WO, say it like it is WORLD!
Delta Studying US Airways as Possible Acquisition Target — The irony of it all
- Thread starter ContUNITEus
- Start date
Wo, he is on you WORLD!
whatkindoffreshhell
Veteran
1. DL has not been the most aggressive. WN, CO, even People's Express were the new thinkers. 9/11 forced change on everybody. DL is merely lumbering along with and reacting to the crowd.
2. WN is the easiest airline to do business with, not the lowest fare. Business 101 in a commodity business -- separate your product from the crowd. DL is the crowd.
3. I have a feeling that if we wanted to search the forum archives we could find a picture you painted that is nowhere close to what you threw together in that way-too-long post above. We are all armchair quarterbacks here.
BoeingBoy
Veteran
- Nov 9, 2003
- 16,512
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- #19
"Fewer but larger airlines" = "more choices for consumers." I almost spit my coffee all over the screen laughing at that one. Two brands give you more choices than 3, 5 give you more choices than 7? Talk about self-serving logic...
In a time when the government regulated routes and fares, the entire basis for deregulation was that the consumer would have more choices because more airlines would be able to compete for the passenger's money thus bringing fares down, not fewer airlines who collectively raise fares. That is what we're seeing with consolidation - while fare are still below those of 1979 in constant dollar terms, as consolidation has reduced the number of carriers (especially in this century) fares have began to rise pretty rapidly. Many passengers, instead of having 8-10 choices in the late 80's, now have 3-4 choices of carrier. Instead of having the choice of non-stop or connecting service between medium-sized and large cities, many passengers now can only get there by connecting in one of 3-4 hubs.
Jim
Once again - it's just all too comical, and predictable. No, Delta is not the end-all-be-all. No, they have not been the most aggressive airline since deregulation - far from it. No, they have not been setting the pace for industry consolidation - they have been merely one of the pack. The continued glorification of Delta is par for the course, but as false as it has been since the last forum it was spewed on. And no, Delta, United and Southwest are not going to control 90% of the U.S. domestic market - yet another hilarious gem to remember for the future.
WorldTraveler
Corn Field
- Dec 5, 2003
- 21,709
- 10,662
- Banned
- #21
when talking about the increase in fares, you might want to factor in the increase in fuel prices... fuel is one of the highest cost items for airlines and continues to rise. The future of the industry must reflect the reality of continually escalating fuel prices which will limit demand and make it impossible for the plethora of airlines that have existed in the past to continue to exist today. Economics 101.
.
Yes, airline seats are a commodity business and WN has done a better than average job of differentiating its product... but WN's business model of high frequency service heavily focused on secondary airports by stimulating low fares doesn't work any more... that's why they bought FL which has a much larger presence in some of the largest markets in the country. In case you missed it, WN's revenue growth and profit margins for several quarters have been at the bottom of the industry - and it can't all be blamed on FL. WN is in the process of adaptation and I have noted elsewhere they will adapt - but they are quickly become not much different from the other network carriers - who incidentally are also doing a better job of customer service than historically strong WN.
.
I didn't say DL has been the most aggressive for all of deregulation... in fact I have said that DL spent most of the first 30 years of deregulation trying to figure out what it was supposed to be. But when DL filed for BK, they had a crystal clear vision of what they wanted to be and they have executed flawlessly against that plan over the past 7 years. CO did in fact have that same sense of vision 15-20 years ago and they executed brilliantly against that vision... but it only went so far. I'm not about ready to say that DL will stay in its position of strategic leadership forever but no one in the industry or larger business world doubts DL's leadership in the global industry right now -whether they are the largest carrier or not. DL's top of the US industry market cap reflects it.
.
I know full well that what I have to say here goes against what most of the members of this forum want to hear - including most AA and US employees and fans.
But it doesn't change the fact that I have been arguing for five years that AA was on course for a disaster if they didn't get their business turned around - and that is exactly what has happened.
.
Whether the industry consolidates into 3 domestic players and 2 major longhaul int'l carriers is far less significant than that the industry will continue to consolidate; AA and US will be the means through which the rest of the industry achieves its strategic ends; and DL more than any carrier is certain to achieve its strategic ends and DL, UA, and WN will indeed be the dominant players in the US industry.
.
So, yes, let's come back and look at how closely I got to my vision of the industry compared to "the worst is flat" crowd who think the shape of the industry from 30 years ago will continue to work going into the future.
