enilria said:
1) If it weren't for their very favorable fuel hedge, Southwest would lose more than $200m in 2004. According to Southwest's 10-Q, Southwest has gained $937 million from its fuel hedges currently in place. Fuel is effectively capped at oil prices of $24 per barrel, which is 1/2 of recent prices. The hedges will expire in 36 months.
SOUTHWEST ON A FAIR FUEL BASIS IS QUITE UNPROFITABLE
It may feel nice to say this to yourself, but it's basically untrue. The "$937 million" you quote shows up as an asset in the balance sheet but it doesn't apply to the company's earnings. If you read through the 10-Q, you see that the company's gains from hedging were $131 million before taxes and profit sharing. Considering that the company had operating income of $191 million for the quarter,
they still would have been profitable, even at market prices for jet fuel.
Southwest's hedges do expire over the next 36 months, but it's anyone's guess as to where fuel prices will be and where fares will be. No one else has hedges out that far, so everyone will be in the same boat as far as fuel goes. But then again, there's likely to be a bit of a shake-out in terms of industry capacity by then.
Southwest's fuel costs were roughly 10% lower than jetBlue's for the last quarter as compared to jetBlue's. And yet, LUV had a 12% operating margin ($191 million on $1674 operating revenue) while jetBlue's was around 7%. JetBlue is fairly well-hedged and yet they predict a loss for the upcoming quarter. Southwest, in contrast, is not predicting a loss.
2) Southwest's pilot wages will be the highest in the industry after NW and DL complete their cuts. Even worse, Southwest's wages continue to rise quickly and there is absolutely no sense of urgency being communicated that they are moving in the opposite direction from everybody else.
SOUTHWEST WAGES ARE VERY HIGH AND HEADED HIGHER
Again this sounds appealing but their pilots really aren't grossly out of line compared to Delta or Continental, especially when you look at the middle of the pay scales. And the one thing you leave out is that WN's pilots, along with the other work groups, are more productive than the competition. Same with the flight attendants -- they're going to be at or near the top of the industry in exchange for productivity at or near the top of the industry.
3) Southwest is abandoning much of their original strategy.
a) They are cutting frequency in short routes where they have had the greatest cost advantage and expanding in long routes.
B) They are moving away from value pricing in monopoly Texas markets where they are now quite expensive. Soon this will spread to California.
c) They are now more motivated by fear of LCCs than anything else. They are expanding in MDW to compete with Air Tran. They expanded in PHL to head off JetBlue. They are now in favor of repealing the Wright amendment to head off Air Tran growing at DFW. The trouble with this is #2 above...labor costs. Air Tran, JetBlue and the other LCCs are now much lower cost than Southwest.
THROWING AWAY STRATEGY THAT WORKED FOR YEARS
a. Cutting frequency on some short-haul routes has been a response to the realities of post-9/11 travel along with an adjustment due to fewer 122-seat aircraft being in the fleet. When security hassles now add an extra hour to travel, fewer people want to fly short-haul routes. Not to mention that ever-increasing government fees are disproportionately burdensome to short-haul travel. Note that this is a problem for US as well given their historical dependence on short-haul travel in the East.
b. Actually, the pricing in the "monopoly" Texas and California markets isn't all that different from where it was ten years ago. The last time I bought a HOU-DAL walk-up fare was in 1991 and it was $79. Now it's $94; I don't consider a 20% increase over 13 years to be grossly out-of-line. Compare that to US Airways on a GoFares route like DCA-BUF, where the lowest walk-up fare is $169 each way or DCA-PIT where the walk-up fare is nearly $450 each way! And, in any case, Southwest doesn't have a monopoly in its Texas markets; they compete with CO in Houston and AA in Dallas/Fort Worth.
c. I guess the situation in MDW depends on your viewpoint. It is very much in WN's best interest to make MDW unattractive to AirTran since ATA is going to have to dump its Midway operation either way. After all, the people currently flying on ATA are going to be flying anyway, and I'm sure Southwest would like to pick up as much of that traffic as they can handle profitably. I suppose it wouldn't be "desperation" for Southwest to just give those markets away?
