local 12 proud
Veteran
- Mar 5, 2004
- 4,265
- 4
Letter from the US
Sharon Smith
Shortly before 2pm on 11 May, ValuJet Flight 592 took off from Miami International Airport, heading for Atlanta. Eleven minutes later, with a fire raging on board, the plane nosedived into the Florida Everglades at a speed of 400 miles per hour, killing all 110 people on board.
Government officials rushed to assure the public that ValuJet was a safe airline and that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the government agency in charge of airline safety, had not compromised safety standards.
'ValuJet is a safe airline, as is our entire aviation system,' said Clinton's transportation secretary, Federico Pena. 'Safety is our highest priority,' echoed ValuJet president Lewis Jordan. But in the weeks after the crash a major scandal unfolded, showing that corporate greed was responsible for ValuJet's crashÂand that the FAA had been involved in a major cover up. Finally on 18 June the FAA shut ValuJet down indefinately, admitting that it had found 'multiple shortcomings' and 'serious deficiencies' in its safety proceedures.
ValuJet was a disaster waiting to happen. During its three year existence, the airline had built up its fleet from two to 51 planes. Last year it boasted the industry's highest profit margin, with $120 million in cash reserves. The company's secret to sucess was simple: it offered low cost fares to consumersÂadvertising itself as a 'low fare, no frills, fun and friendly' airlineÂby slashing all of its operating costs. ValuJet's fleet consisted of old planes that had been retired by other airlines, averaging 26 years old.
ValuJet also saved millions of dollars by paying low wages to its non-union workforce. Its pilots were paid about half the basic salary of other airlines, and were still required to pay nearly $10,000 for their own training. They were only paid for time spent in the air, which meant that any delays or cancelled flights meant a smaller pay cheque.
To save yet more money on wages, ValuJet contracted out work whenever possible. It hired temporary workers to perform most clerical tasks. It also used a total of six different companies to perform heavy maintenance on its planes, and a dozen more (including other airlines) to perform other maintenance procedures at various airports. So workers attempting to perform safety maintenance checks were often unfamiliar with its planes. In many cases they were forced to fix ValuJet planes with manuals for different aircraft! As columnist Roger Simon wrote, 'Funny thing, though, I never saw any of these facts in ValuJet's ads. I never saw slogans like "Our mechanics are temps! Doesn't that make you feel good?"'
It was only a matter of time before its chaotic maintenance practices and poor training would bring on catastrophe. In fact, ValuJet's accident and less serious 'incident' rateÂwhich included planes skidding off runways and a fire on boardÂwas four times higher than that of major airlines. In the case of Flight 592, 16 outdated oxygen canisters were loaded onto the plane after they had been mislabelled as 'empty'. Most experts now agree that, after the plane's electrical system failed, the canisters ignited a fire which caused an explosion.
ValuJet president Lewis Jordan claimed there was nothing 'abnormal or shocking' about the plane which crashed. And it passed an FAA inspection just a week earlier. Yet the 27 year old jet had been forced to return to airports seven times in the past two years because of safety problems. Passengers who had flown on the jet earlier that day reported that, as the plane began its descent, the cabin lights went dark and the public address system failed. 'They had to use a bullhorn to tell people to put their seatbelts back on,' one passenger stated.
Not long after the crash of Flight 592, evidence began to mount that high ranking government officials had been aware for months that ValuJet wasn't safe, yet prevented any attempt to take action. After a fire broke out on a ValuJet plane last year, the FAA 'uncovered widespread maintenance deficiencies, planes flying with malfunctioning mandatory equipment and other safety problems.' The Department of Transportation inspector general, Mary Facler Schiavo, wrote shortly after the crash that she had never flown on ValuJet 'because of its many mishaps.'
FAA inspectors were ordered to 'go soft' on ValuJet, and falsified reports to hide its safety problems. Since the crash, Business Week reported that the FAA has also covered up the widespread use of counterfeit and substandard parts throughout the airline industry. And FAA officials threatened to fire or demote any staff members who publicly state that counterfeit parts are a threat to safety. 'If they acknowledge the problem now, they'd have to admit they haven't been doing their job for years and that the airlines aren't safe,' said a long standing FAA flight inspector who spoke on the condition of anonymity.
Ostensibly, the FAA's primary function is to oversee aeroplane safety. But that role has changed considerably over the last 15 years, after the government deregulated the airline industry. When President Jimmy Carter signed the airline deregulation bill in 1978, he said, 'It will also mean less government interference in the regulation of an increasingly prosperous industry.' He meant prosperity for the fewÂat the expense of workers' wages and organisation. By 1990 more than 50,000 airline employees had lost their jobs because of airlines merging, downsizing or going out of business.
With a minimum of government safety and enviromental regulations, new companies like ValuJet could achieve overnight profitability by sacrificing safety standards. The FAA consciously promotes low wage, non-union airlines like ValuJet, while discouraging safety procedures which might be a financial burden.
For example, in 1993 the FAA decided it would be too costly and would not 'provide a significant degree of protection' to require airlines to put fire detection systems and automatic extinguishers in cargo bays beneath passenger cabins. Such a system might have saved the lives of 110 people aboard Flight 592.
But such changes are too low in the priorities of a system which puts the relentless pursuit of profits above all elseÂincluding human lives.