.
Yes, airline seats are a commodity business and WN has done a better than average job of differentiating its product... but WN's business model of high frequency service heavily focused on secondary airports by stimulating low fares doesn't work any more... that's why they bought FL which has a much larger presence in some of the largest markets in the country. In case you missed it, WN's revenue growth and profit margins for several quarters have been at the bottom of the industry - and it can't all be blamed on FL. WN is in the process of adaptation and I have noted elsewhere they will adapt - but they are quickly become not much different from the other network carriers - who incidentally are also doing a better job of customer service than historically strong WN.
.
I didn't say DL has been the most aggressive for all of deregulation... in fact I have said that DL spent most of the first 30 years of deregulation trying to figure out what it was supposed to be. But when DL filed for BK, they had a crystal clear vision of what they wanted to be and they have executed flawlessly against that plan over the past 7 years. CO did in fact have that same sense of vision 15-20 years ago and they executed brilliantly against that vision... but it only went so far. I'm not about ready to say that DL will stay in its position of strategic leadership forever but no one in the industry or larger business world doubts DL's leadership in the global industry right now -whether they are the largest carrier or not. DL's top of the US industry market cap reflects it.
.
I know full well that what I have to say here goes against what most of the members of this forum want to hear - including most AA and US employees and fans.
But it doesn't change the fact that I have been arguing for five years that AA was on course for a disaster if they didn't get their business turned around - and that is exactly what has happened.
.
Whether the industry consolidates into 3 domestic players and 2 major longhaul int'l carriers is far less significant than that the industry will continue to consolidate; AA and US will be the means through which the rest of the industry achieves its strategic ends; and DL more than any carrier is certain to achieve its strategic ends and DL, UA, and WN will indeed be the dominant players in the US industry.
.
So, yes, let's come back and look at how closely I got to my vision of the industry compared to "the worst is flat" crowd who think the shape of the industry from 30 years ago will continue to work going into the future.
Good to see the blinding bias is alive and well - nice to know that some things never change.
Nonetheless, despite characteristic rewriting of history (and allegedly sage predictions) doesn't change reality.
Others are exactly right to suggest that Delta wants to try and complicate AMR's bankruptcy and any potential USAirways merger precisely because Delta recognizes the competitive threat it poses. Post-bankruptcy AMR alone - with or without a USAirways merger - is going to pose a huge threat to Delta.
In all likelihood, AMR will emerge from bankruptcy just as their peers did, which is to say, with likely among the lowest unit costs of the U.S. network carriers. And, AMR is in the process of dramatically transforming its fleet. All of this at the same time that Delta is watching post-bankruptcy costs (including labor) rise, and as Delta's fleet continues to age. So perhaps Delta won't have it quite as easily as "some" continually suggest.
Thus, it is ridiculous - as are most of these grand, typically arrogant (see: "world is flat crowd"), and often wrong, pronouncements of fact - to suggest that an airline as huge as AMR is not going to be a major U.S. player. And especially when considering AMR and USAirways merging, that proposition is all the more ridiculous, particularly since that combined airline would be larger than Delta. AMR will continue to be a massive force in the U.S. airline industry - very much in league with their peers Delta, United and Southwest - no matter what the fantasies of certain Delta-loving AirlineForums.com "experts."
Through Chapter 11 at AMR and the post-Chapter 11 realities at those other carriers, the gap between AMR and those three peers is narrowing, not shrinking. And, needless to say, regardless of whether said online commentators know that, AMR's competitors most definitely do.
But fear not, folks: you heard it hear first! Get in line behind the Delta-is-invincible wisdom, or you're in the "world is flat crowd." I've been a proud member since 2005. We have our meetings the second Thursday of every month.
Nonetheless, despite characteristic rewriting of history (and allegedly sage predictions) doesn't change reality.
Others are exactly right to suggest that Delta wants to try and complicate AMR's bankruptcy and any potential USAirways merger precisely because Delta recognizes the competitive threat it poses. Post-bankruptcy AMR alone - with or without a USAirways merger - is going to pose a huge threat to Delta.
In all likelihood, AMR will emerge from bankruptcy just as their peers did, which is to say, with likely among the lowest unit costs of the U.S. network carriers. And, AMR is in the process of dramatically transforming its fleet. All of this at the same time that Delta is watching post-bankruptcy costs (including labor) rise, and as Delta's fleet continues to age. So perhaps Delta won't have it quite as easily as "some" continually suggest.