PHL was an underserved market dominated by a "financially-troubled," high-cost, high-fare network carrier. From all reports, the response to WN at PHL has been phenomenal. I mean, where else would you have them go? ABE would have been more in line with their strategy in the past, but if you're WN management and you think US will be gone within five years, it makes sense to take the "crown jewel" of the US Airways system. Moreover, possible service to PHL, BWI, MCO, and MDW makes just about every East Coast city over 500,000 workable for WN.
Repeal of the Wright Amendment doesn't keep AirTran from expanding at DFW. If they were worried about AirTran building up DFW, they would have taken the gates Delta is giving up. Repealing the Wright Amendment, though, would open up a slew of high-fare routes from DAL. DFW-MCI fares are 50% higher than DFW/DAL-HRL for the exact same 461-mile distance. DFW/DAL-ELP averages $113 each way; compare that to $167 for DFW-MCI or $253 for DFW-OMA. DFW-BNA is twice as expensive as DAL/DFW-ABQ even though it's only 10% farther. Shoot, if the Wright Amendment were repealed, don't you think that would open up DAL to other airlines, too?
4) BTW, does anyone consider it interesting that after years of trying to beat Alaska Airlines (not exactly the lowest cost airline), it appears to most people that Southwest has lost that battle. No more expansion out there in the PacNW, while Alaska reports big profits without a giant fuel hedge. Oh, and finally, Spokane and Boise are in the bottom five in load factor among Southwest stations according to AvDaily (below 60%).
THEY CAN BE BEATEN
Where else should they fly in the Pacific NW? Missoula? Walla Walla? Pocatello? Eugene? Kalispell? Pasco? Medford? They serve pretty much every city of significant size out there that can support more than 3 or 4 737's per day. Alaska Airlines (mainline, not Horizon) doesn't serve any more cities in the Pacific NW than WN. And, moreover, Alaska's expansion over the past five years has largely been on flying to/from Mexico or long-hauls to the East Coast that do not compete with WN.
Alaska (like Continental) is a good example of coexisting with Southwest and being profitable on routes that don't compete with them. You can bet that one of the biggest profit drivers at AS is the SEA-ANC route that they dominate and charge high fares on.
I think the fact that Southwest is toying with eliminating open seating is indicative of just how unsettled the whole airline is and shows the desperation level when one looks toward the future. The massive number of planes Southwest plans to take next year (50+) may well be the straw that breaks the camel's back.
If Alaska can beat them, can't Air Tran, JetBlue, maybe even US Airways? Food for thought.
Well, I guess you'd argue that getting rid of the plastic boarding passes and adding leather seating, gate readers, long-haul flights, service to a congested city like PHL, changing the livery, fuel hedging, winglets, kiosks, internet reservations, online checkin, etc. were all signs of desperation for WN at one point or another. They must be desperate because they're retiring old 737-200 aircraft, too, right? They must have been desperate when they added a frequent flyer program, too! Or, you could take the simpler view that almost every business evolves over time, and that successful enterprises are willing to make changes to their product in response to customer demand or external factors.
Southwest has said in the past that they were looking at operating regional jets, but there still aren't any orders to Bombardier or Embraer. They've said they're looking at IFE but they don't seem "desperate" to order satellite TV systems. They're going to look at what the customers say they want and are willing to pay for, and then make their decision based on that.
They're not taking "50+" airplanes next year; they're taking 34 which will be a net increase of 29 when taking 5 737-200 retirements into account. The net increase in the fleet is about 7% which doesn't seem "massive" to me. The 50+ number pretty much is only in play if US or UA or some other network carrier liquidates.
In any case, hoping for Southwest to implode isn't going to fix the problems at US Airways or any other network carrier. Trust me, they're not basing their default future plans on anyone going out of business, but you can bet money that they have contingency plans in place for a variety of "market opportunities" thay may arise. Compare that to the "we don't have a Plan B" way that Wolf and Gangwal approached the UAL-U merger.