Jim,
thanks for your response. I enjoy good dialogue on the issues.
Hiring an advisor does not mean that DL believed then or now that they could acquire AA as a whole.
Google supports searches of specific websites. I'm still trying to understand the positions on which you think I have moved.
State those as a starting point... specific to AA's future, I have consistently said and still believe
1. That a standalone AA emergence is the most likely outcome of AMR's C11 - and BK laws are built around that intended outcome.
2. An AMR standalone plan would have to demonstrate that it provides the best level of return for the creditors - which is a hard, monetary number. There are other factors that might be reduced to a number - but which are more subjective - such as the perceived value of the AA name etc.
3. If AMR - mgmt or the creditors - consider a merger, they will have to evaluate the best alternatives - and it might involve an aquistion resulting in a greater value for those parties than an AA standalone plan or other plans, including the heavily talked about US acquisition.
4. DL has stated it is interested in acquiring key assets. By sheer virtue of DL's size and financial strength - and the fact that DL is not interested in acquiring the whole company, they probably could outbid other potential acquirers including US. BA is not really going to matter in a competitive bidding situation because they are subject to ownership limits. Non-US airline investors can contribute little to addresing some of the structural issues that face the US airline industry, including being able to reduce overlapping capacity.
5. There are antitrust issues involved in many of the possible merger scenarios. DL's interest in DFW and MIA alone largely avoids those. US and B6 have potential antitrust issues involving DCA and JFK.
6. If AA labor refuses to accept AMR's proposals and engages in actions to slow down or damage the company, the chances the company will move to a merger or asset acqusition greatly increase.
7. There is no requirement that the creditors would favor a sale of AA in its entirety if it results in a smaller recovery for the creditors or reduced benefits to other parties.
8. DL pilots have the highest hourly rates among US network carriers - which most certainly is attractive to AA pilots who are the most resistant to AA's contract offers.
9. DL like any other company will move to protect its strategic interests. DL has strategic reason to want to strengthen its position in Latin America, along the southern tier of the US, and to/from LHR. DL, like any other company, will also work to prevent its competitors from gaining a competitive advantage. That is not personal - it is business and what any other well-run company would do.
As I have stated, the airline industry is highly fragmented so it is far from known what the limit the DOJ would allow. AA-US would be larger than DL or UA based on their current networks. Based on passengers boarded, AA-US would also surpass WN which right now has similar share to DL and UA. Should we argue that the combined size of AA+US at 31% is too large? If AA plus DFW/MIA from AA is too large at 33% of the US market, how can anyone argue that 31% is not a problem for US, esp. since there are actually more regional concentrations resulting from AA/US (size in the southwest US and in certain East coast markets) than in DL plus DFW/MIA from AA which adds assets where DL is weak - currently number 3 carrier or smaller? Based on DOT data, AA's DFW/MIA operations amount to about half of the company WRT to passenger boardings.
If 43% is close enough to 50%, then we'll consider any other fact you state with a similar 15% SWAG..... which coincidentally would put DL's proposed jet fuel output for the refinery in line with current averages for jet fuel production at other refineries in the US.