Thus, it is ridiculous - as are most of these grand, typically arrogant (see: "world is flat crowd"), and often wrong, pronouncements of fact - to suggest that an airline as huge as AMR is not going to be a major U.S. player. And especially when considering AMR and USAirways merging, that proposition is all the more ridiculous, particularly since that combined airline would be larger than Delta. AMR will continue to be a massive force in the U.S. airline industry - very much in league with their peers Delta, United and Southwest - no matter what the fantasies of certain Delta-loving AirlineForums.com "experts."
Through Chapter 11 at AMR and the post-Chapter 11 realities at those other carriers, the gap between AMR and those three peers is narrowing, not shrinking. And, needless to say, regardless of whether said online commentators know that, AMR's competitors most definitely do.
But fear not, folks: you heard it hear first! Get in line behind the Delta-is-invincible wisdom, or you're in the "world is flat crowd." I've been a proud member since 2005. We have our meetings the second Thursday of every month.
BoeingBoy
Veteran
- Nov 9, 2003
- 16,512
- 5,865
- Banned
- #23
LOL...your lack of long-term perspective is showing if you thing that increasing fuel prices is something recent...it's not. Fuel prices were higher in 1990 than 1980, higher in 2000 than 1990. Higher in 2010 than 2000.
The only difference is that the airlines aren't insulated from increasing fuel prices by CAB set fares.
Jim
OK, time for an ol' BEAR named "Tom" to way in.
First off, the LLC situation. (And I SERIOUSLY mean NO disrespect to any LCCer Active or retired)
LCC will Never be allowed anywhere near AA ! BA's $$$ would see to that.
Unfortunately, LCC is an Enigma within the Industry(sorry, but it is what it is)
As others have correctly pointed out, DL and UA via BK are thriving. Doesn't it make perfect sense that AA would as well ? AA will soon emerge with the Youngest fleet in the USA, have it's costs in a Dangerously "LOW" as far as ALL the other competition with the lone exception WN. Why you might ask have I excluded B6, because in IMHO AA will emerge in a New package that will INCLUDE B6, and be surrounded by SERIOUS heavyweights aka BA, JL and Qantas. (I hope no one thought Qantas started flying non-stop into DFW from Melbourne and SYD for the good Texas Ribs)
DL is very wise to "try" and complicate AA's BK !
First off, the LLC situation. (And I SERIOUSLY mean NO disrespect to any LCCer Active or retired)
LCC will Never be allowed anywhere near AA ! BA's $$$ would see to that.
Unfortunately, LCC is an Enigma within the Industry(sorry, but it is what it is)
As others have correctly pointed out, DL and UA via BK are thriving. Doesn't it make perfect sense that AA would as well ? AA will soon emerge with the Youngest fleet in the USA, have it's costs in a Dangerously "LOW" as far as ALL the other competition with the lone exception WN. Why you might ask have I excluded B6, because in IMHO AA will emerge in a New package that will INCLUDE B6, and be surrounded by SERIOUS heavyweights aka BA, JL and Qantas. (I hope no one thought Qantas started flying non-stop into DFW from Melbourne and SYD for the good Texas Ribs)
DL is very wise to "try" and complicate AA's BK !
wings396
Veteran
- Aug 20, 2002
- 3,672
- 1,122
Should all of your assumptions be correct, AA will still trail DL & UA by miles in size and market share upon exiting BK. At this point AA is lagging behind, and it will only get worse as they cut capacity during BK. Do you really think that AA will come out of this with a bunch of happy lets go customer service people? DL and UA have their BK's long behind them, and their employees are on their way back to pre-BK wages.
Think what you want, but AA will not come out of BK in shape to jump in the ring with the Heavyweights....
Both UA and DL will capitalize on AA's weakness during their BK. Have you failed to notice that DL is already adding markets to DFW, and UA is beefing up ORD? How will AA fair in the NYC market after BK?
WorldTraveler
Corn Field
- Dec 5, 2003
- 21,709
- 10,662
- Banned
- #26
Good to see the conversation continuing….w/ a moment to sit down now, I’ll throw in a few more thoughts.
