumoured 289 seats on the reconfigured 772s (37J and the rest MCE/E-), it looks to me like AA is really going to have to chase the low-fare economy passengers even more than it has been doing, and that can't be good for yields.
As for load factors, AA's 2013 Pacific load factor wasn't much above 80%, so it's not as though AA's low-density configuration meant leaving behind lots and lots of high-yield passengers (like the argument made in 2003-05 for un-doing MRTC).
Lots and lots more seats will lower the CASM, with all those extra seats against which to divide the costs, but I don't see the configuration increasing AA's low yields all that much.
someone gets it.
When AA offers seats from the US to Asia for $400 under government contracts, their yield problems reflect a deep inability to either fill the flights they do have or to attract the premium revenue that other carriers attract.
Given that Asia is becoming increasingly competitive, AA cannot sustain a strategy of dumping capacity into the market - which is exactly what they are doing when add capacity even while losing money.
AA's fundamental problem is the inability to attract key revenue and throwing capacity into the market doesn't fix it.
I have to laugh when some here talk about how great of a strategy it is for AA to remove seats from its 777s when there were people who trashed DL for doing the same thing by saying they couldn't sell premium seats - and now AA is doing the same thing and ending up with the same size business class cabin.
Further, I still have yet to hear how AA is ending up with a dozen or more fewer seats than DL despite using the same size business class cabin while DL has 9 abreast in coach and AA has 10 abreast.
I'm guessing it has to do with DL's crew rest cabins not being on the main cabin floor but if AA's crew rest facilities are on the main deck, why didn't AA invest in crew rest facilities above the cabin as many 777 operators have?
And adding seats might help but if DL and other carriers have more seats as a result of not having crew rest facilities on the main deck, AA is still at a disadvantage.