Sharon Smith
Shortly before 2pm on 11 May, ValuJet Flight 592 took off from Miami International Airport, heading for Atlanta. Eleven minutes later, with a fire raging on board, the plane nosedived into the Florida Everglades at a speed of 400 miles per hour, killing all 110 people on board.
Government officials rushed to assure the public that ValuJet was a safe airline and that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the government agency in charge of airline safety, had not compromised safety standards.
'ValuJet is a safe airline, as is our entire aviation system,' said Clinton's transportation secretary, Federico Pena. 'Safety is our highest priority,' echoed ValuJet president Lewis Jordan. But in the weeks after the crash a major scandal unfolded, showing that corporate greed was responsible for ValuJet's crashÂand that the FAA had been involved in a major cover up. Finally on 18 June the FAA shut ValuJet down indefinately, admitting that it had found 'multiple shortcomings' and 'serious deficiencies' in its safety proceedures.
ValuJet was a disaster waiting to happen. During its three year existence, the airline had built up its fleet from two to 51 planes. Last year it boasted the industry's highest profit margin, with $120 million in cash reserves. The company's secret to sucess was simple: it offered low cost fares to consumersÂadvertising itself as a 'low fare, no frills, fun and friendly' airlineÂby slashing all of its operating costs. ValuJet's fleet consisted of old planes that had been retired by other airlines, averaging 26 years old.
ValuJet also saved millions of dollars by paying low wages to its non-union workforce. Its pilots were paid about half the basic salary of other airlines, and were still required to pay nearly $10,000 for their own training. They were only paid for time spent in the air, which meant that any delays or cancelled flights meant a smaller pay cheque.
To save yet more money on wages, ValuJet contracted out work whenever possible. It hired temporary workers to perform most clerical tasks. It also used a total of six different companies to perform heavy maintenance on its planes, and a dozen more (including other airlines) to perform other maintenance procedures at various airports. So workers attempting to perform safety maintenance checks were often unfamiliar with its planes. In many cases they were forced to fix ValuJet planes with manuals for different aircraft! As columnist Roger Simon wrote, 'Funny thing, though, I never saw any of these facts in ValuJet's ads. I never saw slogans like "Our mechanics are temps! Doesn't that make you feel good?"'
It was only a matter of time before its chaotic maintenance practices and poor training would bring on catastrophe. In fact, ValuJet's accident and less serious 'incident' rateÂwhich included planes skidding off runways and a fire on boardÂwas four times higher than that of major airlines. In the case of Flight 592, 16 outdated oxygen canisters were loaded onto the plane after they had been mislabelled as 'empty'. Most experts now agree that, after the plane's electrical system failed, the canisters ignited a fire which caused an explosion.
ValuJet president Lewis Jordan claimed there was nothing 'abnormal or shocking' about the plane which crashed. And it passed an FAA inspection just a week earlier. Yet the 27 year old jet had been forced to return to airports seven times in the past two years because of safety problems. Passengers who had flown on the jet earlier that day reported that, as the plane began its descent, the cabin lights went dark and the public address system failed. 'They had to use a bullhorn to tell people to put their seatbelts back on,' one passenger stated.
Not long after the crash of Flight 592, evidence began to mount that high ranking government officials had been aware for months that ValuJet wasn't safe, yet prevented any attempt to take action. After a fire broke out on a ValuJet plane last year, the FAA 'uncovered widespread maintenance deficiencies, planes flying with malfunctioning mandatory equipment and other safety problems.' The Department of Transportation inspector general, Mary Facler Schiavo, wrote shortly after the crash that she had never flown on ValuJet 'because of its many mishaps.'
FAA inspectors were ordered to 'go soft' on ValuJet, and falsified reports to hide its safety problems. Since the crash, Business Week reported that the FAA has also covered up the widespread use of counterfeit and substandard parts throughout the airline industry. And FAA officials threatened to fire or demote any staff members who publicly state that counterfeit parts are a threat to safety. 'If they acknowledge the problem now, they'd have to admit they haven't been doing their job for years and that the airlines aren't safe,' said a long standing FAA flight inspector who spoke on the condition of anonymity.
Ostensibly, the FAA's primary function is to oversee aeroplane safety. But that role has changed considerably over the last 15 years, after the government deregulated the airline industry. When President Jimmy Carter signed the airline deregulation bill in 1978, he said, 'It will also mean less government interference in the regulation of an increasingly prosperous industry.' He meant prosperity for the fewÂat the expense of workers' wages and organisation. By 1990 more than 50,000 airline employees had lost their jobs because of airlines merging, downsizing or going out of business.
With a minimum of government safety and enviromental regulations, new companies like ValuJet could achieve overnight profitability by sacrificing safety standards. The FAA consciously promotes low wage, non-union airlines like ValuJet, while discouraging safety procedures which might be a financial burden.
For example, in 1993 the FAA decided it would be too costly and would not 'provide a significant degree of protection' to require airlines to put fire detection systems and automatic extinguishers in cargo bays beneath passenger cabins. Such a system might have saved the lives of 110 people aboard Flight 592.
But such changes are too low in the priorities of a system which puts the relentless pursuit of profits above all elseÂincluding human lives.