Jim,
There is no doubt that fuel prices are increasing – and even that they were higher at particular periods in the past. But fuel is remaining high priced, there is no expectation that it will reduce, and historic increases in fuel prices – whether on a temporary or sustained basis – has resulted in a thinning of the industry. Airlines have historically done a poor job of being prepared for the inevitable spikes in fuel prices – WN’s early 2000s hedging being one of the few positive examples – while capacity has been forced out of the industry during previous fuel price hikes. (remember that the mergers/acquisitions of the late 80s were followed by the fuel price spikes of the 90s which “undid” most of the west coast capacity that was acquired by AA and US – and partially by DL). OPEC will continue to push oil prices up as high as they can w/o crashing the global economy; unless the US can significantly increase domestic capacity to offset those cuts – and developing countries like India and China quit growing – then the price will continue to rise and w/ it airline demand will shrink – and consolidation will continue.
.
Comm,
Your enthusiasm and support for AA is commendable but your positions are based more on emotions (like hope) than facts (which are historical and defensible).
Airlines don’t come out of BK w/ a great cost structure. C11 provides the opportunity to reset costs but most of the benefits don’t happen until the airline starts regrowing post BK.
1. Pension costs are reduced only during BK since companies don’t fund retirement while replacing the DB plans w/ DC plans. Dumping pension plans is a balance sheet item and really doesn’t reduce costs to a great degree – other than long term cash outlays to catch up pension underfunding.
2. Productivity improvements are designed to properly resize the airline to its employee structure. Thus, AA can either cut much deeper now to get productivity in line with the current size or cut less and then grow into their size… that is the approach they took in 2003 but then never grew into their new size – thus AA was overstaffed for much of the past 10 years.
3. Benefit costs like medical will drop straight to the bottom line but in the scope of things are not going to make or break the company.
4. Outsourcing will save costs esp. in the longer term but the cost of transitioning to outsourcing is expensive and has been shown that it doesn’t necessarily deliver the size of cost cuts that many thought.
5. All of the talk about how the new aircraft will save so much belies the fact that those are expensive costs… they are replacing fuel and maintenance costs with the cost of borrowing money…. Further, other carriers ARE doing fleet replacement, just at a slower rate – and other carriers are getting deals just as good as AA, as much as some AA fans want to think otherwise.
.
And then we get to revenue. BK doesn’t fix revenue problems which have plagued AA for years, including with competitive growth and pressure in key AA markets.
1. DO you realize that on EVERY Asia route on which UA OR DL competes with AA (and the majority of AA’s Transpac system is competitive with UA, not DL), DL or UA outperforms AA in revenue generation? UA outgenerates AA in revenue on every one of their ORD-Asia nonstops. AA and DL both have to deal with poor slots to/from PEK but DL still generates better revenues from DTW to PEK and SEA than AA does from ORD. LAX-PVG was supposed to be AA’s way of finding a new place for AA to grow its Pacific network – and you know that UA stepped right on top of AA’s flight – and UA outperforms in revenue. AA’s decision to end JFK-NRT is not surprising since I’ve said that since DL restarted JFK-NRT, it outperformed AA by a very healthy margin. Having your own hub on both ends of the route apparently is far more powerful than sharing revenue with a partner on one end.
2. To/from LHR, DL and UA now obtain revenues to/from LHR as good as or better than AA in AA’s largest TATL market. Despite predictions to the contrary, DL’s MIA and BOS-LHR flights are generating comparable revenues and aren’t going anywhere.
3. Domestically, carriers of all kinds are moving into AA’s key markets including B6, DL, and VX from ORD, MIA and DFW – and they are all generating very sustainable revenues. And already in 2012 we see DFW-BOS, DFW-LGA and MIA-LGA on the horizon for competitive growth – all key markets.
4. And then we have NYC, where the slot swap dramatically changes the game for AA, an airline that was once headquartered in NYC and has long had an advantage in obtaining corporate revenues. DL is already on par with CO in NYC revenue even before the slot swap is implemented. AA – and most other carriers – have no unique routes from LGA that DL has said they will fly, except for one. YYZ. You know the story. DL partner to be Westjet outbid WN, will feed DL’s new flights at LGA, and will force prices down in the NYC-Toronto market – to the peril of both AA, AC, and UA. AA, not surprisingly is the weakest player. DL just sits back, watches it all play out, and makes money off of the slot divestitures (or the DCA half of it anyway) and the revenue they pick out while watching their partner (also shared with AA) beat the competition up.
I’m sure since I’m biased, I’ve got some of these facts wrong and missed other successes.
.
The exclusivity of AA’s network – its revenue advantages – is slowly being chipped away and will continue to occur.
.
All the promises of what AA will become after BK are tempered by the fact that AA has a very long way to go before emerging from BK, let alone growing and competing anew. Throw in a merger with US and the process of competing against stronger, more nimble competitors is even further off.
In the meantime, DL and UA will continue to pursue their strategic objectives, of which AA meets two of DL’s – an increased presence at LHR and in Latin America.
UA probably will decide before too long they don’t really need US – or that the benefits aren’t really as great as the extra capacity US keeps in the industry along with its low fare pricing strategies (remember US has a revenue disadvantage to the industry and they don’t mind telling you that).
.
I don’t know how this will all turn out but the notion that AA will waltz through BK and come up happy and cleaned up and ready to compete with other airlines which are already giving AA a great deal of heartburn and aren’t going to sit by for 3 years while and AA and US orchestrate AA’s restructuring and an AA/US merger are just way outside the scope of reality.
.
Yes, DL wants to do all it can to limit AA’s success in BK – competitors take advantage of opportunities to grow.
.
Whether DL or UA decide they want to further consolidate the industry and do what they have to do make it palatable to Washington remains to be seen….but I am certain they will not sit idly by and instead will seize their own opportunities which will come at AA and US’ expense.
And as a US based AIRLINE, DL and UA have advantages in this contest that neither BA or TPG can match.
If AA and US individually or collectively can overcome all of that, then, yeah, maybe they can pull off a merger.
Jim,
There is no doubt that fuel prices are increasing – and even that they were higher at particular periods in the past. But fuel is remaining high priced, there is no expectation that it will reduce, and historic increases in fuel prices – whether on a temporary or sustained basis – has resulted in a thinning of the industry. Airlines have historically done a poor job of being prepared for the inevitable spikes in fuel prices – WN’s early 2000s hedging being one of the few positive examples – while capacity has been forced out of the industry during previous fuel price hikes. (remember that the mergers/acquisitions of the late 80s were followed by the fuel price spikes of the 90s which “undid” most of the west coast capacity that was acquired by AA and US – and partially by DL). OPEC will continue to push oil prices up as high as they can w/o crashing the global economy; unless the US can significantly increase domestic capacity to offset those cuts – and developing countries like India and China quit growing – then the price will continue to rise and w/ it airline demand will shrink – and consolidation will continue.
.
Comm,
Your enthusiasm and support for AA is commendable but your positions are based more on emotions (like hope) than facts (which are historical and defensible).
Airlines don’t come out of BK w/ a great cost structure. C11 provides the opportunity to reset costs but most of the benefits don’t happen until the airline starts regrowing post BK.
1. Pension costs are reduced only during BK since companies don’t fund retirement while replacing the DB plans w/ DC plans. Dumping pension plans is a balance sheet item and really doesn’t reduce costs to a great degree – other than long term cash outlays to catch up pension underfunding.
2. Productivity improvements are designed to properly resize the airline to its employee structure. Thus, AA can either cut much deeper now to get productivity in line with the current size or cut less and then grow into their size… that is the approach they took in 2003 but then never grew into their new size – thus AA was overstaffed for much of the past 10 years.
3. Benefit costs like medical will drop straight to the bottom line but in the scope of things are not going to make or break the company.
4. Outsourcing will save costs esp. in the longer term but the cost of transitioning to outsourcing is expensive and has been shown that it doesn’t necessarily deliver the size of cost cuts that many thought.
5. All of the talk about how the new aircraft will save so much belies the fact that those are expensive costs… they are replacing fuel and maintenance costs with the cost of borrowing money…. Further, other carriers ARE doing fleet replacement, just at a slower rate – and other carriers are getting deals just as good as AA, as much as some AA fans want to think otherwise.
.
And then we get to revenue. BK doesn’t fix revenue problems which have plagued AA for years, including with competitive growth and pressure in key AA markets.
1. DO you realize that on EVERY Asia route on which UA OR DL competes with AA (and the majority of AA’s Transpac system is competitive with UA, not DL), DL or UA outperforms AA in revenue generation? UA outgenerates AA in revenue on every one of their ORD-Asia nonstops. AA and DL both have to deal with poor slots to/from PEK but DL still generates better revenues from DTW to PEK and SEA than AA does from ORD. LAX-PVG was supposed to be AA’s way of finding a new place for AA to grow its Pacific network – and you know that UA stepped right on top of AA’s flight – and UA outperforms in revenue. AA’s decision to end JFK-NRT is not surprising since I’ve said that since DL restarted JFK-NRT, it outperformed AA by a very healthy margin. Having your own hub on both ends of the route apparently is far more powerful than sharing revenue with a partner on one end.
2. To/from LHR, DL and UA now obtain revenues to/from LHR as good as or better than AA in AA’s largest TATL market. Despite predictions to the contrary, DL’s MIA and BOS-LHR flights are generating comparable revenues and aren’t going anywhere.
3. Domestically, carriers of all kinds are moving into AA’s key markets including B6, DL, and VX from ORD, MIA and DFW – and they are all generating very sustainable revenues. And already in 2012 we see DFW-BOS, DFW-LGA and MIA-LGA on the horizon for competitive growth – all key markets.
4. And then we have NYC, where the slot swap dramatically changes the game for AA, an airline that was once headquartered in NYC and has long had an advantage in obtaining corporate revenues. DL is already on par with CO in NYC revenue even before the slot swap is implemented. AA – and most other carriers – have no unique routes from LGA that DL has said they will fly, except for one. YYZ. You know the story. DL partner to be Westjet outbid WN, will feed DL’s new flights at LGA, and will force prices down in the NYC-Toronto market – to the peril of both AA, AC, and UA. AA, not surprisingly is the weakest player. DL just sits back, watches it all play out, and makes money off of the slot divestitures (or the DCA half of it anyway) and the revenue they pick out while watching their partner (also shared with AA) beat the competition up.
I’m sure since I’m biased, I’ve got some of these facts wrong and missed other successes.
.
The exclusivity of AA’s network – its revenue advantages – is slowly being chipped away and will continue to occur.
.
All the promises of what AA will become after BK are tempered by the fact that AA has a very long way to go before emerging from BK, let alone growing and competing anew. Throw in a merger with US and the process of competing against stronger, more nimble competitors is even further off.
In the meantime, DL and UA will continue to pursue their strategic objectives, of which AA meets two of DL’s – an increased presence at LHR and in Latin America.
UA probably will decide before too long they don’t really need US – or that the benefits aren’t really as great as the extra capacity US keeps in the industry along with its low fare pricing strategies (remember US has a revenue disadvantage to the industry and they don’t mind telling you that).
.
I don’t know how this will all turn out but the notion that AA will waltz through BK and come up happy and cleaned up and ready to compete with other airlines which are already giving AA a great deal of heartburn and aren’t going to sit by for 3 years while and AA and US orchestrate AA’s restructuring and an AA/US merger are just way outside the scope of reality.
.
Yes, DL wants to do all it can to limit AA’s success in BK – competitors take advantage of opportunities to grow.
.
Whether DL or UA decide they want to further consolidate the industry and do what they have to do make it palatable to Washington remains to be seen….but I am certain they will not sit idly by and instead will seize their own opportunities which will come at AA and US’ expense.
And as a US based AIRLINE, DL and UA have advantages in this contest that neither BA or TPG can match.
If AA and US individually or collectively can overcome all of that, then, yeah, maybe they can pull off a merger.
WT, a couple of things to think about.
AA. = SOUTH AMERICA
AA = JFK/LAX
AA = (Best buddy) British Airways
Fuel going up-up+up !
DL and UA getting "fatter" by the day in all area's that requires use of said fuel.
Huge employee overhead(s), but AA to shrink in that area.
Ask yourself this. DID AA purposely allow the airline to go into BK, with a looong range plan in mind ?
I'm beginning to think they did.
AA. = SOUTH AMERICA
AA = JFK/LAX
AA = (Best buddy) British Airways
Fuel going up-up+up !
DL and UA getting "fatter" by the day in all area's that requires use of said fuel.
Huge employee overhead(s), but AA to shrink in that area.
Ask yourself this. DID AA purposely allow the airline to go into BK, with a looong range plan in mind ?
I'm beginning to think they did.
Yes they did this is a offensive BK not Defensive just wait and see!
signals
Veteran
Deltanomics at it's finest. WT is right 90% of the time :mellow:
The 10% is Southwest. Guess who WNs?
" 10-4 " pitbull ! !
